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Abstract
Over the years, Software Engineering, as a discipline, has recognized the potential for
engineers to make mistakes and has incorporated processes to prevent such mistakes from
becoming exploitable vulnerabilities. These processes span the spectrum from using unit/in-
tegration/fuzz testing, static/dynamic/hybrid analysis, and (automatic) patching to discover
instances of vulnerabilities to leveraging data mining and machine learning to collect met-
rics that characterize attributes indicative of vulnerabilities. Among these processes, metrics
have the potential to uncover systemic problems in the product, process, or people that could
lead to vulnerabilities being introduced, rather than identifying specific instances of vulnera-
bilities. The insights from metrics can be used to support developers and managers in making
decisions to improve the product, process, and/or people with the goal of engineering secure
software.
Despite empirical evidence of metrics’ association with historical software vulnerabilities,
their adoption in the software development industry has been limited. The level of granularity
at which the metrics are defined, the high false positive rate from models that use the metrics
as explanatory variables, and, more importantly, the difficulty in deriving actionable intelli-
gence from the metrics are often cited as factors that inhibit metrics’ adoption in practice.
Our research vision is to assist software engineers in building secure software by providing a
technique that generates scientific, interpretable, and actionable feedback on security as the
software evolves. In this dissertation, we present our approach toward achieving this vision
through (1) systematization of vulnerability discovery metrics literature, (2) unsupervised
generation of metrics-informed security feedback, and (3) continuous developer-in-the-loop
improvement of the feedback.
We systematically reviewed the literature to enumerate metrics that have been proposed
and/or evaluated to be indicative of vulnerabilities in software and to identify the validation
criteria used to assess the decision-informing ability of these metrics. In addition to enumer-
ating the metrics, we implemented a subset of these metrics as containerized microservices.
We collected the metric values from six large open-source projects and assessed metrics’
generalizability across projects, application domains, and programming languages. We then
used an unsupervised approach from literature to compute threshold values for each metric
and assessed the thresholds’ ability to classify risk from historical vulnerabilities. We used
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the metrics’ values, thresholds, and interpretation to provide developers natural language
feedback on security as they contributed changes and used a survey to assess their perception
of the feedback. We initiated an open dialogue to gain an insight into their expectations from
such feedback. In response to developer comments, we assessed the effectiveness of an ex-
isting vulnerability discovery approach—static analysis—and that of vulnerability discovery
metrics in identifying risk from vulnerability contributing commits.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As more aspects of our daily lives depend on technology, the software that supports this
technology must be secure. We, as users, automatically assume the software we use to
always be available to serve our requests while preserving the confidentiality and integrity
of our information. Unfortunately, incidents involving catastrophic software vulnerabilities
such as Heartbleed (in OpenSSL), Stagefright (in Android), and EternalBlue (in Windows)
have made abundantly clear that software systems, like all other engineered creations, are
prone to mistakes.
Over the years, Software Engineering, as a discipline, has recognized the potential for
engineers to make mistakes and has incorporated processes to prevent such mistakes from
becoming exploitable vulnerabilities. The Trustworthy Computing Memo by Bill Gates [35] is
an instance of a software development organization highlighting the importance of security in
the products they engineer. The memo led to the creation of Security Development Lifecycle
(SDL) [46] which emphasized the need to prioritize security during the entire development
lifecycle of software. More importantly, the SDL encouraged software engineers to have
a conversation about software security. For instance, threat modeling—a design activity
prescribed in the SDL—prompts software engineers to have a conversation about securing
assets (such as processes, and data stores), that the software being designed will likely have
access to, against potential threats from attackers. In addition to improving the overall
quality and reliability of software, conversation about security helps software engineers to
develop an attacker mindset, which, as researchers [117, 44, 75] have argued, is an essential
skill.
The demand for vulnerability exploits, and the existence of a business model to support
their trade [11, 78], provides monetary benefits for the attackers to invest considerable effort
to uncover exploitable vulnerabilities in software. In the current situation where developers
and attackers are engaged in a seemingly never-ending battle, the attackers seem to be the
innovators. We, as software engineering researchers, must arm developers with the necessary
arsenal to engineer software that is potentially impregnable by such malicious attackers.
In an effort to provide software engineers with the means of discovering potential security
vulnerabilities, researchers have proposed a plethora of metrics defined on product, process,
and people. Despite the metrics being shown to be effective at assisting in the discovery
of historical vulnerabilities, their adoption in the software development industry has been
1
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limited. The high false positive rate from models that use the metrics as explanatory variables
[91] and difficulty in deriving actionable intelligence from the metrics [32] are often cited as
the factors inhibiting metrics’ adoption. While the apprehension on part of the software
development industry is justified, the utility of the metrics as a promoter of conversation
about security is worth exploring.
The art of engineering software is inherently collaborative [152]; as stakeholders with
diverse skill sets come together to specify, manage, develop, test, and release software, con-
versations within a team of software engineers play a crucial role in facilitating the progress
of a software project. In the development phase of a project, however, software engineers
rely on feedback from tools such as integrated development environments that aggregate
errors and warnings from compiling, building, testing, and/or statically analyzing the source
code. While feedback conveyed by these tools is useful, developers have difficulty interpret-
ing the feedback as Johnson et al. found in their study of static analysis tools [52]. We argue
that feedback about security requires an attacker mindset to exhaustively evaluate and that
such feedback is most effective if it prompts a conversation about security. In effect, we are
proposing the extension of the popular anecdote dubbed Linus’ Law stated by Eric Raymond
as “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” [121] to feedback on security.
In a tool-assisted approach to software development today, there are several opportunities
for providing feedback in a way that it prompts a conversation. Such opportunities are
appropriate for providing feedback on security as a conversation about security is essential to
inculcate an attacker-defender culture among software engineers. The process of code review
is a prime example of an opportunity for providing feedback on security as code reviews are
intended to uncover quality concerns through collaboration. Furthermore, many developers
perceive code reviews to aid in knowledge transfer and increasing team awareness [70], which
is an added benefit. We can leverage security vulnerability discovery metrics proposed in
research literature to provide automatically generated feedback on security during processes
such as reviewing code or triaging issues to highlight the security vulnerability potential.
Our research vision is to assist software engineers in building secure software by providing
a technique that generates scientific, interpretable, and actionable feedback on security as the
software evolves. In accomplishing the research vision, we hope to influence the discipline of
software engineering through:
• the systematization of metrics that are known to be effective in assisting software
engineers to discover vulnerabilities,
• the development of a usable approach to provide security feedback to software engi-
neers, and
• the reference implementation of a platform that leverages the vulnerability discov-
ery metrics to provide software engineers with automatically generated feedback on
security.
In demonstrating the utility of the metrics as agents of feedback on security, we will be
one step closer to bringing the vulnerability discovery knowledge from research literature
into mainstream software engineering.
1.1 Overview
In this section, we provide a narrative overview of chapters that compose the dissertation.
We, however, begin the narration by discussing Chapter 4 which was the catalyst that
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prompted us to define our research vision. In Chapter 4, we propose fine-grained vulner-
ability discovery metrics and describe the (conventional) approach to reasoning about the
utility of these metrics in discovering vulnerabilities. We show that the metrics are statisti-
cally significantly associated with historical vulnerabilities in two large open-source projects
and that the prediction model built using the metrics as features considerably outperforms
existing vulnerability prediction models. While the prediction model evaluated seems util-
itarian relative to existing models, the absolute performance of the model leaves a lot to
be desired. Once the study described in Chapter 4 was published [100], we asked of the
metrics—Do the metrics, that we argue as being predictive of vulnerabilities, actually help
developers discover vulnerabilities?—and this question became the catalyst that prompted
us to define our research vision.
The central position of this dissertation is that vulnerability discovery metrics have the
potential to assist developers in engineering securing software and that this potential goes
beyond the mere performance of a prediction model that uses the metrics as features. The
overall approach (depicted in Figure 1.1) to systematically achieve the research vision in-
volves three steps: (1) systematization of vulnerability discovery knowledge, (2) unsupervised



















Figure 1.1: Pictorial representation of the approach to systematically achieve the
research vision
The first step, described in Chapter 5, is to enumerate the vulnerability discovery metrics
in the literature through a systematic literature review. We addressed the research questions
that follow in the systematic literature review.
RQ 1 - Enumeration
What metrics have been proposed to discover security vulnerabilities in software?
RQ 2 - Validation
How have researchers evaluated the decision-informing ability of the metrics to discover
security vulnerabilities in software?
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While systematization of the vulnerability discovery metrics from the literature is nec-
essary, implementing the metrics is an essential prerequisite to the subsequent steps of our
approach. We decided to use an unconventional approach to implementing the metrics and
this decision was guided by one, and only one, goal: convenience. We chose to implement
the metrics as containerized microservices allowing researchers and practitioners to collect
metrics from any project with minimal effort. We hope the convenience lowers the barrier to
entry to the use of metrics so much so that researchers are encouraged to consider replicating
the metrics and practitioners are encouraged to use the metrics in practice. In addition to
the aforementioned research questions, we also addressed secondary research questions that
follow as part of the literature review.
RQ 3 - Generalizability
Are vulnerability discovery metrics similarly distributed across projects?
RQ 4 - Thresholds
Are thresholds of vulnerability discovery metrics effective at classifying risk from vul-
nerabilities?
The second step, described in Chapter 6, is to use the metrics in the context of a model
to derive vulnerability discovery insights. The insights gained from the model are used to
generate feedback using natural language generation techniques. The automatically gener-
ated feedback is communicated to the developer in a context (e.g. code review) where it
is likely to prompt a conversation about security. We address the research questions that
follow to evaluate the feedback provided to developers.
RQ 5 - Feedback
How is feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery metrics perceived
by developers?
RQ 6 - Expectations
What are developers’ expectations from vulnerability discovery metrics?
RQ 7 - Effectiveness
How effective are existing vulnerability discovery approaches?
RQ 8 - Utility
Is there a utility for vulnerability discovery metrics?
The third step, involving the continuous developer-in-the-loop feedback on our approach,
is used to inform the first and second steps as necessary. As a result, there is no separate
chapter dedicated to the third step in our approach. In fact, research questions RQ 6, RQ 7,
and RQ 8 were formulated as a result of the developer-in-the-loop feedback that prompted
us to adapt our approach while also addressing certain fundamental research questions.
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1.2 Contributions
In this section, we enumerate our tangible contributions to the community (via data sets,
tools, and services) and knowledge (via publications). While some of the contributions
are directly related our research vision, others are from complementary research projects
conducted during the program. The contributions enumerated here is a subset so chosen to
highlight those that have had notable impact in community and/or knowledge.
1.2.1 Data Sets, Tools, and Services
We published several data sets, tools, and services as part of multiple research projects. The
enumeration of contributions follows with those not related to the domain of security high-
lighted with a super-scripted asterisk (Non-security contribution*). All projects contribute
to the research in and/or the practice of Software Engineering.
1. Samaritan Metric Services - The Samaritan metric services, designed and developed
as part of the work described in this dissertation, are a key contribution to the com-
munity. The services are implementations of the vulnerability discovery metrics being
released to encourage researchers to replicate and practitioners to use. The specifics
of the services are described in Appendix A.
2. Samaritan Website - The Samaritan website, available at https://samaritan.
github.io/, complements the Samaritan metric services by being a source of in-
formation about the metrics. Each metric has its own page on the website providing
information such as the definition, the academic publications that have validated the
metric, the consensus within the community about the metrics’ relationship with vul-
nerabilities, the distribution of the metric in example open-source projects, and the
thresholds values that delineates the risk levels computed in an unsupervised way.
We hope the website makes vulnerability discovery metric knowledge accessible thus
bridging the gap between research and practice.
3. Samaritan archeogit - archeogit in an open-source utility, available on GitHub
at https://github.com/samaritan/archeogit/, developed to excavate information
from git repositories. The archeogit blame command implements a heuristic-based
algorithm (similar to the one used by Meneely et al. [85] and Perl et al. [115]) to iden-
tify commit(s) that likely contributed the bug which was later fixed. As we describe
in Chapter 6, archeogit blame was essential to identifying vulnerability contributing
commits. The utility is also being used by students in the Engineering Secure Software
(SWEN-331) course to support the data curation for the Vulnerability History Project
(https://vulnerabilityhistory.org/).
4. Attack Surface Meter - The Attack Surface Meter, available at https://pypi.org/
project/attacksurfacemeter/, is a tool developed to collect fine-grained attack sur-
face metrics from a C/C++ project. The tool was developed to support the research
project described in Chapter 4 and has been cited to have been used in replication
studies (see study by Theisen [146]).
5. GHTorrent reaper - The GHTorrent reaper is an open-source utility, available at
https://github.com/reporeapers/reaper/, designed and developed to collect met-
rics from repositories hosted by GitHub. The utility, designed to be scalable, was used
to analyze 1.8 million repositories from GitHub in less than three calendar months’
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time. The metrics collected from the analyzed repositories was used to identify those
repositories that likely contained engineered software projects. The supporting web-
site https://reporeapers.github.io/ disseminates the data set for researchers to
use in their search for GitHub repositories to study. As on April 2020, reaper has 66
stargazers on GitHub. Furthermore, reaper and the data set curated using reaper
are featured on awesome-msr (https://github.com/dspinellis/awesome-msr), a cu-
rated list of data sets and tools in Empirical Software Engineering.
1.2.2 Publications
We have published eight notable papers as part of multiple research projects conducted
during the program. The enumeration of publications follows with all but one, highlighted
with super-scripted asterisk (Non-security contribution*), contributing to the domain of
software security.
1. Do bugs foreshadow vulnerabilities? An in-depth study of the chromium project in
the Empirical Software Engineering journal [104]
In this study, we investigated the co-location of bugs and vulnerabilities in two large
open-source projects: Chromium and Apache httpd. We evaluated the hypothesis
that files with lots of bugs must be vulnerable. However, we found evidence, consis-
tent across both projects, that bugs and vulnerabilities are likely to be empirically
dissimilar groups. The implication of this study is that vulnerabilities are unlikely to
be discovered using approaches that have been effective in discovering bugs and that
approaches targeted toward vulnerability discovery are necessary. The study lends
credence to the work presented in this dissertation.
2. Beyond the Attack Surface: Assessing Security Risk with Random Walks on Call
Graphs in the Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Software PROtection
(SPRO) [100]
In this study, we proposed and validated two fine-grained metrics to discover vulner-
abilities in software. The study is included as Chapter 4 in this dissertation.
3. Natural Language Insights from Code Reviews that Missed a Vulnerability in the
Proceedings of the 2017 International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software
and Systems (ESSoS) [106]
In this study, we investigated the linguistic characteristics of developer conversations
in code reviews that likely missed a vulnerability. In characterizing messages in a
code review that likely missed a vulnerability, we hoped to provide interventional
feedback to developers if a future code review message exhibited similar characteristics.
We proposed and validated a set of metrics using over 3.9 million messages posted
by Chromium developers and found statistically significant associations between the
metrics and code reviews that likely missed a vulnerability.
4. Vulnerability Severity Scoring and Bounties: Why the Disconnect? in the Proceedings
of the 2016 ACM International Workshop on Software Analytics (SWAN) [101]
In this study, we investigated the economic validity of the standard metric to quantify
vulnerability severity—base score as defined by the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System [80]. We hypothesized that base score, being a measure of vulnerability sever-
ity, must be correlated with the monetary value of the vulnerability. The intuition
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behind the hypothesis is that a severe vulnerability, one that an attacker could exploit
to inflict considerable damage, must have a proportionately higher monetary value.
However, we found that the correlation was negligible-to-weak. We qualitatively ana-
lyzed the criteria used to assign vulnerabilities the base score and that used to assign
the monetary values. We made concrete recommendations based on the limitations
we uncovered in the qualitative analysis.
5. Data-driven Insights from Vulnerability Discovery Metrics in the Proceedings of the
2019 International Workshop on Data-Driven Decisions, Experimentation and Evolu-
tion (DDrEE) [102]
In this study, we implemented and collected ten vulnerability discovery metrics and
assessed their generalizability across projects. We also assessed the ability of metric
thresholds, established using an unsupervised approach, to classify risk from historical
vulnerabilities in Chromium. The study is included as a part of Chapter 5 in this
dissertation.
6. A Domain-Independent Model for Identifying Security Requirements in Proceedings
of the 2017 IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE) [95]
In this study, we proposed and validated a One-Class Support Vector Machine to sift
out security requirements in a corpus of software requirements. The novelty of the
model was in its ability to identify security requirements for projects in a domain-
agnostic way. Our model outperformed an existing model from prior literature which
required domain-specific datasets for training.
7. Characterizing Attacker Behavior in a Cybersecurity Penetration Testing Competi-
tion in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Empirical
Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM) [96]
In this study, we proposed using attacker behavior, characterized from data collected
during a cybersecurity penetration testing competition, to aid the development of
attacker mindset. We systematically identified 44 events that described the attack
campaign of one of the teams participating in the competition. We used the MITRE
ATT&CK™ framework to characterize and disseminate the timeline in a standardized
way.
8. Curating GitHub for Engineered Software Projects in the Empirical Software Engi-
neering journal* [105]
In this study, we proposed an approach to filter repositories from GitHub based on nine
metrics argued to measure essential attributes of an engineered software project: ar-
chitecture, community, continuous integration, documentation, history, issues, license,
size, and unit test. The proposed approach provided researchers in the Mining Soft-
ware Repositories community an alternative to relying on the popularity of repositories
on GitHub as a filtering criteria which implied that popularity correlates with quality.
We analyzed over 1.8 million repositories from GitHub and showed that the proposed
approach considerably outperformed the de facto approach of filtering repositories by
popularity. As on April 2020, the study has 62 citations as reported by Scopus®.
Even though some of the publications are not directly included in the dissertation, they
have indirectly influenced the approach used toward achieving our research vision. For
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instance, the decision to use containerized microservices to implement the metrics was in-
fluenced by the inconvenience experienced by a researcher in using reaper to collect metrics
from a few thousand GitHub repositories.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the key terms related to software anomalies,
software metrics, and software engineering research.
2.1 Software Anomalies
Software anomaly is used to refer to a wide variety of software inconsistencies such as errors,
faults, failures, defects, and bugs [48]. A component is said to have a defect if it does not
meet its requirements or specifications [49, 3.764]. For example, a component responsible
for authentication and authorization in a web application is said to be defective if it does
not invalidate the authentication cookie after users successfully sign out of the application.
An error is the difference between expected and actual outcomes observed during a typical
interaction with software [49, 3.1027]. For example, software is said to have an error when
users see the text “Hello ,” instead of “Hello {last name}, {first name}” where {last name}
and {first name} are the last and first names of the user who successfully signed in to the
application. A software fault is the manifestation of an error in software [49, 3.1122] which,
when encountered, may cause a failure [49, 3.1122]. The term bug is used as a synonym
for fault. For example, a developer missing input validation is an instance of an error. The
missing validation error could lead to multiple faults such as division by zero if unvalidated
input is used as a number in the denominator or type mismatch if unvalidated input is
assigned to a variable of an incompatible type. When one of these faults is executed, users
experience failures. The term defect is also used as a generic term to refer to fault (cause)
or failure (effect) [49, 3.764].
In this research, we will restrict ourselves to a particular kind of software defect, one
that violates an implicit or explicit security policy, called vulnerability. A key difference
between vulnerabilities and other types of software anomalies is the presence of an (active)
adversarial agent. In 1998, Krsul defined software vulnerability as “an instance of an error
in the specification, development, or configuration of software such that its execution can
violate the security policy.” [57]. Ozment modified Krsul’s definition by replacing “error” with
“mistake” to capture the human element and using “implicit or explicit” to qualify “security
policy” [112]. The phrases software vulnerability or security vulnerability are synonymous
9
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with the term vulnerability and we use these three interchangeably. A classic example of a
security vulnerability is the buffer overflow vulnerability [26] which, when exploited by an
adversary, can be used to cause the software to execute malicious code.
2.2 Software Metrics
The ISO/IEC define a (software) metric as “a quantitative measure of the degree to which
a system, component, or process possesses a given attribute” [49, 3.1767]. At a high-level,
software metrics may be categorized into two groups: (1) product metrics, which measure
attributes of the software and (2) process metrics, which measure attributes of the software
development process. The attribute that a metric purports to quantify can either be internal
(e.g. size) or external (e.g. security or diversity) to the product or process.
2.3 Software Engineering Research
In the subsections that follow, we provide a brief overview of key terms used in (empirical)
software engineering research, specifically, on vulnerability discovery.
2.3.1 Software Repositories
Large software projects are typically supported by a plethora of tools that facilitate col-
laboration among software engineers. These tools use databases, commonly referred to as
repositories, to store data. The data used in the empirical study of vulnerabilities are typi-
cally aggregated from one or more such repositories. In a typical software engineering project,
one or more of the following software repositories may be in use:
• Source Code Repository : A source code repository has become a commonplace in
most software engineering projects. Source code repositories enable developers to
simultaneously contribute changes to a project by tracking the history of all files. The
smallest unit of change tracked by a source code repository is called a commit. In
addition to maintaining the contents of the commit, the source code repository also
records metadata about the commit such as an unique identifier, summary of the
change, date and time of the commit, email address of the developer who authored
the change, email address of the developer who committed the change, files modified
by the change, and number of lines added and/or removed by the change. The tool
that facilitates the maintenance of a source code repository is called a version control
system. git1 is a popular version control system that is widely used in the open
source community. GitHub2 is an online hosting service that enables sharing of git
repositories with the wider open source community.
• Issue Tracking Repository : An issue tracking repository is similar to the source code
repository but it facilitates the lifecycle management of issues (bugs). An issue evolves
as developers triaging the issue contribute comments to the conversation. In addition
to the comments, the bug itself may have a variety of metadata associated with it
such as the date and time the issue was opened, a summary of the issue provided
by the user who opened the issue, the type of the issue, the status of the issue and
1 https://git-scm.com/ 2 https://github.com/
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the developer assigned to the issue. Bugzilla3 is a popular open source issue tracking
system that is widely used in the open source community.
• Code Review Repository : A code review is a lightweight, tool-assisted, process used to
improve the overall quality of the software as it evolves. A typical code review involves
a developer (author) submitting changes to a set of files, called a patchset, for review
by other developers (reviewers). The reviewers provide feedback using comments at
the line level, file level, or review level. The author is responsible for addressing the
comments and submitting a revised patchset for review. The reviewers approve the
patchset if it meets their requirements. After a patchset is approved, it is automatically
committed to the source code repository. Gerrit4 is a popular open source code review
system that is widely used in the open source community.
• Vulnerability Repository : A vulnerability repository is an authoritative source for in-
formation on historical vulnerabilities. As of this writing, the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [1] is an example of an exemplary vulnerability repository that con-
tains details of all vulnerabilities that have been disclosed by software vendors.
A software project that uses one or more of these software repositories tend to have
traceability links between entities in different repositories to simplify historical analysis. For
example, a vulnerability in the NVD is likely to have links to a bug in the issue tracking
that may have been internally opened to triage the fix for the vulnerability. The bug in turn
may be associated with one or more code reviews and the code reviews may be linked to
commits in the source code repository.
2.3.2 Vulnerability Discovery
In the empirical study of historical vulnerabilities, an essential step is to identify source code
entities (lines, files, functions, modules, or binaries) that have been fixed for a vulnerability.
Source code entities so identified are labeled as vulnerable and all other entities are labeled
as neutral. In validating the metrics being proposed to discover vulnerabilities, researchers
typically separate source code entities using the label (vulnerable or neutral) and perform
analysis to test if a metric is associated with historically vulnerable source code entities or
if the metric can be used in a machine learning model to identify historically vulnerable
source code entities. Traditionally, machine learning models used in identifying historically
vulnerable source code entities take the form of a binary classifier with the metric being the
independent variable (also known as explanatory variable, feature, or predictor) and label
(vulnerable or neutral) being the dependent variable (also known as the response variable).
3 https://www.bugzilla.org/ 4 https://www.gerritcodereview.com/
Chapter 3
Related Work
The accomplishment of the research vision set forth in this dissertation borrows knowledge
from prior literature in the areas of vulnerability discovery and feedback in software en-
gineering. The two sections that follow include a brief overview of some of the relevant
literature in each of these two areas. The third section provides a summary highlighting the
opportunities to leverage the best of both areas to assist developers in engineering secure
software.
3.1 Vulnerability Discovery
Since the year 2000, researchers have made considerable progress in characterizing vulner-
abilities. The proactive discovery of vulnerability has been one of the primary goals in
multiple studies from prior literature. The vulnerability discovery approaches proposed in
prior literature span the spectrum of proactive assessment of software security from using
testing, static, dynamic or hybrid analysis, (automatic) patching [130] to leveraging data
mining and machine learning to collect metrics that may be used to characterize and predict
vulnerabilities [39].
We restrict ourselves to vulnerability discovery approaches that leverage metrics to char-
acterize and discover vulnerabilities because:
1. The metrics can be used to infer actionable intelligence about impending security risk
rather than identify instances of vulnerabilities and
2. Some of the metrics are relatively easy to collect and may already be continually
collected as part of the software development process (e.g. the CODEMINE platform
at Microsoft [28])
The survey by Ghaffarian and Shahriari [39] provides a summary of existing literature
on vulnerability discovery approaches that leverage metrics published after the year 2010.
We summarize the prior literature here with attention devoted to the metrics used in char-
acterizing the vulnerabilities.
The first empirical study on vulnerabilities is by Neuhaus et al. [110] from 2007. In this
study, dependency relationships, expressed via the #include preprocessor directive, between
12
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Table 3.1: Summary of relevant prior vulnerability discovery metrics literature
Author Metrics
Neuhaus, Stephan [110, 109] Dependency between components andpackages
Shin, Yonghee
[135, 136, 133, 137, 134, 138] Complexity
Chowdhury, Istehad [22] Complexity, coupling, and cohesion
Meneely, Andrew [81, 82, 85] Developer activity and collaboration andinteractive churn
Zimmermann, Thomas [160]
Churn, complexity, coverage, dependency,
organizational, and dependency between
binaries
Scandariato, Riccardo [127] Features derived using text mining
Walden, James [149] Complexity, coupling, dependency, andfeatures derived using text mining
Perl, Henning [115] Churn, experience, GitHub metadata, andfeatures derived using text mining
Younis, Awad [156] Size, structure, ease of access, andcommunication
components in Mozilla were purported to indicate components prone to vulnerabilities. The
researchers collected historical vulnerability data and identified that 424 (4.05% of 10,452)
components were modified during a fix for a vulnerability. A Support Vector Machine classi-
fier trained and tested with the historical data was shown to predict vulnerable components
in Mozilla with an average precision and recall of 0.65 and 0.45, respectively. The dependency
relationship, though effective at predicting vulnerable components in Mozilla, is unlikely to
yield generalizable knowledge that applies to any software project. However, being the first
empirical study on predicting vulnerabilities, the study does demonstrate that vulnerabilities
can indeed be predicted using metrics.
The earliest instance of using metrics collected from source code used to characterize vul-
nerabilities is an empirical study by Shin and Williams [135]. In this study, nine complexity
metrics were assessed to be indicators of vulnerability-prone functions. The researchers col-
lected historical fault and vulnerability data and identified that 0.5% to 16.6% functions were
modified during a fix for a fault and 0.4% to 9.4% functions were modified during a fix for a
vulnerability across four releases of the Mozilla JavaScript Engine. In the empirical analysis,
the metrics were shown to be weakly correlated with number of vulnerabilities. However, the
association analysis revealed that fault-prone functions were less complex than vulnerability-
prone function, strengthening the notion that faults may be distinct from vulnerabilities. In
a similar study [136], Shin and Williams assessed the capabilities of the nine complexity met-
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rics as indicators of vulnerability-prone functions in the context of a machine learning model.
A Logistic Regression classifier was trained and tested on historical data obtained from six
releases of the Mozilla JavaScript Engine. The classifier exhibited an average accuracy, false
positive rate, and false negative rate of 94.35%, 0.74%, and 86.78%, respectively. While the
accuracy of the classifier is high the correspondingly high false negative rate is concerning
as the classifier may be misclassifying a large portion of the vulnerable functions as neutral.
Neuhaus and Zimmermann [109] extended their earlier study [110] assessing the rela-
tionship between dependencies of a component and its vulnerability-proneness to dependen-
cies between packages in the Red Hat distribution of the Linux Operating System. The
researchers collected historical vulnerability data and identified that 1,133 packages were
updated to resolve a vulnerability. A Support Vector Machine classifier trained and tested
with the historical data was shown to predict vulnerable packages in Red Hat with a median
precision and recall of 0.83 and 0.65, respectively, outperforming a Decision Tree classifier
trained and tested on the same data. In aggregate, both studies by Neuhaus [110, 109] allude
to the notion that dependency between source code entities (components or packages) is an
indicator of the entity being vulnerability prone. While the classifier implemented using
the dependency metric achieved reasonable precision and recall, the insight gained from the
classifier is not actionable. Classifying a file as vulnerable simply because it is dependent on
another is not enough information for a developer to understand the rationale behind the
classification.
In more recent times, the study by Zimmermann et al. [160] was key in vulnerability
discovery for two reasons: (1) likened the process of discovering vulnerabilities to the task
of searching for a needle in a haystack and (2) was the first large-scale empirical study
assessing the efficacy of five groups of classical metrics describing characteristics of source
code and team organization as indicators of a vulnerability-prone binary. The metrics were
empirically validated using 66 historical vulnerabilities in the Windows Vista Operating
System. The empirical analysis revealed that the metrics were weakly correlated with number
of vulnerabilities in the binaries. Furthermore, in assessing the effectiveness of a series of
Logistic Regression classifiers using different groups of metrics, trained and tested with the
historical data, the classifier that used metrics related to churn, dependency and organization
exhibited the highest median precision of 0.67 and the classifier that used all five groups of
metrics exhibited the highest median recall of 0.20. The study also replicated the notion—
from prior studies by Neuhaus [110, 109]—that dependencies (between binaries) may be
an indicator of a binary being vulnerability prone. A Support Vector Machine classifier
used actual dependencies between binaries to predict a binary as vulnerable with a median
precision and recall of 0.60 and 0.40, respectively. A key limitation in this study was that
the empirical evaluation was at the granularity of a binary. The insight that a binary may
be vulnerable is not actionable because a developer may have to review hundreds of files
that are compiled into the binary to uncover potential vulnerabilities.
The metrics used to characterize vulnerabilities so far were derived from the product
alone, the people (i.e. software developers) were not considered as a factor contributing to
software vulnerability. Meneely and Williams [81] were the first to propose a set of metrics,
called developer activity metrics, to quantify the contribution of and collaboration among
software developers. The metrics were derived from developer networks constructed using
information derived from version control logs. The researchers collected historical vulner-
ability data from Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel (RHEL4) and identified 205 files that
were modified during a fix for a vulnerability. In the empirical analysis, the researchers found
the developer activity metrics to be statistically significantly different between vulnerable
and neutral files. Furthermore, two classifiers implemented using Multivariate Discriminant
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Analysis and Bayesian Networks, trained and tested with the historical data, was capable of
predicting vulnerable files, however, the Bayesian Networks classifier exhibited the highest
precision and recall of 13.3% and 33.2%, respectively. While the precision and recall measures
are not impressive, the statistically significant difference in the metric between vulnerable
and neutral files alludes to the notion that the way in which developers contribute to and
collaborate in a project does indeed have an impact on the security of the software. In a
follow-up study, Meneely and Williams [82] replicated the study using historical vulnerabil-
ity data from the PHP Programming Language, Wireshark Network Protocol Analyzer and
updated Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel (RHEL4) and found similar results as before. The
classifiers implemented using Bayesian Networks performed better with an average precision
and recall of 20.73% and 72.27%, respectively. The key benefit of using developer activity
metrics is that the they afford a deeper insight into the software development process. The
insights can be used to inform organizational and managerial changes which are relatively
easier to implement than behavioral changes to developers. Furthermore, developer activ-
ity metrics, being process metrics, have certain characteristics that make them better than
product metrics at certain tasks [120].
The code complexity metrics used to characterize vulnerabilities so far were statically
collected i.e. the software was not required to be executed to collect the metrics. In ar-
guing that metrics collected during the execution of software are likely to indicate location
of vulnerable code, Shin and Williams [137] proposed a set of three metrics categorized as
execution complexity metrics. The researchers collected historical vulnerability data from
Mozilla Firefox web browser and Wireshark Network Protocol Analyzer and identified 301
and 181 files that were modified during a fix for a vulnerability, respectively. In the empirical
analysis of the execution complexity metrics and other statically collected metrics, the re-
searchers found statistically significant difference in most of the metrics between vulnerable
and neutral files. The execution complexity metrics, however, were not consistently statisti-
cally significant between Mozilla Firefox and Wireshark. The Logistic Regression classifier
trained and tested with the historical data performed the best, in terms of reduction in cost
of inspection, when using only the execution complexity metrics.
While the developer activity metrics proposed by Meneely and Williams [81, 82] were
empirically shown to be indicators of vulnerability-prone files, the analysis was conducted in
isolation from other vulnerability discovery metrics. Shin et al. examined the utility of the
developer activity metrics proposed by Meneely and Williams [81, 82], analyzing the metrics
in concert with other classical metrics such as code complexity and code churn [133]. The
researchers collected historical vulnerability data for Mozilla Firefox web browser and Red
Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel (RHEL4) and identified files that were modified during a fix for
a vulnerability. In the empirical analysis of developer activity metrics and other conventional
metrics of code complexity and code churn, the researchers found that 27 of the 28 metrics
were statistically significantly different between vulnerable and neutral files. Furthermore,
a Logistic Regression classifier using all three groups of metrics performed the best with a
mean probability of detection of 0.84 and mean probability of false positive of 0.24. While
the mean precision of the model was low at a mere 0.05, the classifier outperformed random
selection by lowering the cost of inspection by 71% and 28% at the file and line levels,
respectively.
In an attempt to evaluate the vulnerability discovery capabilities of complexity, cou-
pling, and cohesion metrics that were shown to have utility in defect discovery, Chowdhury
and Zulkernine [22] conducted an empirical study using historical vulnerability data col-
lected from five releases of the Mozilla Firefox web browser. In the study, researchers found
statistically significant moderate-to-strong positive correlation between 17 metrics and the
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number of vulnerabilities in a file. In assessing the capability of the metrics as indicators of
vulnerability-prone files in a machine learning model, a Decision Tree classifier trained and
tested on historical vulnerability data exhibited an average precision and recall of 71.82%
and 74.22%, respectively. The study was instrumental in highlighting the possibility of using
coupling and cohesion metrics, in addition to traditional complexity metrics, as indicators
of vulnerability-prone files.
Vulnerabilities and faults are similar in that both can manifest as a result of a mistake
that the software developer made during development of software. Shin and Williams [138]
attempted to reap the benefits of this similarity by attempting to use models traditionally
used to discover faults in software to discover vulnerabilities. A total of 25 metrics, span-
ning three types (code complexity, code churn, and fault history), traditionally known to be
indicators of faults were used in the implementation of a series of Logistic Regression clas-
sifiers. The classifiers were trained and tested using historical fault and vulnerability data
obtained from Mozilla Firefox web browser. In the empirical analysis, researchers found that
the classifier trained with historical fault data exhibited comparable performance to that of
a classifier trained with historical vulnerability data in identifying vulnerability-prone files.
The similarity in classifier performance implies that, in the absence of historical vulnerability
data, historical fault data may be used to identify vulnerability-prone files.
In almost all of the studies summarized so far, code complexity metrics seem to be widely
studied as an indicator of vulnerability. The empirical analysis conducted by Moshtari et al.
[94] further strengthens the support for code complexity metrics being effective indicators
of vulnerabilities by (1) replicating the empirical study by Shin et al. [133] using seven
classification techniques and (2) performing a cross-project analysis using five open source
projects. In the replication study, the researchers found that a classifier implemented using
the IBK technique outperformed the Logistic Regression classifier proposed by Shin et al.
[133], achieving an average precision and recall of 94.35% and 94.56%, respectively. Fur-
thermore, classifiers implemented using Bayesian Network and Classification Via Clustering
techniques achieved an average precision and recall in the range 13.52-13.64% and 69.86-
70.18%, respectively, when used to identify files prone to vulnerabilities in a cross-project
setting. The increased performance exhibited by the classifier strengthens the support for
use of code complexity metrics as indicators of vulnerabilities and also highlights the im-
portance of evaluating different classification techniques when attempting to implement a
classifier.
In the studies summarized so far, a metric was empirically validated to indicate if a file
was vulnerability prone. In theory, the metrics may be used to rank files by vulnerability
proneness. Furthermore, with the knowledge of the direction of association between a met-
ric and vulnerable files, one could apply the metric to identify changes that increases the
vulnerability proneness of the file. For instance, since the metric SumEssential is known to
be statistically significantly higher in vulnerable file than in neutral files [133], a change to a
file foo.c that increases the value of SumEssential of foo.c above a certain predetermined
threshold could be flagged for review. The study by Meneely et al. [85] performed empirical
analysis at the level of changes (commits) to files to describe the characteristics of those
commits that have historically contributed vulnerabilities to files. These commits were aptly
called vulnerability-contributing commits or VCCs. In this study, the researchers proposed
a novel variation to the traditional code churn metric, called interactive churn, which is a
metric to quantify the extent to which developers are modifying source code written by other
developers. The data set used in the study comprised of 124 VCCs identified by tracing 68
vulnerabilities in Apache HTTP to the commits that contributed to the vulnerability. The
researchers found that (1) VCCs had higher churn and number of distinct authors, (2) took
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an average of 1,175 days for a vulnerability contributed by a VCC to be resolved, (3) 13.53%
of VCCs were present since the initial import of the project, and (4) 26.6% of VCCs were
to files that had prior vulnerability fixes. The study demonstrates a potential for the use of
metrics in continually assessing commits to a file with the intention of flagging those commits
that increase the risk of file being vulnerability prone for review.
Traditionally, the metrics proposed in the vulnerability discovery literature summarized
so far are derived from the product or process. In an empirical study, Scandariato [127],
rather than proposing additional metrics, applied text mining to represent source code using
frequencies of terms contained. The researchers hypothesized that a classifier build with the
source code terms as features would be effective at identifying components likely to contain
vulnerabilities. In an exploratory analysis of 20 Android applications, the researchers trained
and tested two types of classifiers: Naïve Bayes and Random Forest. While the classifiers
exhibited impressive performance metrics with precision ranging from 0.59 to 1.00 and recall
ranging from 0.24 to 1.00, the response from the classifiers was not if a file is vulnerable or
not but if the file has a static analysis warning or not. When the classifiers were trained
using documented vulnerabilities in Drupal, a popular content management system written
in PHP, the performance of the classifiers reduced to an average precision and recall of 0.57
and 0.77, respectively. Overall, the performance of classifiers built with text mining features
was better than classifiers built with traditional metrics. In a collaborative study Walden et
al. [149], compared software metrics and text mining features and found text mining features
to be more effective at classifying files as vulnerable or neutral. The effectiveness of the text
mining features is impressive, however, interpreting the features may not be straightforward.
Even if interpretation was possible the insights are unlikely to yield actionable intelligence on
the state of security of software. For instance, if the interpretation indicated that a change
containing higher frequency of the keyword if is likely to be vulnerable, one cannot simply
reduce the frequency of if to mitigate the vulnerability.
In a study similar to that conducted by Meneely et al. [85], Perl et al. [115] traced
718 vulnerabilities across 66 C and C++ projects to 640 VCCs. In the empirical analysis,
the researchers compared 16 metrics collected from VCCs and other (possibly non-VCC)
commits. The association analysis revealed that almost all the metrics were statistically sig-
nificantly different in the sample of VCCs when compared to other commits. The researchers
used historical vulnerability data to train and test a Support Vector Machine classifier and
found that their classifier outperformed a tool used to identify security weaknesses called
FlawFinder.
In a recent replication of prior work by Zimmermann et al. [160], Morrison et al. [91]
collected and analyzed 29 metrics broadly categorized as churn, complexity, dependency,
legacy, size, and pre-release vulnerabilities. While replication of prior work was successfully
demonstrated with outcomes being consistent with that from prior work, the primary ob-
jective of the study was to understand the limitations of vulnerability prediction models
that inhibit their adoption in the software development industry. In replicating prior work,
researchers made some notable observations that could be the inhibiting factors. The gran-
ularity at which the prediction models operate is important because a model that predicts
individual files as vulnerable is more useful than a model that predicts binaries as vulnerable
as a single binary may contain source code from several thousand files. Since vulnerabilities
are such a rare occurrence, the data sets used to train the prediction models are severely
imbalanced with the neutral files being overwhelmingly high in number over vulnerable files.
The challenge with imbalanced data sets is compounded when the granularity at which the
prediction model must operate at is lowered. An approach to alleviate the granularity limi-
tation could be to use machine learning techniques that are tailored specifically for learning
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in situations when imbalance in data set is the norm. In the study, the researchers observed
that Random Forest classifiers performed better than classifiers implemented using five other
machine learning techniques.
The role of vulnerability discovery metrics is to assist developers in improving the se-
curity of software. In a recent study by Younis et al. [156], prior vulnerability discovery
metrics were used to understand the differences in characteristics of vulnerable functions
that have an existing exploit and those that do not have an existing exploit. The study was
motivated by a need to understand the reasons for only small portion of disclosed vulner-
abilities to have an exploit. The researchers examined 183 vulnerabilities across the Linux
Kernel and Apache HTTP projects. For each vulnerability, the researchers identified the
function that was fixed and collected eight metrics to quantify size, structure, ease of access,
and communication of each such function. In the association analysis, the researchers found
that vulnerable functions that had existing exploits were statistically significantly likely to
have had fewer lines of code, decision paths and other functions that invoked them than
vulnerable functions that did not have existing exploits. The researchers also evaluated the
effectiveness of a set of classifiers in classifying vulnerable functions as (likely) to have an
exploit or otherwise. The classifiers were built using subsets of metrics chosen via different
feature selection approaches. A classifier implemented using Random Forest performed the
best with an average precision and recall of 83% and 84%, respectively. If we had a classi-
fier capable of identifying vulnerable functions with 100% precision and recall, the classifier
proposed in this study could be used to further identify if the vulnerable function is likely to
have an exploit. While the utility of the classifier may be a stretch to imagine, the metrics
used in the models are still valuable.
In our search for prior literature related to vulnerability discovery we found some studies
[141, 29, 13] in which the empirical analysis was conducted using historical vulnerability
data obtained from sources other than the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [1]. In a
study of web applications, Smith and Williams [141] used number of hotspots (defined as a
location in the source code where SQL statements are executed with input which has not been
validated). In the empirical analysis, 158 security issues across 15 releases of two open source
PHP web applications (WordPress and WikkaWiki) were used as proxy for vulnerabilities.
The researchers found that (1) files with more hotspots were more likely to have other types
of web application vulnerability, (2) files with more hotspots in one release were more likely
to be vulnerable in the next release, and (3) more lines were changed to resolve security
issues were hotspots. In a similar study of PHP web applications, Doyle and Walden [29]
empirically analyzed three metrics in 14 open source PHP web applications. The analysis,
however, used warnings from a static analyzer to indicate vulnerabilities rather than reported
vulnerabilities. The researchers found that cyclomatic complexity was strongly correlated
with number of static analysis warnings in a file. Bosu et al. [13] used a keyword search based
approach, supplemented by thorough manual evaluation, to identify code reviews associated
with VCCs. The researchers identified 413 VCCs in 10 open source projects. The objective
of the study was to describe characteristics of the VCCs and code reviews associated with
them. The researchers found that (1) the types of vulnerabilities identified by peer code
review are diverse and represented all top ten security vulnerabilities ranked by the NVD,
(2) code reviews typically find vulnerabilities that are easy to fix, (3) probability of a file
containing a vulnerability increased with increase in churn, (4) modified files were more
likely to contain vulnerabilities than new files, (5) authors of most VCCs were experienced
developers but less experienced developers were 1.8 to 24 times more likely to author VCCs,
and (6) developers affiliated with the organization sponsoring an open source project were
more likely to author VCCs.
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In summary, there is considerable scientific knowledge on vulnerability discovery in prior
literature, however, as can be gathered from the summary of most relevant literature above,
the knowledge is scattered. Furthermore, there is rich diversity in the approaches used to
validate the vulnerability discovery metrics. We hope that the systematizing the knowledge
will help the transition of knowledge into practice.
3.2 Feedback in Software Engineering
In a tool-assisted approach to software development today, developers receive feedback from
a variety of tools such as integrated development environments that aggregate errors and
warnings from compiling, building, testing, and/or statically analyzing the source code. In
addition to tools, practices such as code review create an opportunity to receive feedback
from other developers. There are many studies in prior literature in which feedback dur-
ing software engineering, generated automatically or provided by humans, was evaluated
to characterize effective feedback. We can leverage the recommendations from these prior
studies to provide feedback on security in a way that it useful to developers. We summarize
relevant studies on feedback from prior literature here.
In the year 2007, Layman et al. [62] conducted a study to understand the factors that
influence developers to address faults detected by automatic fault detection tools. The re-
searchers conducted a controlled study of the experience of 18 developers using a custom
automatic fault detection platform called AWARE [142]. AWARE is a plug-in for the Eclipse
IDE that continuously provides developers a listing of faults prioritized by severity. The
researchers examined transcribed responses from the study participants to identify seven
categories of themes that emerged from the responses. In interpreting the themes, the re-
searchers made concrete recommendations that could encourage developers to use automatic
fault detection tools. Some of the recommendations were (1) for the fault descriptions to
be informative and relevant, (2) to have the severity assigned by the tool to match develop-
ers’ perceived severity of the fault, (3) allow customization of when the faults were shown,
and (4) to have fewer false positives. Even after ten years, these recommendations are still
relevant, as we observed in reviewing more recent studies on automatic feedback generation.
Johnson et al. [52] conducted a study similar to that conducted by Layman et al. [62]
but to identify reasons for developers to not use static analysis tools. FindBugs1 was the
static analysis tool used in the study. The researchers used semi-structured interview to
capture the experience of 20 developers (16 professional developers and 4 graduate students
with prior professional development experience) using FindBugs to find and resolve issues
in a piece of software. Using open coding of the responses from interviews, six themes
were identified. In five of the six themes, the responses were overwhelmingly negative. The
researchers highlighted several reasons for static analysis tools to be underutilized in practice.
Some of the most notable limitations were (1) poorly presented results with false positives
outweighing true negatives, (2) loss of context when scrolling through a long list of warnings,
(3) lack of support for collaboration, (4) lack of support for justified suppression of warnings,
(5) lack of integration with workflow, and (6) interruption to developers’ thought process.
In a similar study, Foss and Murphy [34] evaluated if showing developers code stability
in the source code editor affect their behavior. The researchers developed ChangeMarkup,
an IntelliJ IDE plug-in, to show stability warning at the line level using colored markers.
The plug-in showed two types of stability warnings: one used the age of the source code line
as a metric and the other used change size (churn) as a metric. Five developers participated
1 http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
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in the study for two weeks. The participants were provided a questionnaire four times
through the study to capture the change (if any) in the behavior of the developers. After
the study had concluded, each participant was interviewed for thirty minutes to understand
the experience of the participants. The researchers found that (1) developers preferred
even simpler cues than those provided by ChangeMarkup, (2) developers were drawn by
unfamiliar visual cues in the editor but they seldom used features to drill down a warning
to get more information, (3) and developers tend to ignore warnings when they become
predictable. The observations from this study provide insights into developers’ preferences
for receiving feedback. The researchers also suggest that code stability warnings are better
suited to be shown during other processes such as code reviews.
Building on work by Layman et al. [62], Foss and Murphy [34], and Johnson et al.
[52], Lewis et al. [63] and Sadowski et al. [126] conducted large-scale studies involving
professional developers at Google. The study by Lewis et al. [63] was exploratory with a
goal to understand if the use of bug prediction affects developers’ behavior in code reviews.
In the first phase of the study, developers’ perception of the effectiveness of three state-of-
the-art bug prediction algorithms was assessed. 19 developers from the Google Engineering
Tools department volunteered to participate in the study. Each developer was provided with
three lists of 20 files from two projects determined to be bug prone by each of the three
bug prediction algorithms. The task was to classify the files as bug-prone or not-bug-prone
and to rank the lists by extent of bug proneness of files. The aggregation of the responses
from the task revealed that developers seemed to prefer the outcome from one of the three
bug prediction algorithms. After the first phase, researchers had several informal discussions
with the participants of the study. The informal discussions revealed several common themes
among developers’ requirements from bug prediction and reporting systems. Some of the
notable themes were (1) actionable warning messages with obvious reasoning, (2) biased
toward newer files, and (3) effectiveness and scalability. In the second phase of the study,
researchers modified the most effective bug prediction algorithm identified in the previous
phase to bias the prediction toward newer files. The modified bug prediction algorithm was
integrated with the code review system such that a file determined to be bug prone would
be flagged for review. The objective in the second phase was to understand if the presence
of the flag affects developers’ behavior in the review. The average time for the approval
of and average number of comments in review containing bug-prone files was compared for
three months before and after the deployment of the integration. In statistical analysis,
researchers found no difference between the two samples of metrics leading to the conclusion
that the introduction of bug prediction was not likely to change developers’ behavior during
code review. The lack of an opt-out feature, confusion between authors and reviewers on the
fix, files with technical debt being repeatedly flagged, and auto-generated files being flagged
were some of the reasons that developers mentioned to the integration to be perceived as
ineffective. Despite the limitations of the bug prediction algorithms, developers at Microsoft
use them to improve the quality of their software [91].
As suggested by Lewis et al. [63], improving the effectiveness of bug prediction is cer-
tainly desirable, however, seamlessly integrating existing algorithms with developer workflow
has its benefits as well. The study by Sadowski et al. [126] attempted to accomplish just
that goal. Sadowski et al. [126] developed a program analysis platform, called Tricorder,
which integrated with a code review system (similar to Gerrit2) used internally at Google.
The study contains a description of the experience of developing and deploying Tricorder
at a scale that spanned the entire source code repository at Google. Tricorder was de-
signed to follow the microservices architecture that simplifies scalability, extensibility, and
2 https://www.gerritcodereview.com/
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reliability. The Tricorder architecture is similar that of a platform, called Mediam, pro-
posed by Beschastnikh et al. [10] which is aimed at accelerating the adoption of software
engineering research in the industry. The analyzers in Tricorder are analogous to the bots
in Mediam. Tricorder, when notified of a change submitted for review by a developer,
would launch one or more analyzers to examine the change for issues. The analyzers would
run independent of one another and report issues back to Tricorder which would then ag-
gregate the issues and present them as comments in the code review system. Each comment
posted by Tricorder was accompanied by four links: (1) Not Useful, used to provide
feedback to the developer of the analyzer, (2) Please Fix, used, by a reviewer, to indicate
to the author that the comment must be addressed, (3) Preview Fix, used, by the author,
to preview automatically generated fix for the issue described in the comment, and (4) Ap-
ply Fix, used, by the author, to apply the automatically generated fix. The effectiveness
of Tricorder, and its analyzers, was evaluated using the number of clicks on each of the
four links. Tricorder was introduced to Google developers in July, 2013. Using the data
collected from Tricorder, the researchers demonstrated the overwhelming utility of such
a platform. Using the feedback received from developers, the researchers made recommen-
dations to developers of analyzers, the most notable of which were (1) easy to understand
messages, (2) fewer false positives, (3) scalable, and (4) tight feedback loop between users
and developers of the analyzers.
In addition to the research studies summarized so far, we found a U.S. Patent application
by Allen et al. [4] describing a method, system, and implementation approach for providing
real-time feedback to developers on their most common programming mistakes. We will
follow a similar approach to provide developers with feedback but with some key differences:
(1) feedback will provided asynchronously when a developer submits a change for review and
(2) feedback will be provided not only to the developer implementing the change but also to
the developer(s) who may be reviewing the change.
Despite concerns that software development supported by bots could disrupt developer
productivity [143], using bots seems to be an elegant approach to accelerate the adoption
of software engineering research in the industry [10]. We will use the recommendations
from these studies from prior literature to inform the decisions we make in developing our
approach to providing automatically generated feedback on security.
3.3 Summary
As noted in summarizing the literature on feedback in software engineering, there are several
opportunities for providing feedback to developers in a way that it prompts a conversation.
The Tricorder platform described by Sadowski et al. [126] is a prime example of leveraging
the code review system to provide warnings from static analyzers in a way that it implicitly
enforces peer accountability.
Static analysis has helped developers improve the overall quality of software by uncov-
ering defects [108]. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities are not the same as defects [104, 93].
Traditional approaches to static analysis tend to use pattern matching to find code-level
and technology-level problems. Leveraging static analysis to uncover vulnerabilities may be
non-trivial as patterns matching yet undiscovered vulnerabilities may not exist [19]. Fur-
thermore, vulnerabilities that become apparent only when the source code is executed under
very specific circumstances cannot be statically identified. Fortunately, researchers have pro-
posed a plethora of metrics that may be useful in discovering vulnerabilities as software is
engineered. The literature on vulnerability discovery summarized above provides a sense of
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the wealth of available knowledge.
The goal in our research is to leverage the best of both areas of research to support
developers in engineering secure software. We wish to leverage effective vulnerability discov-
ery metrics to provide automatically generated feedback on security in ways that have been
shown to be effective in the industry.
Chapter 4
Beyond the Attack Surface
When reasoning about software security, researchers and practitioners use the
phrase “attack surface” as a metaphor for risk. Enumerate and minimize the
ways attackers can break in then risk is reduced and the system is better pro-
tected, the metaphor says. But software systems are much more complicated
than their surfaces. We propose function- and file-level attack surface metrics—
proximity and risky walk—that enable fine-grained risk assessment. Our risky
walk metric is highly configurable: we use PageRank on a probability-weighted
call graph to simulate attacker behavior of finding or exploiting a vulnerability.
We provide evidence-based guidance for deploying these metrics, including an
extensive parameter tuning study. We conducted an empirical study on two large
open source projects, FFmpeg and Wireshark, to investigate the potential corre-
lation between our metrics and historical post-release vulnerabilities. We found
our metrics to be statistically significantly associated with vulnerable function-
s/files with a small-to-large Cohen’s d effect size. Our prediction model achieved
an increase of 36% (in FFmpeg) and 27% (in Wireshark) in the average value
of F2-measure over a base model built with SLOC and coupling metrics. Our
prediction model outperformed comparable models from prior literature with
notable improvements: 58% reduction in false negative rate, 81% reduction in
false positive rate, and 548% increase in F2-measure. These metrics advance
vulnerability prevention by(a) being flexible in terms of granularity, (a) per-
forming better than vulnerability prediction literature, and (a) being tunable
so that practitioners can tailor the metrics to their products and better assess
security risk.
The study presented in this Chapter is published in the Proceedings of the 2016
ACM Workshop on Software PROtection (SPRO) [100].
4.1 Motivation
The attack surface metaphor is often invoked as a way to assess the security risk of large
systems [45, 66, 47, 72, 73]. The metaphor goes like this: if an attacker has more avenues to
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enter the system, then the system is at a higher risk. Software systems provide these avenues
in their inputs and outputs, where inputs can take in potential exploits and outputs provide
information on how data is processed (e.g. lack of sanitization). Thus, broadly speaking,
developers can understand their security risks by understanding their inputs and outputs.
This metaphor has been the inspiration for security risk metrics such as the number of entry
points and exit points [72, 74, 71] and is even in practice at Microsoft [66].
Historically, attack surface metrics have focused on the system’s “perimeter” and hence
fail to capture what happens beyond the entry and exit points. A simple source code change,
such as the addition of an API call deep within the system, can have a drastic effect on
security risk because large software systems are vastly interconnected and the API call could
be connecting two subsystems that were earlier disconnected. If the attack surface metaphor
is about examining avenues of attack, then risk analysis should be about how attacker
traverses the software system.
The call graph [43, 42, 3, 31] can be used as a basis for a model of attacker behavior
because it contains the overall system structure. Random walks through a call graph can
serve as an approximation for attacker searching (manually or automatically) for vulnerabil-
ities. With network analysis techniques [15, 83, 116, 81] such as centrality, random walks,
and geodesic paths, we can provide developers with fine-grained risk metrics at the function-
or file-level that can be used to continually assess the impact of a source code change on
security risk.
The goal of this research is to assess security risk through an empirical understanding of
the relationship between vulnerabilities, individual functions or files, and the attack surface
of a software system. We apply the attack surface metaphor described in prior literature [45,
47, 71] to the call graph and propose function- and file-level metrics—proximity and risky
walk—that simulate random walks across functions/files to account for system structure
beyond the surface. We empirically analyze our metrics in two large open source projects:
the FFmpeg media transcoder and the Wireshark network protocol analyzer to understand if
the metrics are associated with historical vulnerabilities. We also investigate the sensitivity
of the metrics to call graph collection approach (static-only vs. static+dynamic), as well as
parameter tuning for our random walk metric.
We address the following research questions:
RQ 1 - Association
Is a function/file more likely to be fixed for a post-release vulnerability if:
(a) it is near the attack surface or dangerous points?
(b) it has a higher probability of being traversed on a random walk from the attack
surface?
RQ 2 - Prediction (Base)
Do proximity and risky walk metrics improve the performance of a base prediction
model built with SLOC and coupling metrics?
RQ 3 - Prediction (Prior)
How do the prediction models built with proximity and risky walk metrics compare
with prior vulnerability prediction literature?
The research contributions of this work are:
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• A method for applying the attack surface metaphor to individual functions/files so
that developers can quantitatively assess security risk;
• Implementation of our method as an open source project
[99];
• Empirical evaluation of our method in two large open source projects.
4.2 Metric Motivation
In this section we discuss some key decisions that led to the formation of our risk metrics.
Modeling attacker behavior using graphs is not new [132, 79], nor is using call graphs [72, 74,
154], but our approach of combining attack surface and call graph is unique to our knowledge.
Historically [45], software attack surface researchers have concluded that reducing points
of entry/exit should reduce the number exploits attackers can use. We expand the scope of
that argument by applying the principle of defense in depth. We wish to consider risks of
attack by aggregating how the system is interconnected, still using the attack surface as a
starting point, to model attacker behavior.
Consider the attack surface metaphor as it applies to medieval castles. If a castle has
many different entrances and exits, attackers will also have many different ways of invading
the castle. Reduce entrances and the security will improve. But, an inner courtyard might
also be particularly risky because it is the point of convergence for multiple pathways into
the castle. A renovation within the castle might change attacker behavior without changing
the external entry and exit points. By combining both structure and surface, we can better
understand our system from the inside out.
Why use call graphs?
Call graphs provide an inexpensive, automated way of measuring how the system is
interconnected. Most programming languages support call graph collection, so these metrics
could be easily adopted into, say, a continuous integration build. Call graphs are also the
next natural step from the attack surface methods because entry/exit points in prior attack
surface literature [72, 74, 71] are actual methods.
While call graphs are simple to collect they are, in practice, imperfect representations of
what can happen at runtime because of pointer manipulations. In our approach discussed
in the subsequent section, we discuss how one could mitigate this concern and how, in our
empirical study, we found our call graph to be a close representative of potential attacker
pathways. We also examined the sensitivity of static-only vs. static+dynamic call graph
collection in our empirical study in Section 4.4.2.
Once customized to the build process of a software system, our proposed approach is en-
tirely automated. We envision developers using these fine-grained metrics as an informative
part of their everyday development workflow to prioritize their software protection efforts
such as code reviews and penetration testing.
Why use random walk metrics?
Many network analysis applications rely upon geodesic path (i.e. “shortest path”) metrics
to provide analysis. Geodesic path metrics are useful in social situations where distance is
to be measured and the attempt to find a shortest path (e.g. two humans who are “friends”
are also “friends-of-friends”, but the shortest path makes the most sense in that domain).
We use geodesic paths whenever we want to gauge potential distance (e.g. “distance to the
attack surface”).
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Computers, however, do not execute methods based on shortest paths, they execute
methods based on inputs. For attackers searching for a vulnerability, perhaps via a fuzz
testing tool or through manual experimentation, traversals of the network would look more
random. An attacker, via his inputs, would execute commonly-used methods, leading to a
higher risk of attack if those methods had a vulnerability. Thus, we use random walk metrics
to simulate the attacker behavior of exploring the system.
Why use PageRank and not regular Random Walk?
The standard Random Walk metric is useful when discussing how someone traverses a
network infinitely (e.g. car traffic patterns). Attackers, however, are constantly starting over
their traversals–at the attack surface. The PageRank metric, based on Google’s algorithm of
modeling web surfing behavior, is a Random Walk with additional parameters of(a) damping
factor (a probability of “starting over”), and (b) personalization vector (the probability of
starting at a particular method). The concept of constantly starting over at the attack
surface and then conducting a random walk fits with the scenario of an attacker exploring
for a vulnerability. Thus, to incorporate the notion of attack surface into call graph centrality,
we found PageRank to be the most appropriate metric.
4.3 Proposed Metrics
In this section, we introduce the proximity and risky walk metrics in the context of the
attack surface metaphor introduced earlier. A unique (read desirable) feature of our metrics
is that they can be defined at either function- or file-level, enabling developers to choose the
level of granularity in risk assessment.
The high-level approach to collecting the metrics, at either the function- or file-level,
may be summarized as follows:
Step 1: Obtain the call graph
Step 2: Identify Entry, Exit, and Dangerous Points
Step 3a: Compute Proximity metrics
Step 3b: Compute Risky Walk metric
We have developed an open source tool, called Attack Surface Meter [99], that enables
the collection of the metrics proposed in this chapter for a software system written in the
C programming language. As of this writing, attack surface meter is capable of parsing
call graphs obtained from GNU cflow and GNU gprof. The attack surface meter may be
extended to measure software systems written in other programming languages by defining
a parser for the call graph generated by an appropriate language-specific utility.
Step 1: Obtain the call graph
The proximity and risky walk metrics are defined on the call graph representation of a
software system. The call graph represents a series of steps that an attacker effectively takes
when attempting to exploit a vulnerability. In our definition, a call graph is a collection of
directed relationships from caller functions to callee functions, represented as a symmetric
directed graph. That is, if an attacker’s exploit accesses a callee, it can potentially access the
caller, and vice versa. We use a symmetric directed graph instead of an undirected graph
so that we can weight returns differently than calls. (Note: our predecessors [72, 74, 154]
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have used directed but not symmetric call graphs, which we believe does not fully account
for function returns.)
The caller—callee relationships may be deduced in two ways:(1) static analysis, where
the source code is parsed and analyzed, or (2) dynamic analysis, where the software system
is profiled during execution. Both techniques are imperfect: static analysis has limited
support for language features such as function pointers and polymorphism, and dynamic
analysis requires software to compile and all possible execution paths to be exercised. Thus,
the call graph is always an approximation as Grove et al. mention when describing soundness
of call graphs [42]. We hypothesize that the level of approximation achieved by the call graph
may be improved if static and dynamic analyses are used in unison. In Section 4.4.2, we
present the sensitivity of our metrics to static-only vs. static+dynamic analysis.
Developers familiar with their own systems can manually inspect the call graph for
soundness, as we did in both of our historical studies. Based on applying our technique to
historical case studies, we also used two heuristics for gauging if the collected call graph has
a representative set of edges. The two heuristics we used were:
Number of Fragments (f) The number of strongly connected components in the call
graph
Monolithicity (m) The percentage of total functions that is in the largest strongly con-
nected component.
We note that these heuristics are useful in systems that are “monolithic”, that is, systems
that are intended to compile into one massive call graph. While this happened to be true
in our empirical studies, it may not be in, say, an API with intentionally disconnected
subsystems such as glibc.
In practice, software systems often have functions that are never invoked or functions
that are invoked only when testing. These functions will appear as islands in the call graph,
so the ideal m is not necessarily 100% and the ideal f is not necessarily one. The ideal value
of m and f vary between systems, and must be taken into consideration.
The call graph described so far is conventional in that the edges in the graph represent
function call/return. The edges in the conventional call graph may be used to deduce cal-
l/return relationships between files as well. The file-level call graph enables the proximity
and the risky walk metrics to be collected at a file-level, providing an alternate approach to
security risk assessment.
Step 2: Identify Entry, Exit, and Dangerous Points
Attackers need places to send their attacks, or places where they might start the reconnais-
sance for their attacks. From Manadhata et al. [71], we defined these functions as entry
points (where data enters in) and exit points (where data exits out). Additionally, attackers
may be more likely to target functions that make system calls deemed dangerous. We call
these functions as dangerous points. There may be other criteria in which a function could be
deemed dangerous (e.g. function handling sensitive information specific to an application),
however, we restrict ourselves to only functions that make dangerous system calls.
The language used in the development of a system and its operating environment deter-
mine how inputs, outputs, and the dangerous system calls are identified. For instance, in
the context of a web application, an entry point could be a method that saves form-posted
data to a database, whereas, an exit point could be a method that formats data for a web
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page. In the context of a C program: any function invoking a C standard input function (e.g.
scanf, getc, etc.) is an entry point, whereas, any function invoking a C standard output
function (e.g. printf, putc, etc.) is an exit point. Again, in the context of a C program,
any function making a dangerous system call (e.g. chown, fork, etc.) is a dangerous point.
Defining entry and exit points for all available technologies may be an open problem, but
the most popular set of functions for the C standard library is in Appendix A of Manadhata
and Wing [73]. Similarly, the set of available system calls is dependent on the version of the
C standard library used during the development of a software system. We have used the
system calls with threat level 1 through 3 enumerated by Bernaschi et al. [9].
The notion of entry, exit, and dangerous points may be extended to the file-level by
applying the following heuristic: a file is an entry point, exit point, or dangerous point
if it contains at least one function that is an entry point, exit point, or dangerous point,
respectively.
Step 3a: Compute Proximity Metrics
As an attacker’s exploit enters the system, functions/files that are near entry and exit points
are likely to be involved with handling user data. In the call graph, nearby ancestors (i.e.
functions/files that can reach a given function/file) may be more likely to have security risks,
so we use an unweighted shortest path algorithm to determine the distance from a given
function/file to the attack surface. Since functions/files may be reachable from multiple
entry and exit points, we average the shortest path lengths. We chose to use the average
of the shortest path lengths to better approximate the reality of function/file invocation
pattern. In addition to measuring the distance to the attack surface, we also measure the
distance of a function/file to dangerous points that were defined in the previous step.
Our three proximity metrics (i.e. proximity to entry, proximity to exit, and proximity to
dangerous) are defined as:
Definition 1 Proximity of a function/file foo to entry points, exit points, or dangerous
points is the mean of the shortest unweighted path lengths to all functions/files reachable
from foo that are entry points, exit points, or dangerous points, respectively.
The power of the proximity metric is in its sensitivity to the (unforeseen) ripple effect
of a source code change on functions that may have not been directly modified by the
developer. For example, suppose a developer working on a function, readMessage, adds a
call to pingServer. The proximity of readMessage, and all its descendants (i.e. functions
reachable from readMessage), to the entry surface would decrease if pingServer is near an
entry point. Conversely, a refactoring effort on pingServer that separates concerns of input
validation or secure memory management would increase the proximity of readMessage to
the entry surface without a direct change to it.
Step 3b: Compute Risky Walk Metric
Attackers looking for vulnerabilities may have limited knowledge of the system’s source
code and are essentially exercising different execution paths in the system hoping to find a
vulnerability. This behavior of the attacker is similar to that of a World Wide Web user
(“surfer”) searching for a piece of information. The surfer starts at, say, the results from a
search engine and follows a series of links until she finds the information she was looking for.
Or perhaps she deems the search futile, at which point she returns back to the starting point
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and follows a different series of links. The starting point of the surfer is analogous to the
entry points of the software system and the act of following a link is analogous to invoking a
function in the software system. However, the attacker has no direct control over the series
of function calls that the system makes in response to a particular input. As a result, the
attacker resorts to trying several entry points with varying inputs.
In addition to ranking web pages [113], twitter users [58], and improving recommender
systems [76], PageRank algorithm has found application in the realm of security as well [147,
79].
The PageRank algorithm uses three configurable parameters in addition to the call graph,
they are:
• a personalization vector, v, that contains the probability that a random walk starts at
a given node,
• a damping factor, α, that defines the probability that an attacker will continue the
random walk across the call graph without abandoning the current walk and starting
over, and
• an edge weights vector, w, that contains the edge weights used to derive the probability
that a random walk traverses one of the many possible edges from a given node.
Wills [153] presents an elaborate description of the mathematics behind the computation
of the page rank and the role of these parameters in the algorithm.
In the context of security risk assessment, these parameters must be chosen with the
intent of reflecting attacker mindset. For instance, we may want to assign a higher weight
to edges terminating at functions that were fixed for vulnerabilities in the past to model
the likelihood that an attacker may try to attack past vulnerable functions hoping to un-
cover a new vulnerability. Similarly, some software systems may have defenses in place to
wraparound standard library functions known to be used incorrectly by developers. In such
cases, we may want to assign a lower weight to edges terminating at such defensive functions.
In the empirical analysis of the risky walk metric in FFmpeg and Wireshark, we carried
out an extensive parameter tuning exercise (detailed in Appendix B) to identify a robust set
of parameters. Users of our approach may choose to use the parameters we arrived at in our
study as our parameters ended up being similar across case studies. Alternatively, users may
choose to use our weights as a starting point and adapt them to their own software systems.
Our Risky Walk metric is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Risky walk of a function/file is the PageRank of that node in the call graph
computed with a personalization vector, a damping factor, and an edge weights vector tuned
to simulate attacker behavior.
The power of risky walk metric is that it aims to simulate, by means of probabilities, the
behavior of a typical attacker, specifically during the reconnaissance phase of an attack. The
risky walk of a function/file is the probability that a random execution of the system, with
inputs tailored to uncover vulnerabilities, will result in the function/file being invoked. In
practice, risky walk of a function/file may be extremely small in a system with large number
of functions/files, so viewing the logarithm of the risky walk or simple a ranking can make
the values easier to interpret.
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4.3.1 An Example
Shown in Figure 4.1 is the call graph of a sample C program with the attack surface high-
lighted with dotted ellipse. The nodes represent the functions in the program. The solid
directed edge represents call to a function, whereas, the dotted directed edge represents re-
turn from a function. The function read_config is an entry point because it calls an input
function scanf. The functions compute_foo and pretty_print are exit points because they
call the output function printf. The entry and exit points are shaded gray. For simplicity,
the graph does not show any dangerous points.
Figure 4.1: Attack surface visualization of a sample C program
The proximity to entry for compute_baz is 1 and for compute_bar it is 2. The proximity
to exit for compute_baz is (2+2)/2 = 2 and for compute_bar it is (1+1)/2 = 1. Let α = 0.85,
vector v contain 0.3125 for entry and exit points and 0.03125 for the other functions (i.e.
attacker is 10 times more likely to start at entry or exit point), and the vector w contain 10
for call edges and 5 for return edges. For risky walk, the function compute_bar would have
a total weighting of 10 + 10 + 5 = 25 for the outgoing edges. Each edge weight is computed
as a proportion of the total, for example, the compute_bar to compute_baz edge probability
would be 10/25 = 0.4%. The page rank of compute_baz will be 0.29 and compute_bar will
be 0.27.
4.4 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used in the empirical evaluation of the prox-
imity and risky walk metrics in the context of two large open source projects: FFmpeg and
Wireshark. At a high-level, the empirical evaluation was conducted in four phases, they are:
Phase I: Metric Collection
Phase II: Function/File Labeling
Phase III: Association Analysis
Phase IV: Regression Analysis
All statistical tests were executed on R version 3.2.3 [118].
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4.4.1 Study Subjects
We chose two large open source projects as subjects of study in the empirical evaluation
of our metrics. The motivation for choosing our subjects of study were:(a) large, popular,
and open source projects, (b) well-kept vulnerability fix records, (c) substantial development
history for tracking vulnerabilities over time, and (d) automated regression test suites to
compare the sensitivity of static-only vs. static+dynamic analysis.
FFmpeg is a popular open source media transcoding library that is capable of encod-
ing, decoding, multiplexing, demultiplexing, streaming, filtering, and playing an enormous
variety of media. FFmpeg is used by other projects such as Google Chrome and the VLC
Media Player. Since 2009, FFmpeg has had 19 major releases, 217 patch releases, and 237
vulnerabilities. In this study, we collected metrics for 16 of the 19 major releases of FFmpeg,
mining 675 vulnerability-fixing commits to identify 280 unique functions that were fixed for
a post-release vulnerability. On average, each major release of FFmpeg has 536k source-
lines-of-code (SLOC) and 12,908 functions spread across an average of 1,865 files. In terms
of SLOC, the average length of each file is 306 and that of each function is 30. FFmpeg has
an extensive, automated regression test suite call FATE1, which we leveraged for dynamic
analysis.
Wireshark is an open source network protocol analyzer that has come to be the de facto
standard for sniffing network data. The current release of Wireshark supports the analysis of
2,000 network protocols. Since 2008, Wireshark has had 8 major releases, 118 patch releases,
and 312 vulnerabilities. In this study, we collected metrics for 7 of the 8 major releases of
Wireshark, mining 590 vulnerability-fixing commits to identify 1,705 unique functions that
were fixed for a post-release vulnerability. On average, each major release of Wireshark has
2,081 kSLOC and 53,350 functions spread across an average of 2,593 files. In terms of SLOC,
the average length of each file is 855 and that of each function is 24. We collected dynamic
analysis data by developing a simple test runner script to invoke the Wireshark GUI (and
its command line variant, TShark) for a set of 1,877 packet capture files typically used for
regression testing by the Wireshark team.
4.4.2 Phase I: Metric Collection
In this section, we apply the method introduced in Section 4.3 to collect the proximity and
risky walk metrics from the releases of FFmpeg and Wireshark considered in our study. In
addition to attack surface meter, we have developed another open source application, called
Attack Surface Evolution,2 to facilitate the automated (and parallel) collection of the metrics
for multiple releases of a software system. The metrics collected are saved to a database for
further analysis.
We note that we collected, and analyzed, the metrics at both function- and file-level to
evaluate the utility of the metrics at different levels of granularity.
Step 1: Obtain the call graph
We chose two popular call graph generation utilities: GNU cflow,3 a static call graph gen-
eration utility, and GNU gprof,4 a dynamic profiling utility, to obtain the call graphs of
1 https://ffmpeg.org/fate.html 2 https://github.com/nuthanmunaiah/attack-surface-evolution
3 http://www.gnu.org/software/cflow/ 4 https://sourceware.org/binutils/docs/gprof/
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FFmpeg and Wireshark. We refer to these as cflow and gprof in the remainder of the
section, respectively.
In order to determine the need for dynamic analysis, we use the heuristics—number of
fragments and monolithicity—from Section 4.3. We obtain static and dynamic call graphs
for the most recent release of FFmpeg and Wireshark considered in our study and use the
heuristics to determine if there is a need for dynamic analysis or not. The most recent releases
of FFmpeg and Wireshark considered in this study are 2.5.0 and 1.12.0, respectively. Since
FFmpeg and Wireshark are intended to compile into a single system, we expect number
of fragments to be low and monolithicity to be high. The number of fragments (f) and































Table 4.1: Number of Fragments (f), Monolithicity (m), and mean value of Proximity to Entry (pen), Proximity to Exit
(pex), Proximity to Dangerous (pda), and Risky Walk (rw) from static and static+dynamic analysis of FFmpeg version 2.5.0
and Wireshark version 1.12.0
Subject (Version) Analysis f m µpen µpex µpda µrw
FFmpeg (2.5.0)
Static 182 0.979 3.669 3.807 3.498 6.530E-05
Static+Dynamic 124 0.985 3.666 3.832 3.546 5.727E-05
Interpretation: Appending call graphs obtained through dynamic analysis decreased the
number of fragments and marginally increased the monolithicity. Furthermore, there was a
non-trivial change in the mean value of risky walk metric. Hence, we use dynamic analysis
when obtaining the FFmpeg call graph.
Wireshark (1.12.0)
Static 78 0.998 4.197 4.408 4.335 1.527E-05
Static+Dynamic 82 0.998 4.195 4.403 4.334 1.525E-05
Interpretation: Appending the call graphs obtained through dynamic analysis neither
decreased the number of fragments nor increased the monolithicity. Furthermore, there
was a trivial change in the mean value of the metrics. Hence, we do not use dynamic
analysis when obtaining the Wireshark call graph.
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cflow and gprof call graphs are saved to the disk as plain-text files. The attack surface
meter parses the textual call graph files and produces a single call graph that represents the
software system. The attack surface meter uses NetworkX5 version 1.9.1 to represent the
call graph. The nodes in the call graph represent the functions in the software system and
the edges represent transfer of control.
Step 2: Identify Entry, Exit, and Dangerous Points
The C standard input and output functions, used to identify the entry points and exit points
in FFmpeg and Wireshark, are the same as those listed in Appendix A of previous work [73]
by Manadhata. The dangerous system calls used in our study are the system calls with
threat level 1 through 3 enumerated by Bernaschi et al [9].
With the entry, exit, and dangerous points identified, functions belonging to the C stan-
dard library were removed from the call graph to prevent these functions from being ac-
counted for in the computation of our metrics.
Step 3a and 3b: Compute Proximity and Risky Walk Metrics
The attack surface meter has methods to compute the proximity and risky walk metrics
for a given function or file. These methods use the shortest_path_length and page_rank
methods from the NetworkX API.
4.4.3 Phase II: Function/File Labeling
To evaluate the efficacy of our metrics as an indicator of vulnerabilities, we must under-
stand fixes to historical post-release vulnerabilities and identify those functions/files that
were vulnerable in the past. We labeled functions/files that were fixed for post-release vul-
nerability as vulnerable and all other functions/files as neutral. We refer to these two groups
of functions/files as vulnerable functions/files and neutral functions/files, respectively.
We begin by collecting a list of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities from Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE)6, National Vulnerability Database (NVD)7, or the se-
curity advisories section on the project’s website. The security advisories section on the
project’s website is more suited for our purposes as it contains the versions of software af-
fected by a vulnerability and information that helps trace vulnerability fixes to the source
code. Furthermore, the security advisories are released only when a publicly-disclosed vul-
nerability is acknowledged and fixed by the project team. The FFmpeg and Wireshark
project teams post their security advisories at https://www.ffmpeg.org/security.html
and https://www.wireshark.org/security/, respectively. In our study of FFmpeg and
Wireshark, for each historical vulnerability fixed by the development team, we collected the
commit identifier that the project team reports as containing the fix. For each vulnerability-
fixing commit identifier collected, we generated a patch using the git client and parsed the
patch output (similar to [86]) to identify the name of the functions/files affected by the
commit. We manually examined a random sample of the patches to ensure that the fix
commit was not combined with other changes. In our sample, we found none of these cases
to be true for FFmpeg and Wireshark.
5 http://networkx.github.io/ 6 https://cve.mitre.org/ 7 https://nvd.nist.gov/
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4.4.4 Phase III: Association Analysis
We used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test to understand how well
the proximity and risky walk metrics reflect the reality of historical post-release vulnerabil-
ities. We consider the association between a given metric and post-release vulnerabilities to
be statistically significant if the p-value is less than 0.05. We use the population median to
determine if a metric is higher (or lower) for vulnerable functions/files when compared with
neutral functions/files.
Association analysis merely reveals if there is a statistically significant difference between
the distribution of the metric values collected from a population of vulnerable functions/files
from that of the metric values collected from a population of neutral functions/files. We
complemented the association analysis with Cohen’s d effect size evaluation to assess the
strength of association (if any, as revealed by MWW test). We used the heuristics proposed
in Cohen’s d literature [24] when interpreting the effect size. According to the heuristic,
an effect is considered large if |d| ≥ 0.8, medium if |d| ≥ 0.5, small if |d| ≥ 0.2, negligible
otherwise.
4.4.5 Phase IV: Regression Analysis
In the regression analysis phase, the goal is to assess if the proximity and risky walk metrics
can be used in building a regression model capable of predicting the likelihood of a func-
tion/file needing a fix for a post-release vulnerability in the future. A necessary condition
in the evaluation of the efficacy of such a model is to assess if it performs better than a
base prediction model built with SLOC and coupling metrics. The coupling metrics used
in this study are the structural variant of fan in and fan out of a function/file. Fan in is
the number of functions/files that call a given function/file and fan out is the number of
functions/files that a given function/file calls. We chose to use SLOC, fan in, and fan out
in building the base model because these metrics have been shown to be good predictors of
vulnerabilities [160, 133].
While fan in and fan out were collected directly from the call graph, SLOC was mea-
sured using Scitools Understand8. Functions/files for which SLOC was not available from
Understand were omitted when training and testing the model. We note that SLOC was
available for all functions/files that were fixed for a post-release vulnerability.
We used two approaches in the training and testing of the regression models:(a) Cross–
validation and (b) Next release validation. We used precision, recall, and F2-measure to
evaluate the performance of a model against the base model. In contrast to F1-measure, the
F2-measure weights recall higher than precision. A model that exhibits a higher recall is de-
sirable in vulnerability prediction [87, 22, 133]. We note that the performance of a model was
evaluated if and only if the model had at least one statistically significant (p-value ≤ 0.05)
feature.
In cross-validation, a model is repetitively trained and tested with random splits of the
data from a single release. We used stratified sampling when randomly splitting the data set
to ensure equal proportion of vulnerable and neutral functions/files was maintained between
the training and testing splits. In our study, we performed 10 repetitions of a 10-fold cross-
validation. In other words, we trained and tested 100 models in each of the 23 releases of
FFmpeg and Wireshark. The performance metrics—precision, recall, and F2-measure—were
aggregated across the 100 models.
8 https://scitools.com/understand/
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In next release validation, a model is trained with historical vulnerability data and tested
by attempting to predict known future vulnerabilities. For example, consider a scenario
where FFmpeg version 1.1.0 is being prepared for release. Retrospectively, all functions
fixed for a post-release vulnerability in releases leading up to, and including, 1.1.0 are used
in training the model. The model is then used to predict functions that are likely to require a
fix for a post-release vulnerability in the future. The predictions are validated by comparing
them against all functions known (in the context of this study) to be fixed for a post-release
vulnerability in patch releases from the 1.1.x branch (i.e. FFmpeg releases 1.1.1 to 1.1.16).
While cross-validation is an acceptable, and commonly used [145, 160, 136, 38], approach,
next release validation is intuitive and closer to reality. We chose to use both approaches to
ensure that the performance of our models can be compared with those from prior vulnera-
bility prediction literature.
Vulnerabilities are rare; the act of predicting vulnerabilities in software systems has
been compared with searching for a needle in a haystack [160]. As an example, on average, a
mere 0.67% of functions in FFmpeg were fixed for a vulnerability. At a file-level, however, an
average of 3.47% of files in FFmpeg were fixed for a vulnerability. Predicting at a higher level
of granularity may partially alleviate the problem of disproportionately sized populations of
vulnerable and neutral entities. However, even at the file-level, the number of vulnerable
entities are so few that the prediction models may be biased toward neutral entities resulting
in a considerably high false negative rate. We have used a popular approach to dealing with
class imbalanced data sets called SMOTE [18]. SMOTE uses synthetic over-sampling of
the minority class (vulnerable functions/files) and a random under-sampling of the majority
class (neutral functions/files). In our study, we have over-sampled vulnerable functions/files
by 200% and under-sampled neutral functions/files by 200%.
4.5 Results
In the subsections that follow, we present the results from the empirical evaluation of our
metrics.
4.5.1 RQ 1 - Association
Question: Is a function/file more likely to be fixed for a post-release vulnerability if:
(a) it is near the attack surface or dangerous points?
(b) it has a higher probability of being traversed on a random walk from the attack surface?
In this question, we wanted to understand if the proximity and risky walk metrics are
capable of explaining the reality of historical post-release vulnerabilities. A statistically
significant association between the metrics and historical post-release vulnerabilities support
the utility of these metrics as early warning indicators of vulnerability likelihood.
We found a statistically significant association between the proximity metrics and vulner-
able functions in 15 of the 16 FFmpeg releases and in all releases of Wireshark. The Cohen’s
d effect size evaluation was predominantly medium in FFmpeg and large in Wireshark. The
association results were consistent at the file-level as well, with the metrics being associated,
to a statistically significant extent, with vulnerable files in 14 of the 16 FFmpeg releases
and in all releases of Wireshark. The Cohen’s d effect size was predominantly small in both
FFmpeg and Wireshark.
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At both the function- and file-level, the median values of proximity metrics collected
from vulnerable functions/files were lesser than that collected from neutral functions/files.
In other words, vulnerable functions/files tend to be near the attack surface of a software
system and also other functions/files regarded as dangerous.
Vulnerable functions/files tend to be near the attack surface and/or dangerous points.
The association analysis also revealed a statistically significant association between the
risky walk metric and vulnerable functions in 13 of the 16 FFmpeg releases and in all releases
of Wireshark. The Cohen’s d effect size evaluation was predominantly small in both FFmpeg
and Wireshark. The association results were consistent with the file-level as well, with the
metric being associated, to a statistically significant extent, with vulnerable files in 15 of
the 16 FFmpeg releases and in all releases of Wireshark. The Cohen’s d effect size was
predominantly large in both FFmpeg and Wireshark.
At both the function- and file-level, the median value of risky walk metric collected
from vulnerable functions/files was higher than that collected from neutral functions/files
indicating that vulnerable functions/files tend to have a higher probability of being traversed
by a random walk starting at the attack surface.
Vulnerable functions/files have a higher probability of being traversed on a random walk
from the attack surface.
4.5.2 RQ 2 - Prediction (Base)
Question: Do proximity and risky walk metrics improve the performance of a base prediction
model built with SLOC and coupling metrics?
In this question, we wanted to understand if the proximity and risky walk metrics can be
used in building a predictive model that can predict the likelihood of a function/file being
vulnerable better than a base model built with SLOC and coupling metrics.
We begin the regression analysis by assessing the correlation between the different met-
rics: proximity, risky walk, SLOC, fan in, and fan out. We used the non-parametric Spear-
man’s Rank Correlation Coefficient, ρ, to asses the correlation between metrics. We observed
a very high positive correlation (ρ ≥ +0.97) between the proximity metrics. The high cor-
relation suggests that entry points, exit points, and dangerous points tend to be close to
one another. As a consequence, only one of the three proximity metrics may be sufficient in
explaining all three phenomena, rendering the other two metrics redundant. The correlation
analysis also revealed a strong positive correlation (ρ ≈ 0.76) between SLOC and fan out.
The positive correlation between SLOC and fan out is understandable in that a function that
has more SLOC is likely to have more function calls. We also observed a moderate negative
correlation (ρ ≈ −0.65) between fan out and the proximity metrics. All correlations were
statistically significant with p-value < 0.05.
We chose to not remove the redundant features manually but to use regression analysis
approaches that are capable of dealing with multicollinearity. We explored several parametric
and non-parametric regression analysis approaches and found the random forest machine
learning approach to perform the best. The model performance results presented here,
and in RQ3, are from the random forest model. Furthermore, the performance metrics—
precision, recall, and F2-measure—presented here are the mean values of those obtained from
the models using the cross-validation and next release validation approaches.
FFmpeg
CHAPTER 4. BEYOND THE ATTACK SURFACE 38
File-level: The average values of precision, recall, and F2-measure of the base model were
0.0467, 0.7938, and 0.1840, respectively. The random forest model outperformed the base
model model with an average precision of 0.1138 (an increase of 143.47%) and average F2-
measure of 0.3196 (an increase of 73.69%). However, the average recall of the random forest
model was 0.5753 (a decrease of 27.52% from that of base).
Function-level: The average values of precision, recall, and F2-measure of the base model
were 0.0114, 0.7200, and 0.0533, respectively. The random forest model outperformed the
base model with an average precision of 0.0156 (an increase of 36.33%) and average F2-
measure of 0.0725 (an increase of 36.07%). However, the average recall of the random forest
model was 0.5493 (a decrease of 23.71% from that of base).
Wireshark
File-level: The average values of precision, recall, and F2-measure of the base model were
0.1147, 0.7574, and 0.3399, respectively. The random forest model outperformed the base
model model with an average precision of 0.1841 (an increase of 60.53%) and average F2-
measure of 0.3646 (an increase of 7.25%). However, the average recall of the random forest
model was 0.5250 (a decrease of 30.68% from that of base).
Function-level: The average values of precision, recall, and F2-measure of the base model
were 0.0245, 0.5259, and 0.1023, respectively. The random forest model outperformed the
base model with an average precision of 0.0333 (an increase of 31.11%), average recall of
0.5991 (an increase of 13.93%), and average F2-measure of 0.1294 (an increase of 26.55%).
The random forest model outperformed the base model in terms of F2-measure at both
function- and file-levels.
As seen above, lowering the granularity of the metrics from file-level to function-level
makes finding the “needle in a haystack” an order of magnitude more difficult. While function-
level prediction has its challenges, the benefits warrant the need for more research at function-
level prediction. For instance, in FFmpeg, if a file is predicted as vulnerable, developers must
audit 306 SLOC, on average, however, if a function is predicted as vulnerable, developers
must audit 30 SLOC, on average–a considerable reduction in effort.
4.5.3 RQ 3 - Prediction (Prior)
Question: How do the prediction models built with proximity and risky walk metrics compare
with prior vulnerability prediction literature?
While traditional bug prediction is related to this question, our recent work has shown
that the best bug prediction models would perform poorly when predicting vulnerabili-
ties [104]. Further discussion on this is in Related Work in Section 4.7. Furthermore, vulner-
ability data used in building the model is one of the most important aspects in vulnerability
prediction [77]. There have been many studies [89, 148, 37, 36] that use warnings from static
code analyzers as indicators of vulnerability in a file. While these studies show that there is a
correlation between warnings from static code analyzers and vulnerabilities, the correlation
is moderate at best. In our prediction models, we have used real-world vulnerabilities i.e.
those that were publicly disclosed, acknowledged, and fixed by the development team. In
contrast, a recent work by Scandariato et al. [127] used files marked as vulnerable based
on warnings from a static code analyzer. While the precision and recall of the model was
shown to be high (≥ 0.8), the response from the model was not the likelihood of a file being
vulnerable but its likelihood of having a static analysis warning.
Prediction models from prior vulnerability prediction literature have operated at file-
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level [110, 82], component-level [111], or binary-level [160, 145]. We found only one vulner-
ability prediction model that attempted to predict vulnerabilities at a function-level [136].
As a consequence of the disparity in granularity, choice of study subjects, and vulnerability
data used in building the model, a direct comparison of the performance of the models in
terms of metrics like precision, recall, etc., may be unfair. However, since we have collected
our metrics, and built the prediction models, at both the function- and file-levels, we have
partially alleviated the limitation of direct comparison imposed by granularity. To ensure
fairness, we compared our function- and file-level models with other function- and file-level
models from prior literature, respectively. We also collected and compared the same metrics
(e.g. precision, recall, etc.) that were used in the performance evaluation of the models from
prior literature.
At the function-level, the random forest model, fitted to data from both FFmpeg and
Wireshark, outperformed the logistic regression model proposed by Shin and Williams [136].
The model proposed by Shin andWilliams [136] achieved an almost zero average false positive
rate (FPR) but a considerably high average false negative rate (FNR). A low FPR and a
high FNR suggests that the model may have marked almost all functions as neutral. The
best of our random forest models achieved a considerably lower average FNR of 0.3610 (a
58.02% decrease from 0.86) while maintaining an acceptable level of average accuracy at
0.8995 (a 4.31% decrease from 0.94).
Our file-level random forest model, fitted to data from both FFmpeg and Wireshark,
outperformed the file-level prediction model proposed by Theisen et al. [145]. The best
of our random forest models had an average recall that was considerably higher at 0.5796
(a 1059.24% increase from 0.05), the precision was 0.1984 (a 71.24% decrease from 0.69).
However, in vulnerability prediction we prefer higher recall over a higher precision [87].
Furthermore, the model proposed by Theisen et al. was built using only those files that ever
appeared on stack traces from system crashes. There may be files with latent vulnerabilities
(see [84]) that may have never crashed but their model does not consider these files. Putting
such a model into operation means that the system must be in production, and potentially
vulnerable, for a long time to get the stack trace data in the first place.
The file-level random forest models, fitted to data from both FFmpeg and Wireshark,
outperformed the component-level prediction model proposed by Gegick et al. [38]. The
CART model proposed by the authors achieved a recall of 0.57 but suffered a FPR of 0.48.
The best of our random forest models had an average recall of 0.5796, which is similar to the
model proposed by Gegick et al., however, the average FPR was 0.0876 (a 81.37% decrease).
In summary, both the function-level and file-level prediction models proposed in our work
outperformed comparable models from existing vulnerability prediction literature. The true
value of our metrics is in providing fine-grained, actionable, and interpretable intelligence
about potential security risks that tend to vary with everyday changes to the source code.
Furthermore, while performance metrics such as precision and recall provide a common
ground to compare models, they fail to capture the nuances of the model building process.
The random forest model, at both function- and file-levels, outperformed comparable mod-
els from prior literature.
4.6 Limitations
Our empirical analysis is based on historical vulnerabilities, which are by no means com-
prehensive. Thus, many vulnerabilities may exist in our systems that have not been found.
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This is a common limitation in empirical security research, and is the reason we use the word
“neutral” instead of “not vulnerable”.
A call graph is only an approximation of the system’s function calls because ensuring
all possible paths of control flow are represented is, at best, time consuming, and, at times,
impossible. Program analysis researchers [42, 43] have proposed several call graph construc-
tion algorithms that produce call graphs with varying levels of precision. Researchers have
used missing functions and/or function calls when comparing two call graphs [64] or two call
graph generation tools [107]. In our study, we conducted manual inspection of the call graph
to ensure its accuracy, and we suggest some added heuristics—number of fragments and
monolithicity—to help users of our metrics understand how “close” they may be to getting
as many graph edges and nodes as they will get.
The proposed metrics, especially the risky walk metric, depends on several parameters
that, if not tuned properly, may result in poor risk analysis. We have conducted sensitiv-
ity analysis via parameter tuning across our models (See Appendix B). We found similar
parameter values across our two case studies, indicating that our discovered parameters
may generalize. Nonetheless, we recommend that some careful consideration be put into
parameters when deploying these metrics.
Furthermore, the risky walk metric is sensitive to the weight assigned to edges in the call
graph. While the sensitivity may seem to be a limitation of the metric, it indeed presents
the users with an opportunity to configure the metric to better reflect the structure and
history of a software system. For instance, in our empirical evaluation, we have chosen to
increase the weight of edges terminating at historically vulnerable functions/files with the
assumption that an attacker may attempt to start the reconnaissance by looking at such
functions/files. We did, however, explore the impact of not weighting the edges terminating
at historically vulnerable functions/files and found that the prediction models suffered a small
(2.70% in FFmpeg and 7.84% in Wireshark) decrease in the average F2-measure, while still
outperforming the base model. The exploration revealed that the prediction performance of
the models can be improved by assigning appropriate weights to the call graph edges thus
allowing the users to customize the metric to their software systems.
4.7 Related Work
The attack surface as a metaphor for risk is far from new. Michael Howard of Microsoft
proposed the idea of quantifying security of a software system by measuring its attack pro-
file [45]. Michael Howard’s proposal was to reduce the attack profile of a product by having
only the most commonly used features enabled by default. He introduced the notion of
attackability of a product as a measure of its exposure to an attack. He computed the
Relative Attack Surface Quotient (RASQ) to compare the attackability of seven versions of
the Windows operating system to assess the relative security between them. The notion of
attackability was redefined by Howard et al. along three dimensions: targets and enablers,
channels and protocols, and access rights [47]. Howard et al. also proposed a formal method
of measuring attack surface of software system in terms of its attack vectors (features that
may be used in an attack).
The granularity of attack surface measurement was lowered from a system-level to a
design-level by defining entry points and exit points to identify resources that compose
the attack surface [71]. The notion of size of the attack surface emerged as measured by
number of entry and exit points. We propose the refinement of the attack surface metrics
by extending them to individual functions (and files) and taking into account the structure
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as they connect to the system’s entry and exit points.
In addition to interpreting the attack surface as being the outer shell of a system, we could
also consider all resources “exposed” through the surface as being part of the attack surface as
well. Younis et al. [154, 155] used reachability analysis to assess the severity of a vulnerability
and the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited. While this work used call graphs,
they did not apply attack surface metrics to individual functions as we did. We also take
dangerous system calls into account in our empirical analysis. Theisen et al. [145] used the
attack surface metaphor to improve existing vulnerability prediction models. The authors
have shown that approximating the attack surface of a software system using functions
from stack traces improves the performance of existing vulnerability prediction models. The
prediction models are at the source file and compiled binary levels. While their study focuses
on prediction improvement, our study focuses on producing a more lightweight approach to
collecting metrics that rely on the call graph and entry/exit points, and does not require a
database of millions of stack traces from production usage data.
A vulnerability is a special kind of a software bug, one that has security consequences.
Naturally, one may assume that bug/defect prediction models [150, 88, 161] may be used
in vulnerability prediction. While an empirical connection has been observed [138], we
have shown that bugs do not foreshadow vulnerabilities [104]. Thus, while the vulnerability
prediction methods may resemble bug prediction, the models do not directly translate.
4.8 Summary
The goal of this study is to assess security risk through an empirical understanding of the
relationship between vulnerabilities, individual functions/files, and the attack surface of a
software system. We proposed novel attack surface metrics—proximity and risky walk—
defined on the call graph representation of a software system. Our empirical analysis revealed
a statistically significant association with historical vulnerabilities (RQ1), and that prediction
models outperformed a base prediction model built with SLOC and coupling metrics (RQ2).
Prediction models that leverage our metrics, at both function- and file-levels, outperformed
comparable models from prior vulnerability literature (RQ3). We envision the metrics to
be beneficial to both researchers and practitioners as they are simple to collect, intuitive to
understand, and flexible to apply.
In the future, we will explore the space of personalization and edge weighting schemes for
the call graph as that affords an enormous opportunity for configuration and room for inno-





Software metrics help developers discover and fix mistakes. However, despite
promising empirical evidence, vulnerability discovery metrics are seldom relied
upon in practice. In prior research, the effectiveness of these metrics has typi-
cally been expressed solely with precision and recall of a prediction model. These
prediction models, being black box machine learning models, may not be deemed
useful by developers. However, by systematically interpreting the models and
metrics, we can provide developers with nuanced insights about factors that have
led to security mistakes in the past. In this study, we systematically review the
literature to enumerate the vulnerability discovery metrics proposed and the
extent to which their ability to support decision making has been validated.
We identified 172 vulnerability discovery metrics from the literature but their
decision-informing ability was primarily validated using association, discrimina-
tion, and prediction, with limited attention given to actionability, causality, and
developer perception. We collected ten metrics (churn, collaboration central-
ity, complexity, contribution centrality, nesting, known offender, source lines of
code, # inputs, # outputs, and # paths) from six open-source projects. We
assessed the generalizability of the metrics across two contextual dimensions
(application domain and programming language) and between projects within
a domain, computed thresholds for the metrics using an unsupervised approach
from literature, and assessed the ability of these unsupervised thresholds to
classify risk from historical vulnerabilities in the Chromium project.
A part of the study presented in this Chapter is published in the Proceedings
of the 2019 International Workshop on Data-Driven Decisions, Experimentation
and Evolution (DDrEE) [102].
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5.1 Motivation
Vulnerability discovery metrics [110, 109, 135, 136, 133, 137, 134, 138, 22, 81, 82, 85, 160,
127, 149, 115, 156], having been empirically-validated to be associated with historical vulner-
abilities, have incredible potential to provide insights into the engineering failures that may
have led to the introduction of vulnerabilities. Despite empirical evidence of the association
between metrics and vulnerabilities, their adoption in practice has been limited owing to
concerns such as the high frequency of false positive from predictive models that use the
metrics as features, the granularity at which the metrics operate, and lack of interpretable
and actionable intelligence from the metrics [91].
In prior vulnerability discovery metrics literature, there seems to be an overwhelming
emphasis on optimizing precision and recall of vulnerability prediction models at the expense
of interpretability, usability, and actionability of the insights from such models. However,
by using the performance of a vulnerability prediction model to infer the utility of metrics,
we are ignoring the metrics’ ability to tell a story, as Fenton and Neil suggested in their
software metrics roadmap almost twenty years ago [32]. Even if we had a vulnerability
prediction model with a precision and recall of 90% in one project, we may not be able
to apply it to predict vulnerabilities in a different project [162]. The insights from such
a model and the metrics, however, may be transferable as being indicators of engineering
failures that may have led to vulnerabilities in the past. For instance, consider a metric
that identifies if a file is on the approximated attack surface [145] or one that quantifies the
proximity of a function to the attack surface (Chapter 4). These metrics may not yield a
marked improvement in precision and recall but provide valuable insights to contextualize
the change that developers make to the software. In effect, we must ask ourselves what is the
metric telling us? and what can we ask developers to do? We must humanize the metrics
such that they can communicate the rationale for a source code entity to be considered
vulnerable. In interpreting the feedback that a metric provides, developers gain awareness
of the potential factors that lead to vulnerabilities thus aiding the inculcation of an attacker
mindset.
Our research vision, as stated in Chapter 1, is to assist developers in engineering se-
cure software by providing a technique that generates scientific, interpretable, and actionable
feedback on security as the software evolves [97]. In this chapter, we describe an essential
step toward the accomplishment of this research vision through (1) the systematization of
the state of the art in vulnerability discovery knowledge, specifically, in the realm of met-
rics-based discovery of vulnerabilities and (2) the assessment of the potential for deriving
metrics- and data-driven insights from vulnerability discovery metrics in an unsupervised
way.
We address the following research questions:
RQ 1 - Enumeration
What metrics have been proposed to discover security vulnerabilities in software?
RQ 2 - Validation
How have researchers evaluated the decision-informing ability of the metrics to discover
security vulnerabilities in software?
RQ 3 - Generalizability
Are vulnerability discovery metrics similarly distributed across projects?
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RQ 4 - Thresholds
Are thresholds of vulnerability discovery metrics effective at classifying risk from vul-
nerabilities?
5.2 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used in collecting and analyzing the data needed
to address the research questions. Addressing RQ 1 and RQ 2 requires a traditional system-
atic literature review methodology, while addressing RQ 3 and RQ 4 requires a traditional
empirical research methodology. We describe the methodology here in a way that is as de-
coupled from the research questions as possible. We will, however, refer to specific parts of
this section when presenting the results for each research question.
5.2.1 Systematic Review
In this section, we describe the methodology used to collect and analyze the data to address
research questions RQ 1 and RQ 2.
Sidenote: At the outset, we want to acknowledge an event that caused us to de-
viate from the systematic literature review methodology presented in this section.
While we were being methodical in developing the protocol to guide the system-
atic literature review, our colleague—Patrick Morrison—from North Carolina
State University published a study mapping the field of security metrics [92]. As
a result, the initial few steps of our methodology were rendered redundant. We
adapted our methodology to use the studies mapped by Morrison et al. as our
candidate studies thus removing the need to perform the search for candidate
studies ourselves.
A typical [55] systematic literature review has three main stages: (1) plan, (2) conduct,
and (3) report. In each of these main stages, there are several subtasks that must be
accomplished to ensure that the review is carried out in as rigorous, unbiased, and repeatable
way as possible. We describe the subtasks in the planning stage of the systematic review in
the remainder of this section. The planning stage concludes with the publication of a review
protocol to the research team. The conducting stage involves carrying out the plan outlined
in the review protocol and the reporting stage involves presenting the observations from the
review. We describe the conducting and reporting stages when presenting our results in in
Section 5.3.
In the planning stage, the specifics of all aspects needed for the conduct of the systematic
review being proposed are identified and documented. The planning stage is crucial to ensure
the rigor of the systematic review. In the subsections that follow, the various subtasks of the
planning stage are described in detail. The stage begins by determining if there is indeed a
need for the review being proposed. The stage concludes with the publication of a review
protocol to the research team. The research team will then use the protocol to guide the
conduct of the systematic review, revisiting the planning stage only when there are issues
identified with the protocol during the conduct stage.
The protocol has been developed in adherence with the guidelines for performing Sys-
tematic Literature Reviews in Software Engineering prescribed by Kitchenham and Charters
[55]. In addition to the guidelines prescribed by Kitchenham and Charters, specific aspects
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEMATIZATION 45
of the the review protocol have further been informed by other, more specific, guidelines.
For instance, we used the guide published by Counsell [25] to aid formulating the research
questions in our systematic review. We reference such specific guidelines in the sections that
they are applicable in.
Need for the Review
The literature on vulnerability discovery metrics is largely scattered across many primary
studies [110, 109, 135, 136, 133, 137, 134, 138, 22, 81, 82, 85, 160, 127, 149, 115, 156]. To aid
developers in engineering secure software, we must characterize the factors that may have
led to the introduction of vulnerabilities in the past. The primary need for the systematic
review is to aggregate the empirical evidence demonstrating the utility of metrics to discover
vulnerabilities in software. The secondary need for the systematic review is as a prelude to
the subsequent research studies conducted toward achieving our research vision.
As recommended by the guidelines [55], we searched for existing secondary studies ad-
dressing the same (or similar) research questions as we aim to address in our systematic
review. In this search, we used Google Scholar1 as the query engine and software +
vulnerability + review as the search string. While we did not find any secondary stud-
ies addressing the same research questions as we aim to address, we did find two studies
[67, 39] that seemed related. However, these studies are not systematic review but rather
surveys of the different approaches to discover vulnerabilities. The use of metrics to discover
vulnerabilities in software was just one of many approaches described in the work by [39].
Research Question(s)
The guidelines [55] prescribe the use of the PICOC (Population, Intervention, Compari-
son, Outcomes, and Context) criteria to structure research questions in systematic reviews.
The components (i.e. PICOC) of the research question are determined by the type of re-
search question. The type of research question is in-turn determined by the type of evidence
available in the primary studies (See Table 3 in the study by Fineout-Overholt and Johnston
[33] for examples of different types of questions and the types of evidence needed to answer
a given question).
In the context of our systematic review, these components of the research question are
as follows.
Population The population component in our review is software since the goal is to un-
derstand the metrics that aid in discovery of vulnerabilities in software.
Intervention The intervention component in our review is the increasing or decreasing of
the value of an empirically-validated metric as a result of some activity in the Software
Development Lifecycle.
Comparison The comparison component is not applicable in our review because the goal
of our review is not to compare the intervention across studies but to characterize the
intervention itself.
Outcomes The outcome that concerns our review is discovery of security vulnerabilities.
Context In Software Engineering, the context is the context in which the primary study was
conducted. The context could include factors such as where (academia or industry),
what (open source or closed source), who (if applicable, practitioners, academics, or
students), and how (quantitative or qualitative). In our review, the only restriction on
context is that the primary study must be quantitative. By not restricting the where,
1 https://scholar.google.com/
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what, and, who, we are likely to get a holistic perspective on the literature increasing
the potential for our review to produce more generalizable conclusions.
The research questions RQ 1 and RQ 2 were formulated using the aforementioned guide-
lines.
Search Strategy
The approach to identify the primary studies that will be systematically reviewed to ad-
dress the research questions is outlined here. The search for primary studies is accomplished
by search strings to search various source of candidate studies. There are two steps that
must be accomplished before the search can begin, they are: (1) identify sources of primary
studies and (2) identify search keywords.
A note on terminology before we proceed: we use the phrase candidate study to refer to
any study that is hypothesized to be relevant to our review according to some predetermined
criteria (i.e. is retrieved by the keywords used to search). The candidate studies are subject
to thorough inclusion and exclusion criteria to identify those studies that are relevant to
address the research questions posed in our systematic review. We use the phrase primary
study to refer to a candidate study that satisfies the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
We use a set of primary studies known, from manual search and prior experience, to be
relevant to address the research questions posed in our systematic review to identify sources
of primary studies and validate the search keywords. The set of known primary studies is
known as the Quasi-Gold Standard Set as described by Zhang et al. [159]. The primary
studies that compose the Quasi-Gold Standard Set in our review are listed in Appendix C.
We used the Quasi-Gold Standard approach prescribed by Zhang et al. [159] to validate,
and improve, the effectiveness of the final search string. More specifically, we use the Quasi-
Sensitivity metric defined in Equation (5.1). The metric enables objective assessment of the
effectiveness of the search strings. For instance, assume that the Quasi-Gold Standard Set
contains 10 studies published by ACM. If a search using the ACM Digital Library retrieved
8 (of the 10) studies, then the Quasi-Sensitivity is 80%.
Quasi-Sensitivity =
# Studies in Quasi-Gold Standard Set Retrieved
Total # Studies in Quasi-Gold Standard
% (5.1)
As Zhang et al. [159] have suggested, a rational threshold for Quasi-Sensitivity may be
assumed to say that the search strategy is acceptable. We have chosen 80% as the threshold
in our review.
Identify Sources of Primary Studies
We begin by identifying the sources from which our primary studies are likely to originate.
Since we have a set of known primary studies (the Quasi-Gold Standard Set), we simply
enumerate the publishers of these primary studies. The publishers become the sources of
primary studies in our review.
The studies in our Quasi-Gold Standard Set were published by five distinct publishers:
(1) ACM, (2) IEEE, (3) Elsevier, (4) Springer, and (5) USENIX. Each of these publishers
provide a service to search their respective publication databases. The name, and location
(URL), of the search services used in our review are shown in Table 5.1.
In addition to the search services shown in Table 5.1, we used the private search service
provided by Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT), called Summon, that is used by RIT
Library (https://library.rit.edu/). We chose to include Summon as a catch-all source
of primary studies to include studies that may be missed by the other search services. In
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Table 5.1: Search services provided by publishers of academic content
Publisher Service (URL)
ACM ACM Digital Library (https://dl.acm.org/)




the past, systematic reviews have used Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com/) for
similar purposes.
Identify Search Keywords
We followed the approach outlined below to identify the keywords that will be used to
query sources of academic publications for candidate studies.
1. We started with the population (software), intervention (metrics), and outcome (dis-
cover vulnerabilities) components from the research questions outlined earlier. In
addition to these components, we also included the context (quantitative) in which
primary studies should have been conducted to be considered relevant.
2. We identified synonyms of the keywords pertaining to population, intervention, out-
come, and context. We also considered truncated versions (stems) of the keywords
to ensure variations in usage of the same keyword was accounted for. For instance,
the truncated keyword “vulner” can capture both “vulnerability” and “vulnerabilities”.
When applicable, we also considered alternative spellings2 of the keywords to allow
for difference in word usage across English dialects.
3. We combined the search keywords, their corresponding synonyms, truncated forms,
and alternatives spelling using the boolean OR operator.
4. We then used the boolean AND operator to combine the search strings (combination
of search keywords, their synonyms, truncated forms, and alternative spellings) corre-
sponding to population, intervention, and outcome.
The search strings obtained by applying the aforementioned approach are as follows.
Population
• “software” OR “application” OR “system” OR “program” OR “product” OR “code”
Intervention
• “metric” OR (“measure” OR “measurement”)
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_spelling_variants
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Outcome
• ((“discover” OR “detect” OR “predict” OR “uncover” OR “locate”) AND (“vulnerability”
OR “vulnerabilities” OR “security vulnerability” OR “security vulnerabilities”))
• ((“vulnerability” OR “security vulnerability”) AND (“discovery” OR “detection” OR
“prediction”))
Context
• “quantitative” OR “empirical” OR “evidence-based” OR “experiential”
The individual search strings corresponding to the population, intervention, outcome,
and context are logically combined using the form (outcome AND intervention AND population
AND context). The effective search string is shown in Figure 5.1
(((“discover” OR “detect” OR “predict” OR “uncover” OR “locate”) AND (“vulnerability”
OR “vulnerabilities” OR “security vulnerability” OR “security vulnerabilities”)) OR
((“vulnerability” OR “security vulnerability”) AND (“discovery” OR “detection” OR
“prediction”))) AND (“metric” OR (“measure” OR “measurement”)) AND (“software” OR
“application” OR “system” OR “program” OR “product” OR “code”) AND (“quantitative”
OR “empirical” OR “evidence-based” OR “experiential”)
Figure 5.1: Effective search string in the systematic review
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria to Select Primary Studies
By applying the search strategy, we will identify candidate studies that are hypothesized
to be relevant to our systematic review. However, not all candidate studies may contain the
data needed to address all the research questions posed in our systematic review. In this step
of the review process, the candidate studies are subject to additional criteria (referred to
as inclusion and exclusion criteria) to identify those studies that are relevant to our review.
The inclusion and exclusion criteria used in our systematic review are described here.
Applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria to evaluate the relevancy of candidate
studies is, for the most past, an objective exercise. As a result, the benefit of having at least
two authors independently apply the inclusion and exclusion criteria to all the candidate
studies may be trivial. However, to quantify the objectivity of applying the inclusion and
exclusion criteria, a random subset of the candidate studies will be independently evaluated
for relevancy by at least two authors. The level of agreement between the two authors
will be quantified using the Cohen’s κ. If the level of agreement is not almost perfect
(See scale in a paper by Landis and Koch [60]), all candidate studies will be independently
evaluated for relevancy by at least two authors to mitigate subjectivity. In the event that
two or more authors apply the inclusion and exclusion criteria to all candidate studies, the
level of agreement between the authors will be assessed using Cohen’s κ, if two authors were
involved, or Fleiss’ κ, if more than two authors were involved. Any disagreements in applying
the inclusion and exclusion criteria will be resolved through discussion among the authors
involved. If the discussion yields no consensus, an additional author may be involved to
mediate the disagreement.
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEMATIZATION 49
Exclusion Criteria
The exclusion criteria defines rules to exclude a candidate study from consideration. The
exclusion criteria in our review is as follows.
• Studies for which the published full text is inaccessible through the University’s sub-
scription.
• Studies not written in English.
• Studies that have not been subject to peer review.
• Studies published as extended abstracts or supplement to poster and/or presentation.
• Studies that are secondary or tertiary.
• Studies published before the year 2000.3
• Studies not published in a venue related to the discipline of Computer Science.
Inclusion Criteria
• Study proposes and/or evaluates one or more metrics as a means to discover vulnera-
bilities in software.
• Study presents empirical evidence when reasoning about the utility of the metrics to
discover vulnerabilities in software.
The empirical evidence presented is in the context of publicly-disclosed historical vul-
nerabilities either disclosed via the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) or as ad-
visories or bulletins in vendor-specific security disclosure portals such as Microsoft
Security Bulletin4 and Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories.5 The rationale behind
this qualification is that we do not want to include studies that assume static analysis
warnings to be indicative of real vulnerabilities and propose and/or evaluate metrics
to discover static analysis warnings.
• Study describes the approach to collect the metric being proposed and/or evaluated
with enough detail to enable replication.
• Study provides an interpretation of the metric as being a factor in vulnerability dis-
covery.
Data Extraction Strategy
The data needed to address the research questions in our systematic review will be
extracted from the primary studies using a predetermined data extraction form. The design
of the data extraction form is driven by the research questions and the type of data needed to
address the research questions. The data extraction form that will be used in our systematic
review is presented in Table D.1 in Appendix D.
3 The year threshold is based on a similar study by Morrison et al. [92]. The threshold,
while arbitrary, is reasonable since the term vulnerability was formally defined by Krsul in his
PhD thesis [57] in 1998. 4 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletins.aspx
5 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/
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The process of extracting data from primary studies, for the most part, is an objective
exercise. As a result, the benefit of having at least two authors independently extract the
same data from all primary studies may be trivial. However, to quantify the objectivity
of the data extraction process, at least two authors will independently extract data from a
random subset of the primary studies. The level of agreement between the two authors will
be quantified using the Cohen’s κ. If the level of agreement is not almost perfect (See scale
in a paper by Landis and Koch [60]), at least two authors will independently extract data
from all primary studies to mitigate subjectivity. In the event that two or more authors
extract the data from all primary studies, the level of agreement between the authors will be
assessed using Cohen’s κ, if two authors were involved, or Fleiss’ κ, if more than two authors
were involved. Any disagreements in data extraction will be resolved through discussion
among the authors involved. If the discussion yields no consensus, an additional author may
be involved to mediate the disagreement.
Extracted Data Synthesis Approach
There are two ways of synthesizing data for addressing research questions in a system-
atic review: descriptive (narrative) synthesis and quantitative synthesis. Although primary
studies in our systematic review are likely to be empirical in nature, using formal meta-
analysis to synthesize data in a quantitative way may be infeasible since the protocol for
reporting quantitative results tend to vary greatly between primary studies [16]. As a result,
we will use the descriptive (narrative) synthesis approach to synthesize the data needed for
addressing the research questions in our systematic review.
Protocol Pilot
The review protocol is perhaps the most important factor in ensuring that the systematic
review is carried out in as rigorous, unbiased, and repeatable way as possible. The review
protocol described thus far has been collaboratively developed by two authors to uncover
any methodological flaws as early as possible. We also piloted the protocol by applying it to
a subset of candidate studies identified using the search strategy.
5.2.2 Empirical Research
In this section, we describe the methodology used to collect and analyze the data to address
research questions RQ 3 and RQ 4.
Data Collection
We collected nine of the 18 vulnerability discovery metrics described in Section A.1
of Appendix A from six open-source projects spanning three domains. Being a manually
collected metric, offender was difficult and time consuming to collect from all six projects.
Therefore, we only collected it for the Chromium project, reusing a considerable portion of
the data collected as part of a previous work [106]. The projects that we considered in our
study are shown in Table 5.2.
We only collected the metrics from file paths ending with the extensions .c, .cc, .cpp,
.cxx, .h, .hh, .hpp, .hxx, or .inl for C/C++ projects and .java for Java projects.
Data Analysis
In the subsections that follow, we describe the series of analysis we performed on the
vulnerability discovery metrics collected from the six open-source projects. We used R [119]
version 3.5.1 to conduct our data analysis.
Assessing Normality
In using statistical methods, we must validate the assumption of normality to inform the
choice of parametric or nonparametric statistical methods. We used the Anderson-Darling
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Table 5.2: Projects from which the vulnerability discovery metrics were collected










*Total number of source lines of code across all languages.
test to assess if the metrics collected from a project are normally distributed. We found,
with statistical significance (p-value  0.001), that no discrete- or continuous-valued metric
was normally distributed in any of the projects.
Assessing Generalizability
In addressing RQ 3, we wanted to assess if the vulnerability discovery metrics proposed
in the literature are generalizable. The interpretation of the term generalizability may be
subjective. Therefore, we define the necessary (not sufficient) condition for generalizability
as the need to have consistent distribution. We assessed the generalizability condition of a
metric by comparing the distribution of the metric values collected from different projects.
We used the same approach that Zhang et al. [158] used to assess the impact of contextual
dimensions on the distribution of metrics.
We used the nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis to assess if the sample distribution of metric
values collected from projects, grouped by contextual dimensions, originated from the same
underlying distribution. We consider the outcome from the Kruskal–Wallis test to be sta-
tistically significant if p-value < 2.78e − 03 = 0.05/9/2 (α = 0.05 corrected for multiplicity
using Bonferroni Correction).
A statistically significant outcome from Kruskal–Wallis test would indicate that at least
one metric distribution is different from the rest. To explain the difference(s) further, we sup-
plement the outcome from Kruskal–Wallis test with observations from pairwise comparison
of distribution of metric values using the nonparametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test.
We consider the outcome from the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test to be statistically sig-
nificant if p-value< 7.94e−04 = 0.05/63 (α = 0.05 corrected for multiplicity using Bonferroni
Correction). The inference from a statistically significant outcome from Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon test is that the metric distributions being assessed are different. To quantify the
magnitude of the difference in distributions, we used Cliff’s δ [69], a nonparametric effect
size measure. The difference between distributions is considered negligible when δ < 0.147,
small when 0.147 ≤ δ < 0.33, medium when 0.33 ≤ δ < 0.474, and large when δ > 0.474
[124].
In summary, we consider a metric to satisfy the generalizability condition if it is similarly
distributed irrespective of contextual dimensions and between projects within a domain with
negligible to medium effect size (same as the threshold of large effect size used by Zhang et
al. [158]).
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Computing Thresholds
Vulnerability discovery metrics are typically evaluated using a supervised approach re-
quiring data on historical vulnerabilities to train a prediction model that uses the metrics
as explanatory variables. While some projects may have a curated list of historical vulnera-
bilities to satisfy this prerequisite, a model trained with data from one project may not be
directly applicable to discover vulnerabilities in a different project [162]. An unsupervised
approach is, therefore, needed.
An intuitive interpretation of a metric is to establish, and use, thresholds to label an entity
being measured to exhibit certain attribute to a higher or lower degree. While computing
a universal threshold for all projects is intractable, Lanza and Marinescu suggest using
statistical information rankings to determine explicable thresholds [61].
In our study, we used the methodology proposed by Alves et al. [5] to compute the
thresholds. Despite being an unsupervised approach, the methodology proposed by Alves et
al. was found to be effective in the prediction of fault-proneness in comparison with other
supervised approaches [14].
We compute the thresholds for only those metrics that satisfied our generalizability
condition. As proposed by Alves et al. [5], we compute the thresholds by taking metric
values from all projects together and use the same 70%, 80%, and 90% of the weighted
(using the source lines of code metric) metric value averaged over all projects to determine
the risk levels. We use the following risk levels to assess risk using a metric (m): low
(m < 70%), medium (70% ≤ m < 80%), high (80% ≤ m < 90%), and critical (m ≥ 90%).
In addressing RQ 4, we use the metrics’ thresholds to classify the risk from metrics
collected from known (historically) vulnerable files (determined by the offender metric). We
quantify the effectiveness of such risk classification by expressing the coverage (i.e. percentage
of vulnerable files covered) of and assessing the odds of finding a vulnerable file in each of
the non-trivial risk levels (i.e. risk levels other than low).
5.3 Results
In the subsections that follow, we address the research questions. We begin by providing an
overview of the primary studies reviewed. As highlighted in the side note at the beginning
of Section 5.2.1, we used the 70 studies already mapped by Morrison et al. as containing
security metrics [92] as the candidate studies in our work. 5 of these 70 studies were already
in our Quasi-Gold Standard Set. We applied our inclusion and exclusion criteria to the
remaining 65 studies and identified 8 as being relevant. The 8 primary studies identified as
being relevant through the review are listed in Appendix E. In total, we reviewed 26 primary
studies (8 from review and 18 from Quasi-Gold Standard Set) spanning the ten years from
2007 to 2017. The data extracted from these 26 primary studies are available for download
as a data set from Zenodo [103].
The 26 primary studies were authored by 15 distinct first authors. While all primary
studies evaluated the utility of metrics to discover vulnerabilities, there were certain differ-
ences between the studies. These differences were in (1) the granularity at which the analysis
was performed, (2) the metric used to quantify vulnerability of an entity (which in turn de-
pends on the granularity of analysis), and (3) the subjects of study, and their respective
nature (open-source or closed-source), used in the empirical analysis. An overview of the
differences we observed among the primary studies follows.
Level of Granularity
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We identified 9 distinct levels of granularity at which researchers have analyzed the
utility of vulnerability discovery metrics. The level of granularity is an important
aspect since higher level of granularity has been cited as one of the factors inhibiting
the adoption of metrics in practice [91]. We observed file, component, and commit to
be the top three most common level of granularity with 11, 5, and 4 primary studies
analyzing the metrics at the file, component, and commit level, respectively. Insights
at the commit level of granularity is likely to be the most actionable because (1) the
insights are in the context of a logical unit of change to the software system and (2) the
developer contributing the commit, being familiar with the change, is most suited to
interpret the insights to assess its validity.
Vulnerability Metric
We identified 5 distinct metrics used to quantify vulnerability of an entity (which
dependents on the granularity). The metric used to quantify vulnerability becomes the
dependent (or response) variable when evaluating the utility of vulnerability discovery
metrics. We observed that the boolean metric, vulnerability, was the most common
measure of vulnerability of an entity with 16 primary studies using it as the dependent
variable. The vulnerability metric is true if the entity has had (or has been fixed for)
a vulnerability in the past, false otherwise.
Subjects of Study
We identified 87 distinct subjects of study in which the utility of vulnerability discovery
metrics has been evaluated in. When a primary study (the study by Gegick et al. [36],
for instance) did not report the name of the subject of study for confidentiality, we
used the unreported-closed or unreported-open in place of the name of the subject
of study for closed-source and open-source, respectively. Firefox, Apache httpd, and
Wireshark were the most common subjects of study with 6, 5, and 4 primary studies
that used these in the empirical analysis, respectively. We also observed that 86.21% of
the subjects of study were written in C or C++, 10.34% in PHP, and 3.45% for which
the language was not reported either because the subject of study was proprietary or
because the specifics of the subjects were only presented in aggregate. As for the nature
of the subjects of study, we observed that 22 primary studies considered only open-
source projects in their analysis while the remaining 4 primary studies considered only
closed-source projects. The bias toward open-source is expected given the inherent
challenges in gaining access to analyzing closed-source projects. In fact, the 4 primary
studies that only analyzed closed-source projects were authored by 2 distinct first
authors and all 4 primary studies had at least one collaborator from the software
development organization whose projects were analyzed (Microsoft and Cisco in case
of the 4 primary studies).
As we described in Chapter 1, one of the key contributions of our work is the implemen-
tation of the vulnerability discovery metrics identified through the systematic review. While
our initial goal was to implement all the metrics identified, we found ourselves having to
trade off between making contribution to knowledge versus community. As a consequence
of weighing this trade off, we chose to implement a subset of the metrics identified during
the systematic review. However, our decision to implement the metrics as containerized
microservices led to the creation of a platform which provides all necessary architectural
boilerplate to implement additional metric services with minimal effort. The platform is
called Samaritan and the specifics of the platform and the subset of vulnerability discovery
metrics implemented to date are presented in Appendix A.
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5.3.1 RQ 1 - Enumeration
Question: What metrics have been proposed to discover security vulnerabilities in software?
Motivation. The purpose of the systematic literature review is to systematize the vast
vulnerability discovery metric knowledge [92] scattered across the many academic publica-
tions [110, 109, 135, 136, 133, 137, 134, 138, 22, 81, 82, 85, 160, 127, 149, 115, 156]. The
motivation for the enumeration research question is to enumerate all metrics that have been
shown, through empirical evaluation, to be utilitarian in vulnerability discovery.
Approach. We used the data extraction form presented in Table D.1 in Appendix D to
systematically collect data needed to address this research question from each primary study.
While collecting data about the metrics proposed and/or evaluated in each primary study,
we observed that the same metric was aggregated using different aggregation functions in
different primary studies. For instance, while Chowdhury and Zulkernine [21] aggregated
Cyclomatic Complexity metric at the file level by computing the average of the metric
value collected from all functions in the file, Shin and Williams [137] aggregated the same
metric at the file level by computing the sum and maximum of the metric value collected
from all functions in the file. Since we used Airtable, a spreadsheet-database hybrid, to
implement the data extraction form, we were able to normalize the extraction form such
that we collected unique metrics separately and used references to associate metrics to a
primary study. Furthermore, unlike Morrison et al. [92], who clustered metrics related to
one another into distinct groups to deduplicate security metrics in the literature, we treat
two (or more) metrics to be the same if and only if their implementation is the same or if one
metric can be obtained by aggregating another metric. For instance, line churn and thirty-
day line churn that appear in the study by Meneely et al. [85] are treated the same because
the implementation of the thirty-day line churn metric is simply a filtered aggregation of the
line churn metric. However, we have treated percentage of interactive churn and thirty-day
percentage of interactive churn that also appear in the study by Meneely et al. [85] as two
separate metrics because their implementations are different, albeit slightly, and one metric
cannot be aggregated from the other.
Observations. We identified a total of 172 metrics that have been proposed and/or
evaluated for as factor in discovering vulnerabilities. The list of metrics identified is presented
in Appendix F. In terms of the data type of the metric, almost all (159) metrics were
numerical with a small number (11) being boolean. We had a one metric each of type
categorical (programming language from the study by Perl et al. [115]) and tuple (attack
surface measurement from the study by Manadhata and Wing [71]).
On average, 11 metrics were proposed and/or evaluated in each primary study with the
study by Zimmermann et al. [160] having the most metrics at 26. We observed that the
source lines of code was the one metric that was in a majority of the primary studies (14 of
the 26). The maximum nesting level of control structures in a function and the incoming
information flow (aka fan in) were a close second, appearing in 8 primary studies each.
However, only 28 of all identified metrics have been studied by two or more distinct first
authors. As mentioned earlier, more than 95% of the subjects of study were written in C,
C++, or PHP. We observed that only 6 metrics have been studied in the context of all
three programming languages. We also observed that 14 metrics have been studied in both
open-source and closed-source studies.
172 metrics have been proposed and/or evaluated to discover vulnerabilities in software
with 28 of these metrics studied by two or more distinct first authors. Over 95% of the
subjects of study used in the literature were written in C, C++, or PHP and only 6 metrics
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identified have been studies in the context of all three programming languages.
The observations from the enumeration research question highlights a key limitation that
must be overcome if we were to attempt to use the vulnerability discovery metrics to assist
developers in engineering secure software: the considerable majority of the metrics, having
been validated in the context of a single subject of study, do not seem to have the potential
for deriving generalizable insights to support vulnerability discovery. We hope that the
Samaritan metric services (described in Appendix A) alleviates the burden of implementing
algorithms to collect metrics from subjects and encourages researchers to replicate the metrics
in the context of diverse subjects.
5.3.2 RQ 2 - Validation
Question: How have researchers evaluated the decision-informing ability of the metrics to
discover security vulnerabilities in software?
Motivation. In the enumeration research question, we merely enumerated the vulnera-
bility discovery metrics identified by our review. The motivation for the validation research
question is to characterize the extent to which the decision-making ability of these metrics
has been validated in the literature.
Approach. We used the data extraction form presented in Table D.1 in Appendix D to
systematically collect data needed to address this research question from each primary study.
The data extraction form was structured as a matrix with rows being the primary studies
and columns being the validation criterion. We used the value “Yes” in a cell corresponding
to row (r) and column (c) if the primary study in r subjected the metrics being studied to
the validation criterion in column c. Since the motivation for this research question is to
characterize the ability of vulnerability discovery metrics to inform developer decisions, we
used the set of ten atomic validation criteria6 reported to have decision-informing advantage
[84]. The ten atomic validation criteria considered are: actionability, association, causal
model validity, causal relationship validity, constructiveness, discriminative power, economic
productivity, prediction system validity, rank consistency, and trackability.
We used the definition of each of the ten validation criterion as reported by Meneely et al.
[84] in assessing if a primary study used a specific criterion. While identifying evidence to
support the use of some of the criteria is straightforward, there is an element of subjectivity
involved in the rest. We overcame this limitation by developing an interpretation guide for
each of the ten validation criterion before we started to collect the data from the primary
studies. For instance, the interpretation guide for the actionability criterion involved search-
ing for the mention of interpretive guidelines and/or suggested actions associated with the
metrics in a primary study.
In addition to the validation criteria, we also collected one more piece of data from each
of the primary studies: a boolean indicating if the researchers contacted real developers
and/or experts to validate the metrics.
Observations. The percentage of primary studies that subjected vulnerability discov-
ery metrics to each of the ten atomic validation criteria reported to have decision-informing
advantage [84] is shown in Table 5.3. As can be inferred from the table, there seems to
be a bias toward validating metrics using prediction system, association, and discriminative
power. The observation, while unsurprising, highlights an key aspect that is seldom consid-
ered when validating metrics: the ability of the metrics to tell a story, as Fenton and Neil
6 An atomic validation criterion is one that cannot be subdivided further.
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Table 5.3: Percentage of primary studies that subjected vulnerability discovery met-
rics to each of the ten atomic validation criteria reported to have decision-informing
advantage [84]











[32] suggested in their software metrics roadmap almost twenty years ago. Fenton and Neil
suggested the use of causal modeling to describe the relationship between a metric and a
quality attribute (vulnerability, in our case).
We also observed that in only one (the study by Perl et al. [115]) of the primary studies
we reviewed, the authors reported to have reached out to real developers to validate the
predictions from their model. Again, the observation is unsurprising given the resource
intensiveness of validating metrics/models with real developers.
The validation of vulnerability discovery metrics in the literature is biased toward using
prediction system, association, and discriminative power with limited involvement of real
developers.
The observations from the validation research question highlights the need to explore
validation criteria beyond the conventional association, discrimination, and prediction. We
hope that the Samaritan metric services (described in Appendix A) alleviates the burden
of implementing algorithms to collect metrics from subjects and encourages researchers to
explore a more holistic approach to validating the metrics.
5.3.3 RQ 3 - Generalizability
Question: Are vulnerability discovery metrics similarly distributed across projects?
Motivation. As we observed when addressing the 1 research question, the literature has
no shortage of vulnerability discovery metrics with over 172 identified through our systematic
literature review. However, about 83.72% of these metrics have been empirical evaluated
solely by the authors who proposed them. Furthermore, the isolation of the empirical eval-
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uation to a few subjects of study with little diversity in programming language limits the
potential for generalizability of the metrics. A key first step toward realizing the (near) uni-
versal adoption of these metrics is to assess if these metrics are generalizable across multiple
projects. The assertion being that the insights that one can gain from a generalizable metric
can be transferred from one project (perhaps one that has had engineering failures in the
past) to another.
The motivation for the generalizability research question is to assess if security metrics,
particularly vulnerability discovery metrics, are generalizable across projects.
Approach. The interpretation of the term generalizability may be subjective. In our
study, we use the similarity in distribution of metrics across projects as a proxy for gener-
alizability. The approach to address the research question involved supplementing insights
from Krukal–Wallis test with that from Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test and Cliff’s δ.
Observations. We use a traditional violin plot to compare the distribution of the nine
discrete- and continuous-valued metrics in the six projects considered in our study. The plot
provides us an inkling of the metrics that are likely to be generalizable. Shown in Figure 5.2
is a plot comparing the distribution of churn and collaboration metrics.7 As can be inferred
from the figure, churn appears to be similarly distributed across all projects (irrespective of
domain and language). However, collaboration centrality seems to be similarly distributed
between projects in the browser domain but differently distributed between projects in both
the operating system and application server domains and, consequently, between domains.
Figure 5.2: Comparing the distribution of churn and collaboration metrics across all
projects considered in our study
We supplemented the qualitative inference from the plot by quantitatively assessing the
similarity of distribution using the Krukal–Wallis test. The outcome from Krukal–Wallis test
was statistically significant (p-value < 2.78e − 03) for all metrics (including Churn) when
separated by domain and language. The outcome indicates that the distribution of at least
one sample of metrics between the three domains and two languages is different from the
others. To understand the exact nature of the difference(s), we ran pairwise Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon tests using Cliff’s δ to assess the magnitude of difference. The outcome from the
pairwise test for churn and collaboration metrics is shown in Table 5.4. The effect size
7 We chose churn and collaboration as exemplars to present our observations
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Table 5.4: Magnitude of difference in the distribution of churn and collaboration
metrics separated by two contextual dimensions (domain and language) and between





BR OS 0.2148 (S) 0.1881 (S)
BR AS 0.1928 (S) 0.3062 (S)
OS AS 0.0667 (N) 0.3110 (S)
Language C/C++ Java 0.1497 (S) 0.3078 (S)
Project
Chromium Firefox 0.0610 (N) 0.1043 (N)
Linux OpenBSD 0.2056 (S) 0.9915 (L)
Tomcat WildFly 0.1153 (N) 0.9955 (L)
Legend
BR - Browser, OS - Operating System, and AS - Application Server
Effect Size
(N) δ < 0.147 (S) 0.147 ≤ δ < 0.33 (L) δ > 0.474
further provides credence to our inference from the plot that churn is similarly distributed
across domains and languages and between projects within a domain. Collaboration, on the
other hand, is similarly distributed across domains and languages but differently distributed
between projects within the operating system and application server domains.
We summarize the observations from the statistical analyses in Table 5.5. We found
that, with the exception of the collaboration metric, all metrics are generalizable.
All metrics, except collaboration, are generalizable (i.e. have similar distributions) across
the projects considered in our study irrespective of domain and language.
5.3.4 RQ 4 - Thresholds
Question: Are thresholds of vulnerability discovery metrics effective at classifying risk from
vulnerabilities?
Motivation. The benefit of using metrics to support software development is the ability
to make objective decisions based on quantifiable aspects of product, process, or people.
However, for the metrics to be an effective tool to support decision making, there must
be an objective way of saying when the value of a metric indicates specific scenarios. An
example of this is the empirical study that found 200 lines of code per hour to be a threshold
for individual reviews beyond which there may be degradation in defect discovery [53].
The motivation for the thresholds research question is to leverage existing approaches to
compute thresholds for the generalizable vulnerability discovery metrics considered in our
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEMATIZATION 59
Table 5.5: Summary of the assessment of generalizability of the metrics with 3 in-






















































Domain 3 3 3 3 3* 3 3 3 3
Language 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Project 3 7 3 3 3 3 3* 3 3
Summary 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
*Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon p-value > 7.94e− 04
study. While we assess the effectiveness of the thresholds to cover historically vulnerable
files, our intention is to use the thresholds as triggers to determine if developers should be
shown certain feedback about their change.
Approach. We used the methodology proposed by Alves et al. [5] to compute the
thresholds using metric data collected from all six projects considered in our study. The
threshold value for the metrics are chosen at the same quantiles (70%, 80%, and 90%) as
that in the paper by Alves et al. with the risk levels for a metric (m) being low (m < 70%),
medium (70% ≤ m < 80%), high (80% ≤ m < 90%), and critical (m ≥ 90%). We assess
the effectiveness of the thresholds in two ways, both of which make use of the historical
vulnerabilities data from the Chromium project. Firstly, we quantify the distribution of the
historically vulnerable files across the risk levels to ascertain the percentage of vulnerable files
that each risk level captures. Secondly, we compute the odds of discovering an historically
vulnerable file in each of the risk level. We also compute the odds ratio to assess the change
in odds as we move from one risk level to the next.
Observations. In addressing RQ 3, we found the collaboration metric to not meet our
criteria to be considered generalizable. Therefore, we do not include it in our analysis for RQ
4. Shown in Table 5.6 are the threshold values computed for each of the eight generalizable
metrics. By themselves, the metric threshold values provide limited (if any) insights; their
utility is to help segregate files into disjoint groups to highlight risk. The risk levels of
medium, high, and critical are non-trivial and thus we do not consider the risk level of low
in the remainder of this section.
Shown in Table 5.7 is the percentage of historically vulnerable files (offenders) in Chromium
covered by each of the three non-trivial risk levels. The percentages indicate the effectiveness
of the thresholds, which, on average, captured 23.85% of vulnerable files, going as high as
69.85%, in aggregate, for the contribution metric.
While the percentage of historical files covered by the risk levels is interesting, charac-
terizing the effect of a file moving from one risk level to another is essential if we need to be
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEMATIZATION 60




Churn 3,403 5,682 12,005
Complexity 197 336 710
Contribution 5.53E+04 1.59E+05 4.95E+05
Nesting 4 5 6
# Inputs 256 412 865
# Outputs 261 415 787
# Paths 4.15E+03 7.86E+04 6.97E+07
Source LOC 1,099 1,826 3,695
able to use thresholds to support any sort of decision making. Shown in Table 5.8 is the odds
of discovering a vulnerable file (from the Chromium project) in each of the three non-trivial
risk levels. The odds ratios shown in the table quantify the increase in odds of discovering
vulnerable files as a file moves from one risk level to next. We also present the ratio of odds
in a risk level to that in low. By interpreting the odds ratios we can make inferences such
as a file being 14 times more likely to be vulnerable when it moves from low to medium on
the churn threshold scale (Odds RatioLow = 13.9862).
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Table 5.7: Percentage of vulnerable files covered by each of the three non-trivial risk
levels (Medium, High, and Critical)
Metric
% Vulnerable Files Covered
Medium High Critical Aggregate
Churn 7.68% 8.39% 5.85% 21.92%
Complexity 6.62% 5.96% 4.64% 17.22%
Contribution 15.90% 18.95% 35.01% 69.85%
Nesting 9.24% 5.95% 4.27% 19.47%
# Inputs 4.97% 4.97% 4.30% 14.24%
# Outputs 7.28% 6.62% 6.62% 20.53%
# Paths 5.30% 5.96% 4.97% 16.23%
Source LOC 6.26% 3.44% 1.68% 11.37%




















Table 5.8: Odds of discovering a vulnerable file in each of the three non-trivial risk levels (Medium, High, and Critical) with
Ratiox being the ratio of odds in a particular risk level to odds in risk level x
Metric
Medium High Critical
Odds RatioLow Odds RatioLow RatioMedium Odds RatioLow RatioHigh
Churn 4.57E-02 13.9862 7.96E-02 24.3699 1.7424 1.12E-01 34.3548 1.4097
Complexity 9.48E-02 4.2210 1.61E-01 7.1569 1.6955 2.86E-01 12.7234 1.7778
Contribution 1.84E-02 3.8177 3.52E-02 7.3282 1.9195 1.16E-01 24.1669 3.2978
Nesting 6.36E-02 3.8456 7.39E-02 4.4739 1.1634 8.92E-02 5.3960 1.2061
# Inputs 7.65E-02 3.2952 1.32E-01 5.6655 1.7193 1.97E-01 8.4811 1.4970
# Outputs 7.10E-02 3.2246 8.70E-02 3.9511 1.2253 2.41E-01 10.9488 2.7711
# Paths 6.84E-02 2.9648 9.73E-02 4.2188 1.4230 1.29E-01 5.6069 1.3290
Source LOC 1.89E-01 10.8511 1.93E-01 11.0919 1.0222 2.68E-01 15.4085 1.3892
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On average, non-trivial risk levels delineated by thresholds of generalizable vulnerability
discovery metrics captured 23.85% of the historically vulnerable files in Chromium, provid-
ing support for the effectiveness of the thresholds in classifying risk from vulnerabilities.
5.4 Limitations
Generalizability is a concept that is much broader than demonstrating similar distributions.
However, in using similarity in distribution as a necessary condition for metric generalizabil-
ity, we can reason about the potential for statistically-derived thresholds from one project to
translate to another. One of the steps in our research approach (an overview of which was
provide in Chapter 1) is to leverage developer-in-the-loop to help continually improve our
feedback technique and we hope this loop will help strengthen the evidence of generalizability
as developers provide their comments on the threshold-driven feedback.
Although we chose projects spanning three application domains and two programming
language, we may need to consider more projects to be able to apply our technique at a
broader scale. Some of the projects not represented in our sample are small projects with
short histories, projects developed in interpreted languages, and closed-source (proprietary)
project. Fortunately, most of our analysis is unsupervised and we hope can be easily applied
to additional projects.
5.5 Summary
In this study, we presented the first step in our approach toward achieving our research
vision. We systematically reviewed vulnerability discovery metrics literature and identified
a plethora of metrics defined at various levels of granularity. We observed certain limitations
in the way these metrics have been validated in the literature, namely: (1) the subjects of
study used in the empirical validation tended to be biased to open-source projects, (2) the
validation criteria used to reason about the decision-informing ability of the metrics tended
to be biased toward assessing association, discrimination, and prediction with little-to-no
attention given to actionability and causality, and (3) developers’ perception of the metrics
was seldom sought in validating the metrics. We implemented and collected ten vulnerability
discovery metrics from six open-source projects and assessed their generalizability in terms
of similarity in distribution and computed thresholds for the discrete- and continuous-valued
metrics using an unsupervised technique proposed by Alves et al. [5]. With the exception
of one, all discrete- and continuous-valued metrics satisfied our criteria for generalizability.
We also found the thresholds to be effective at classifying risk from historically vulnerable
files in the Chromium project. The work described in this study forms for the basis for the
development of an automated vulnerability discovery interpretation technique to provide
developers valuable security insights as they develop software.
Chapter 6
Feedback
Software metrics, as Fenton and Neil [32] suggest, have the ability to tell a story
to assist developers and managers discover systemic problems in product, pro-
cess, and people. In a systematic literature review of the vulnerability discovery
metrics, we observed that the ability of metrics to support decision making was
seldom evaluated using actual developers. In this study, we used vulnerabil-
ity discovery metrics collected from the Chromium project to provide natural
language feedback to developers as they contributing changes. We evaluated
developers’ perception of the feedback using a survey and their expectations
from the feedback using an open dialogue. We further assessed the utility of
an existing vulnerability discovery approach—static analysis—to highlight risk
from vulnerability contributing commits in FFmpeg. We evaluated the ability
of static analysis to highlight risk in vulnerability contributing commits and
compared it to that of metrics.
6.1 Motivation
The community of researchers have proposed several hundred security metrics [92], in general,
and vulnerability discovery metrics (Chapter 5), in particular. However, their proliferation
into practice has been limited [91]. The primary factor inhibiting the adoption of metrics
in practice is the perception that vulnerability discovery metrics cannot support decision
making. However, as we found in systematically reviewing the vulnerability discovery metric
literature in Chapter 5, the decision-informing ability of metrics has seldom been assessed
using causal modeling or developers’ feedback. A metric is deemed not actionable simply
because a prediction model that used the vulnerability discovery metric as an explanatory
variable was not as effective at predicting vulnerabilities as one would like.
A goal-driven developer or manager is likely to perceive metrics’ inability to predict
vulnerabilities as the metrics not being actionable. However, the value of metrics, is in their
ability to uncover systemic problems in the product, process, and people. If we were to
consider “un-actionable (metric) is not useless” [84] and assess the utility of metrics, treated
as agents of feedback rather than mere features in a black box prediction model, we are likely
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to uncover potential (or the lack thereof) for the use of metrics in practice. In this study, we
explore the utility of metrics as agents of security feedback by providing natural language
feedback on security to Chromium developers as they contributed changes to the project.
We used the values, (unsupervised) thresholds, and interpretation of the metrics collected
from the Chromium project to provide the feedback and leverage a qualitative survey to
assess developers’ perception of the feedback.
We address the following research questions:
RQ 5 - Feedback
How is feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery metrics perceived
by developers?
RQ 6 - Expectations
What are developers’ expectations from vulnerability discovery metrics?
RQ 7 - Effectiveness
How effective are existing vulnerability discovery approaches?
RQ 8 - Utility
Is there a utility for vulnerability discovery metrics?
6.2 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used to collect and analyze the data to ad-
dress our research questions. We collected the data from two large open source projects:
Chromium, the open-source project behind the Google Chrome web browser which “aims
to build a safer, faster, and more stable way for all Internet users to experience the web,”
and FFmpeg, the “leading [open-source] multimedia framework, able to decode, encode,
transcode, mux, demux, stream, filter and play pretty much anything that humans and
machines have created.” We choose these projects because they were large, popular, and
open-source with substantial development history and curated history of vulnerability fixes.
We refer to Chromium and FFmpeg as the subjects of study in the remainder of this study.
We address RQ 5 and RQ 6 in the context of the Chromium project and RQ 7 and RQ 8 in
the context of the FFmpeg project. The rationale behind distribution of subjects of study to
research questions will become apparent as we describe the data collection and data analysis
methodology.
6.2.1 Data Collection
In addition to the vulnerability discovery metrics collected from the subjects of study, there
are several other pieces of data essential to addressing the research questions. In the sub-
sections that follow, we introduce these peices of data and describe the approach used in
collecting them.
Vulnerability Fixing Commits
A vulnerability fixing commit is, as the name suggests, a commit that introduced changes
to the source code of a project to resolve a vulnerability. The vulnerability fixing commits,
and associated metadata, are essential as they identify the timestamp representing the point
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in the history of the project when the vulnerability was resolved, the developer responsible
for resolving the vulnerability, the type of change (addition, deletion, and/or modification of
lines) that resolved the vulnerability, and, more importantly, the file(s) that was(were) mod-
ified to resolve the vulnerability. For instance, from commit 5465561 in the FFmpeg project,
which was reported to resolve the vulnerability identified by CVE-2019-11338, we know
that libavcodec/hevcdec.c was the vulnerable file and that the vulnerability, which was
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process ..., was fixed on March 23, 2019 by Michael
Niedermayer by adding ten lines of code and deleting four lines of code. Depending on the
project, the commit message associated with the vulnerability fixing commit may include
additional pieces of information such as bug identifier, code review identifier, and/or the way
in which the vulnerability was discovered. For instance, from the commit message associated
with commit ff05b41 in the Chromium project, which was reported to resolve the vulner-
ability identified by CVE-2016-5216, we know that the commit resolved a bug identified by
653090 (BUG=chromium:653090) and the resolution was reviewed in a code review identified
by 2418533002 (Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002).
The approach to accurately identify vulnerability fixing commits is predominantly man-
ual with any automation used only to support the manual process. Sabetta and Bezzi [125]
attempted to automate the approach to identify vulnerability fixing commits (or, security-
relevant commits, as Sabetta and Bezzi referred to them) by proposing a machine learning
model that predicted a commit as fixing a vulnerability or otherwise. However, the reported
performance (80% precision and 43% recall) of the machine learning model is unacceptable in
the context of our work given the downstream impact of incorrectly identified vulnerability
fixing commits.
In our study, we collected vulnerability fixing commits for the Chromium and FFmpeg
projects by manually perusing the various avenues in which these projects responsibly dis-
close vulnerabilities. We describe the nuances of, and challenges in, manually identifying
vulnerability fixing commits in Chromium and FFmpeg projects below. Since the imple-
mentation of the (known) offender metric relies on the ability to identify vulnerability fixing
commits, the effort expelled in identifying the vulnerability fixing commits is serving the
dual purpose of providing data to the (known) offender metric and to the addressing of the
research questions.
Chromium The Chromium project publishes a list of all security fixes implemented in a
particular release in the blog post on Chrome Releases Blog2 that announces the release.
Each security fix includes a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier and an identi-
fier to an entry in the bug tracking system that describes the vulnerability. The bug identifier
can in turn be used to identify the commit that resolved the vulnerability by relying on the
knowledge that the Chromium project follows a practice of including bug identifiers in the
message of a commit (if the commit resolved a bug). As we curated vulnerability fixes from
the Chrome Releases Blog, we noticed that some publicly disclosed vulnerabilities were not
mentioned in any of the blog posts. We overcame this limitation by supplementing the vul-
nerability fixes from the Chrome Releases Blog with those from Monorail3, the bug tracking
system that the Chromium project uses, and by manually reviewing the vulnerability reports
associated with cpe:/a:google:chrome (the Common Platform Enumerations identifier as-
signed to Google Chrome) on the National Vulnerability Database [1]. In total, we identified
1,453 vulnerabilities in the Chromium project that were associated with a bug identifier.
1,079 of these vulnerabilities were identified from Monorail, 105 from the Chrome Releases
Blog, and 269 by manual review of the National Vulnerability Database.
1 https://github.com/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/commit/546556 2 https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/
3 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues
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FFmpeg The FFmpeg project publishes the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures iden-
tifiers of all vulnerabilities that have been resolved in the project on the Security Section4
of their project website. The page conveniently includes the identifier of the commit that
resolved the vulnerability. However, fixes to some of the earlier vulnerabilities do not in-
clude the commit identifier. We reviewed the vulnerability reports of such vulnerabilities on
the National Vulnerability Database [1] which sometimes included a link to the fix in their
source code repository. In cases where the vulnerability reports did not have a reference to
the fix, we searched the repository for the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifier.
In total, we identified 341 commits that were reported to have fixed 287 vulnerabilities in
the FFmpeg project. 96.77% (330) of these commits fixed a single vulnerability, 2.93% (10)
fixed two vulnerabilities, and 0.29% (1) fixed three vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 82.23%
(236) of the vulnerabilities were fixed in a single attempt (i.e. one commit was attributed
to have fixed the vulnerability), 14.29% (41) of the vulnerabilities took two attempts, 2.44%
(7) took three attempts, 0.70% (2) took four attempts, and 0.35% (1) took six attempts.
The 341 vulnerability fixing commits modified a total of 184 files. Although a considerable
portion (63.04%) of these (vulnerable) files were fixed for a single vulnerability, three files
(libavcodec/utils.c, libavcodec/h264.c, and libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c) were fixed for
eight vulnerabilities lending further credence to the utility of the (known) offender metric
[85].
Shown in Figure 6.1 is the distribution of churn by type (insertion or deletion) in vulnera-
bility fixing commits in the FFmpeg project. As can be inferred from Figure 6.1, vulnerability
fixing commits tend to insert lines than delete lines to fix vulnerabilities. We found quan-
titative evidence to support this inference leading us to conclude that vulnerability fixing
commits in the FFmpeg project are statistically (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon p-value  0.01)
and practically (Cliff’s δ = 0.5419 representing a large effect) more likely to insert lines than
delete lines.
Figure 6.1: Distribution of churn in vulnerability fixing commits in the FFmpeg
project
Vulnerability Contributing Commits
The vulnerability fixing commits are essential to characterizing vulnerabilities in soft-
ware as they identify files that were definitively vulnerable prior to the fix. However, any
attempt to characterize security vulnerabilities using attributes of software at the time of
vulnerability fix is unlikely to yield insights that could foreshadow vulnerabilities because
the attributes are describing if a file is likely to need a fix for a vulnerability rather than if
4 http://ffmpeg.org/security.html
CHAPTER 6. FEEDBACK 68
a file is likely to be vulnerable. The difference is subtle but its implications to the practical
application of the insights could be profound. The temporality of vulnerabilities is the key
contributor to this disparity. As Meneely et al. [85] report, vulnerabilities tend to exist in
software for many years before they are exploited by attackers or discovered by developers.
The attributes of software at the time of the fixing of the vulnerability may not be the same
as that at the time of the introduction of the vulnerability. The key, therefore, is to charac-
terize vulnerabilities when they are introduced rather than when they are fixed. However,
while vulnerability fixing commits are disclosed when a vulnerability is fixed, commits that
introduced the vulnerabilities, referred to as vulnerability contributing commits [85, 115], are
seldom disclosed.
In our work, one of the lines of inquiry is to assess the effectiveness of existing vulnerabil-
ity discovery approaches in highlighting risk of vulnerability from changes to software as the
developers introduce them. As a result, identifying vulnerability contributing commits is no
longer a preference but a necessity. In their work, Meneely et al. [85] manually identified 124
vulnerability contributing commits that could be attributed to have contributed the 68 vul-
nerabilities in Apache HTTP. In principle, the manual approach to identifying vulnerability
contributing commits, involving the two steps enumerated below, is quite simple.
For each file changed in a vulnerability fixing commit,
Step 1: Identify suspect lines by perusing the change that fixed a vulnerability. Suspect
lines can be of two types: (1) lines modified to fix the vulnerability and (2) lines
before and after (commonly referred to as context lines) the lines inserted to fix the
vulnerability.
The intuition is that lines modified to fix a vulnerability are likely the lines that
led to the vulnerability and the lines before and after the lines inserted to fix the
vulnerability represent the snippet in which code that could likely have prevented
the vulnerability was missed.
Step 2: Identify the commit that last modified each of the suspect lines.
The intuition is that the commit that last modified the line that led to the vulner-
ability or the line near which the code to prevent the vulnerability was missed is
attributable as having contributed to the vulnerability.
The seemingly simple approach can be quite tricky in practice because the step to identify
the commit that last modified a suspect line is accomplished using features provided by the
system used to manage the repository containing the project source code. For instance, if
source code repository was managed by git, one could use git blame -L n,m fix^ -- path
to identify the last commit that modified each line in the interval [n,m] in the file identified
by path prior to it being fixed for a vulnerability (specified as fix^, where ^ represents the
parent of the commit identified by fix).
The manual approach to identifying vulnerability contributing commits used by Meneely
et al. [85] is not scalable, especially when we have 341 vulnerability fixing commits in the
FFmpeg project. The alternative is to leverage the SZZ Algorithm [140], named after the
researchers who proposed it (Śliwerski, Zimmermann, and Zeller), to trace vulnerability
fixing commits to vulnerability contributing commits. However, as Rodríguez-Pérez et al.
[123] mention, publicly-available implementations of the SZZ Algorithm are few and far
apart. Borg et al. [12] attempted to mitigate this limitation by developing SZZ Unleashed,5
an open implementation of the SZZ Algorithm for git repositories.
5 https://github.com/wogscpar/SZZUnleashed
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While the availability of SZZ Unleashed is a boon to the research community, its (implicit)
coupling with an issue tracker (Atlassian Jira) limits its applicability to projects that do not
actively maintain an issue tracker system. We worked around this limitation by skipping
steps in SZZ Unleashed that were dependent on the issue tracker. However, SZZ Unleashed
failed to identify vulnerability contributing commit for 110 (32.26%) of the 341 vulnerability
fixing commits in FFmpeg. We presumed that this discrepancy was likely an implication of
skipping steps that were dependent on the issue tracker. As an alternative, we resorted to
using the heuristics-based approach to identify vulnerability contributing commits used by
Perl et al. [115].
The approach used by Perl et al. [115], being similar to that used by Meneely et al. [85],
is intuitive. We were unable to find an open implementation of the approach used by Perl
et al. [115] so we implemented the approach ourselves. We have released the implementation
as an open-source utility named archeogit available on GitHub at https://github.com/
samaritan/archeogit.
We used archeogit [98] to identify 309 vulnerability contributing commits in FFmpeg
which contributed to one or more vulnerabilities which were later resolved by one (or more)
of the 341 vulnerability fixing commits identified earlier. 83.82% (259) commits were found
to have contributed code to a single vulnerability, 11.97% (37) to two vulnerabilities, 1.94%
(6) to three and five vulnerabilities, and 0.32% (1) to four vulnerabilities.
Since archeogit is an utility developed to support this research, we verified and validated
it using a random sample of 2056 vulnerability contributing commits. The verification (Does
archeogit produce expected results?) did not uncover any flaws in the implementation but
the validation (Do the vulnerability contributing commits reported by archeogit actually
contribute the vulnerability?) did uncover potential flaws. The only way to mitigate the
potential flaws identified during the validation of archeogit is to use a manual approach,
which can be a prohibitive endeavor. Fortunately, the Vulnerability History Project (https:
//vulnerabilityhistory.org/), a brainchild of Andrew Meneely, is working to address just
this need in the community. In the Vulnerability History Project, undergraduate students in
the Engineering Secure Software (SWEN-331) course at Rochester Institute of Technology
manually curate the history of vulnerabilities in popular open-source project through an
established collaborative process.
A vulnerability contributing commit can contribute a vulnerability in one of two ways:
the vulnerability is contributed when the file is added for the first time or the vulnerability
is contributed when the file is modified. 73.23% (227) of the vulnerability contributing com-
mits in FFmpeg contributed a vulnerability when modifying a file and the remaining 26.77%
(83) contributed a vulnerability when adding a file. There is a mismatch in the number of
vulnerability contributing commits here (310 = 227 + 83) from that mentioned earlier (309)
because one of the vulnerability contributing commits (07c55d8ea3) contributed a vulnera-
bility when adding libavcodec/vorbis_dec.c and when modifying libavcodec/vorbis.c.
Static Analysis
Chess and McGraw [19], in advocating for the (regular) use of static analysis to improve
software security, suggest that one should “aim for good, not perfect.” The quote succinctly
highlights both the good and the bad of static analysis. In principle, static analysis techniques
look for patterns in source code being analyzed; patterns that represent known security
problems. The limitation of this approach is that security problems for which no patterns
exist yet are unlikely to be detected by static analysis. However, in the spirit of “aiming for
good” [19], static analysis can be used as an effective means to prevent mistakes that are
6 Computed using the SurveyMonkey Sample Size Calculator [144] using 95% as the Confidence
Level and 5% as the Margin of Error
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known to lead to security problems, providing developers an objective approach to improving
the overall security of software. The design philosophy of Splint, a lightweight static analysis
tool, proposed by Evans and Larochelle [30] further contributes to the vision of having static
analysis be an integrated part of a modern software development workflow.
The potential for leveraging static analysis to improve software security certainly exists,
however, its effectiveness in detecting real vulnerabilities has been a subject of inquiry in
the research community. In proposing a static analysis technique, Livshits and Lam [68]
reported that their technique was effective at identifying potential security vulnerabilities in
Java applications with a relatively low false positive rate of 29.27% (12 out of 41). Walden
and Doyle [148], in proposing a metric called Static Analysis Vulnerability Indicator, found
that the density of vulnerabilities reported by static analysis (Fortify Source Code Analyzer,
in their study) was strongly correlated (ρ = 0.67) with number of vulnerabilities discovered
after release. These studies suggest that static analysis techniques have the potential for
detecting actual vulnerabilities.
Over the years, several static analyzers have been developed by academicians, open-
source communities, and commercial enterprises. Li and Cui [65] reviewed and compared
eight static analyzers available for C, C++, and Java project and concluded that the short-
comings of individual analyzers may be overcome by using multiple analyzers together. How-
ever, a challenge in using multiple analyzers together is that the overlap among vulnerabilities
reported by the analyzers must be collapsed to make the report more usable. Code Dx,7 a
commercial application vulnerability management tool, aggregates vulnerabilities reported
by multiple analyzers to provide a holistic perspective on the security of software.
In our work, we assess the ability of static analyzers to detect vulnerabilities in the code
contributed by vulnerability contributing commits. By definition, the vulnerability con-
tributing commits are contributing vulnerabilities and assessing the static analyzers’ ability
to identify these vulnerabilities highlights their usefulness in assisting developers engineer
secure software. Taking note of the suggestion by Li and Cui [65], we use findings8 reported
by three static analyzers: Cppcheck [27], Flawfinder [151], and Rough Auditing Tool for
Security (RATS) [128]. While we did translate the severity of findings reported by the three
static analyzers to a normalized scale to simplify analysis, we did not collapse the overlap in
the reported findings. Shown in Table 6.1 is the translation of severity of findings reported by
Cppcheck, Flawfinder, and RATS to the uniform scale. We have six levels in our normalized
severity scale with 1 (Trivial) and 6 (Catastrophic) being the lowest and highest severity,
respectively. Our choice of six as the number of levels was predicated on the six severity
levels that both Cppcheck and Flawfinder use. RATS, which uses a four level severity scale
(default, low, medium, and high), was introduced to data collection after the normalized
severity scale was developed and, as a result, we have two levels in the normalized severity
scale that do not translate to a severity reported by RATS.
We used the High Performance Computing Cluster [122] at the Rochester Institute of
Technology (RIT) to parallelize the static analysis of multiple versions of a subject of study
using Cppcheck, Flawfinder, and RATS.
6.2.2 Data Analysis
In the subsections that follow, we describe the approach used to analyze the data collected
from the subjects of study to address the research questions. Each subsection concludes with
7 https://codedx.com 8 We use the term finding (instead of vulnerability) to refer to static-ana-
lyzer-reported vulnerability to avoid confusion with actual vulnerabilities.
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Table 6.1: Translation of severity of findings reported by Cppcheck, Flawfinder, and
RATS to a normalized severity scale
Cppcheck Flawfinder RATS* Normalized
information 0 Default Trivial
portability 1 - Low
performance 2 - Medium
style 3 Low High
warning 4 Medium Critical
error 5 High Catastrophic
*RATS uses four severity levels so we chose to not
translate severity of 2 and 3 on the normalized severity
scale to a severity from RATS.
a reference to the relevant research question(s) that the analysis pertains to.
Computing Metric Thresholds
Predictability [84] is often the criterion used to reason about the empirical validity of
vulnerability discovery metrics. The prerequisite for assessing predictability, however, is
the availability of a dataset of historical vulnerabilities to train and test a vulnerability
prediction model. While some projects, in the interest of responsible vulnerability disclosure
[17], have developed mechanisms for the curation of historical vulnerabilities, satisfying this
prerequisite, a model trained with data from one project may not be directly applicable to
discover vulnerabilities in a different project [162]. An unsupervised approach is, therefore,
needed.
As researchers empirically validate vulnerability discovery metrics using predictability as
a criterion, related criteria such as association and discriminative power as often evaluated
as well. The outcomes from association and discriminative power often reveal important
empirical information about the relationship between vulnerability discovery metrics and
historical vulnerabilities. The polarity of the association (if one exists) between vulnerability
discovery metrics and historical vulnerabilities is one such key piece empirical information
that is likely to be transferable from one project to another. For instance, Zimmermann
et al. [160] found that total (cyclomatic) complexity was positively correlated with number
of vulnerabilities in Windows Vista binaries and Shin et al. [133] found a positive association
between total (cyclomatic) complexity and vulnerabilities in files in both Mozilla Firefox and
Red Hat Enterprise Linux. In both these studies, high total complexity was associated with
vulnerabilities, however, the missing piece of information is the threshold value at which
total complexity indicates a problem.
If we had acceptable thresholds for the vulnerability discovery metrics, we could apply
the thresholds to label an entity being measured to exhibit certain attribute to a higher or
lower degree. While computing a universal threshold for all projects is intractable, Lanza and
Marinescu suggest that statistical information rankings may be used to determine explicable
thresholds [61]. In our study, we used the methodology proposed by Alves et al. [5] to
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compute the thresholds. Despite being an unsupervised, the methodology proposed by Alves
et al. [5] was found to be effective (1) in predicting fault-proneness when compared with other
supervised approaches [14] and (2) at being able to delineate risk levels that captured, on
average, about one-fourth of the historically vulnerable files in Chromium[102].
As proposed by Alves et al. [5], we compute the thresholds by taking metric values
collected from a projects and using the metric values at 70%, 80%, and 90% (the quantiles
proposed by [5]) of the metric value distribution to delineate the risk levels. We use the
following levels to assess risk using a metric (m): low (m < 70%), medium (70% ≤ m < 80%),
high (80% ≤ m < 90%), and critical (m ≥ 90%). The approach to compute thresholds,
being based on the distribution of metric values, cannot be applied to non-numeric metrics
like (known) offender. Since we know the (known) offender is a boolean-valued metric, we
consider a file to be risky if it is a known offender.
To simplify aggregation of risk assessed using multiple metrics, we assign numerical values
of 0, 1, 2, and 3 to the low, medium, high, and critical, respectively. We used the source
lines of code of a file to normalize the other metrics collected from the file since source lines
of code in a file has shown to be correlated with typical metrics collected from a file (See
work by Jay et al. [50] for an investigation of the linear relationship between source lines of
code and cyclomatic complexity). We do not normalize the metrics collected at the change
level, commit level, and developer level because we found no strong inter correlation among
the metrics collected at these levels of granularity.
The implicit assumption in the approach to computing thresholds proposed by Alves
et al. [5] is that higher values of a metric indicate a concern of interest (vulnerabilities, in
our case). However, there are vulnerability discovery metrics (ownership evaluated by Perl
et al. [115], for instance) for which lower values indicate a concern of interest. In case of
such metrics, we consider the mirror of the distribution of metric values when computing the
thresholds. In case of ownership, we simply subtract the metric values from 1.0 to get the
mirror distribution. For instance, if the ownership value of a developer is 0.37 (i.e. 37% of
the commits to the project were made by the developer), then 0.73 = 1.00 - 0.37 represents
the mirror value (i.e. 73% of the commits to the project were made by other developers).
In addressing the feedback research question (RQ 5), we use the metrics’ thresholds,
coupled with corresponding metrics’ values, to generate natural language feedback on security
and to determine when to present the security feedback to developers. In addressing the
utility research question (RQ 8), we use the metrics’ thresholds to classify risk from changes
in vulnerability contributing commits, the commit itself, the file(s) in the commit, and
developer contributing the commit. We do not use the same version of a project to compute
the metrics’ thresholds and use the thresholds to classify risk. The rationale for this decision
is to simulate a likely scenario in which thresholds computed in the past are used to highlight
risk from future changes.
6.3 Results
In the subsections that follow, we present our empirical analysis and observations to address
the research questions.
6.3.1 RQ 5 - Feedback
Question: How is feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery metrics perceived
by developers?
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Motivation. Although the research literature is rife with security metrics [92], their
adoption in practice to assess security, in general, and to discover vulnerabilities, in particu-
lar, has been limited. The subpar performance of the prediction models that use vulnerability
discovery metrics as features and the granularity at which these models predict vulnerabil-
ities are cited as inhibitors to the use of vulnerability discovery metrics in practice [91].
The reliance on performance measures (usually precision, recall, and F-measure) of (black
box) vulnerability prediction models to assess the utility of vulnerability discovery metrics,
though objective, has several limitations, chief among which are:
1. A prediction from a black box vulnerability prediction model is seldom accompanied
by context to enable a developer to interpret the prediction. For instance, if a black
box vulnerability prediction model was to tell developers that “foo.c is likely, with
certain probability, to be vulnerable to exploit,” the first question a developer is likely
to ask is “Why?”. If, on the other hand, we were to interpret the vulnerability discovery
metrics that were used as features in the model to tell developers that “foo.c is likely,
with certain probability, to be vulnerable to exploit because it has been modified a
lot and has been vulnerable in the past.”,9 the developers can use the accompanying
context to decide whether or not to investigate further.
2. A metric that likely has the potential to assist developers in improving the overall
security of software may be unduly regarded as non-utilitarian simply because it does
not improve the performance of a state-of-the-art vulnerability prediction model. For
instance, the proximity to the attack surface metric [100] may not improve the per-
formance of a vulnerability prediction model built with traditional metrics [160] but
the insights from the proximity to the attack surface metric may be perceived as more
relevant by a developer than that from the traditional metrics.
As a consequence of the aforementioned limitations, vulnerability discovery metrics are
seldom seen as an useful approach to assess the overall security of software, in general, and
to discover vulnerabilities in software, in particular. The key to encouraging adoption of
vulnerability discovery metrics in practice is to think of these metrics not as mere features
in a black box prediction model but as agents of (natural language) feedback.
The motivation for the feedback research question is to assess developers’ perception of
feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery metrics. While the ideal is for
the feedback to lead to the discovery of a vulnerability, we hypothesize that developers can
still benefit from being made aware of the engineering failures known to be associated with
historical vulnerabilities. The increased awareness may contribute to the developers’ security
mindset which, as Bruce Schneier argues [129], is increasingly becoming an essential skill for
security professionals, in general, and software engineers, in particular.
Approach. We address the feedback research question by providing developers natural
language security feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery metrics and
assessing the developers’ perception of the feedback. We address this research question using
a subset of eight (line churn, collaboration, complexity, contribution, nesting, # inputs, #
outputs, and # paths) of the eighteen metrics described in Appendix A.1. Furthermore, we
address this research question in the context of the Chromium project alone, the reasoning
for which will soon become apparent.
The two steps involved in addressing the feedback research question were (1) to provide
the feedback to Chromium developers and (2) to assess their perception of the feedback.
9 The two metrics used in this hypothetical scenario are line churn [160] and (known) offender [85],
respectively.
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Step 1: Provide Feedback
We had to address three key concerns to provide feedback to Chromium developers:
(1) Where should the feedback be provided?, (2) When should the feedback be provided?,
and (3) What should the feedback contain?.
Where should the feedback be provided? Developers tend to have specific expectations from
the tools that they use when engineering software [62, 52, 34] and the expectation that the
tool not interrupt their existing workflows is paramount [52]. Code review, being a common
practice in many mature software engineering workflows today, provides an ideal opportunity
to provide feedback on security [7]. Tricoder, a program analysis ecosystem at Google,
does just this but with static analysis warnings [126]. We chose to use code reviews as a
medium to provide the natural language feedback on security addressing the concern on
where the feedback should be provided. The use of code reviews has the added benefit of
providing developers participating in the review an opportunity to have a conversation about
the security feedback aiding knowledge transfer and enabling us to leverage a developer-in-
the-loop approach to improving the feedback.
We chose the Chromium project because all changes to the source code are required to
be reviewed [23] which implies that code review is already a part of Chromium developers’
workflow. Furthermore, the Chromium project has been at the forefront of introducing
practices to improve security of software through initiatives like the Chrome Vulnerability
Reward Program10 and ClusterFuzz.11 The Chromium project uses Gerrit,12 an open-source
code review system, to facilitate the code review process. We provide the security feedback
as a comment on open code reviews in the Chromium project.
When should the feedback be provided? The act of providing developers security feedback is
akin to an intervention. The developer receiving the security feedback must read, consider,
and (possibly) discuss the feedback with other developers to determine whether to act on
the feedback or not. Therefore, the concern of when to provide the feedback is crucial to
avoid being labelled as the “the boy who cried wolf” [2]. A trivial solution like using the
predicted probability that a file is likely to need a fix for a vulnerability from a prediction
model and provide the feedback when the probability is higher than a threshold (say, 0.75)
is infeasible owing to the prerequisite for dataset with which to train the prediction model.
In our work, we used the methodology proposed by Alves et al. [5] to associate metric
values (v) with a weight and mapping the weight using prescribed quantiles of 70%, 80%,
and 90% to risk levels using the scale low (v < 70%), medium (70% ≤ v < 80%), high
(80% ≤ v < 90%), and critical (v ≥ 90%). We collected the metrics from Chromium at
6b9bf768231f and associated each metric value with weights enabling us to determine the
threshold values for each metric. As mentioned earlier, we chose to provide security feedback
as comments on open code reviews in the Chromium project. As a result, we had to first
identify the open code reviews and the files that were being reviewed. We developed a utility
to mine Gerrit using its RESTful API for open code reviews. We then mapped each file in
each open code review to the metric values and the corresponding weights. We averaged the
individual metric weights to assign each file a weight and then averaged the file weights to
assign each code review a weight. We then picked one or more of the open code reviews with
the highest weight as the candidates to provide the feedback on, addressing the concern of
when should the feedback be provided.
We automated the entire workflow such that at 12:00 AM each day Gerrit was mined for
open code reviews and each open code review was assigned a weight. The Gerrit RESTful
10 https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/chrome-rewards/index.html
11 https://google.github.io/clusterfuzz/ 12 https://www.gerritcodereview.com/
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API has an upper limit on the number of code reviews that it returns and the limit was
1,000 when we mined the code reviews. Each morning, we had a fresh set of 1,000 candidate
code reviews to review and provide feedback on. We tracked all code reviews that we had
provided a feedback on. We also tracked the developers and reviewers who participated in
code reviews that we had provided a feedback on. When reviewing candidate code reviews
to provide feedback on, to get as varied a perception as possible we made sure the developer
and reviewers participating in the review were not already provided feedback on in a past
code review.
What should the feedback contain? In their work proposing interpretable decision sets,
Lakkaraju et al. [59] state that “Interpretable models ... bridge the gap between domain
experts and data scientists.”. We, as researchers, should work toward translating our metrics
to interpretable and actionable insights for developers. As with addressing the concern of
when to provide the feedback, we could train an interpretable machine learning model13 like
Logistic Regression or Decision Trees and use their interpretation in the feedback. However,
the lack of historical vulnerabilities and the cross-project incompatibility of the models ren-
der the trivial solution infeasible. Furthermore, the models, though interpretable, may not
be directly comprehensible to the developer because the interpretation of the models is more
than just metric coefficients (in Logistic Regression) or split cutoffs (in Decision Trees). As
researchers propose metrics, they painstakingly theorize the attributes that the metric quan-
tifies and then assess its validity to quantify the attribute and its relationship with a quality
attribute of software (vulnerability, in our case). The feedback that we provide developers
must interpret the metric in the context of the attribute that the metric quantifies. The
developers are more likely to be aware of these attributes as they are related to the domain
of Software Engineering. For instance, the collaboration centrality metric [81] may not be
directly comprehensible by developers, however, the attribute that it aims to quantify—
structure of developer collaboration—is more amenable to developer comprehension.
In our work, we used the weight associated with a metric value, determined using the
approach proposed by Alves et al. [5], and the risk level that it represents to determine
the metrics that are relevant for a given file. As mentioned earlier, the open code reviews
with the highest weight were considered as candidates for providing security feedback on.
For each such candidate code review, we selected all metrics whose values (v) indicated at
least a medium risk (using the scale 70% ≤ v < 80% where 70% and 80% are the threshold
values for the metric in question). We then manually designed the feedback which included
a list of file paths, from the code review in question, and a natural language description
of the risk associated with the file. The natural language description included a narrative
describing the attributes that each risk-indicating metric measures with the metric value and
the corresponding weight used to support the narrative.
Step 2: Assess Perception
We assessed developers’ perception of the security feedback through an online anonymous
survey the link to which was included in the feedback that we provided. The survey had
three questions, the first of which elicited developers’ perception of the feedback via eight
five-level Likert scale (levels from strongly disagree to strongly agree) statements, the second
elicited developers’ experience in the Chromium project and in software development, and
the third elicited anything else the developers wanted to communicate. The questions, and
associated statements (if any), from the survey are included in Appendix H in the Appendix
to this paper.
Since the assessment involves human subjects (Chromium developers), the survey was
13 See Interpretable Machine Learning by Molnar [90] for an overview
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Line Churn 2,954 5,421 12,164
Collaboration 217.40 285.94 438.66
Complexity 142 266 785
Contribution 394,024.66 778,280.86 2,207,375.77
Nesting 3 4 5
# Inputs 179 326 898
# Outputs 319 554 1,222
# Paths 472 6,399 3,484,322
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Rochester Institute of Tech-
nology. The approval from the review board is shown in Figure G.1 in Appendix G. As
mentioned earlier, the survey was anonymous and entirely voluntary. Furthermore, develop-
ers who volunteer to participate in the survey are presented with an informed consent form
describing the study, in general, and the survey, in particular, in more detail. The developers
are provided a link using which they can download a copy of the informed consent form for
their record.
Observations. We collected the eight vulnerability discovery metrics from the Chromium
project at 6b9bf768231f and, using the approach proposed by Alves et al. [5], associated
each metric value with weights enabling us to determine the threshold values for each metric.
Shown in Table 6.2 are the threshold values for each of the eight metrics in the Chromium
project.
We used the metric values, the weights associated with the metric values, and the afore-
mentioned thresholds to develop the feedback, identify the code review that we were going
to provide the feedback on, and post the security feedback as a comment on the identified
code review. Shown in Figure I.1 in the Appendix is a sample security feedback provided to
Chromium developers in one of the code reviews.
We provided security feedback on 19 code reviews from June 13, 2019 to June 27, 2019,
averaging about 2 code reviews per week day. The survey link in the first four instances of
the security feedback we provided did not track the code review on which the feedback was
provided on making it hard to associate developers’ perception of the security feedback to
the actual feedback. We modified the survey link to include the unique identifier of the code
review on which the security feedback was provided. The inclusion of the unique identifier in
the link does not violate the anonymity of the survey because a code review has more than
one person involved (developer and one or more reviewers) and the survey can be associated
with the code review but not the actual developer providing their perception. Furthermore,
the code review and any comments on it are publicly accessible so the survey can conceivably
be accessed by anyone with access to the code review comments.
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We received a total of five complete survey responses which places the response rate at
26.31% (assuming one response from each of the 19 code reviews we provided a feedback
on). The first of the five responses seems like the developer was just trolling us because the
developer responded with 0 years on both experience questions (Q2) and in the additional
information (Q3) included a link to an animated GIF. We were left with four legitimate
responses which, is not a sizeable sample to draw any sort of generalizable conclusions from.
After we had provided feedback on nine code reviews, one of the developers participating
on a code review we provided feedback on reached out to us via email expressing their
recognition of our effort to improve security in Chromium. The developer suggested that
code reviews may not be the right medium for the sort of feedback we were providing and
that chromium-dev@chromium.org and/or security-dev@chromium.org Google Groups were
more appropriate. After a cursory investigation of both groups referenced, we concluded that
these groups were generic and not amenable to the sort of (contextual) feedback we were
providing. We responded to the developer and continued to provide security feedback on
code reviews. We provided feedback on 11 more code reviews but on July 1, 2019 we noticed
that we could no longer access the code reviews that we had provided feedback on when
authenticated to the Gerrit web interface. We created an issue with the Gerrit team and
were told “You are getting a 404 because you have been explicitly banned from Gerrit on
the chromium host for spammy comments you made on code reviews ...”
After a couple of weeks, we modified our approach to use security-dev@chromium.org
as the medium to provide the feedback on to. We included a link to the code review that
the feedback was for to include additional context in the feedback. We posted two mes-
sage to security-dev@chromium.org and got two complete survey responses. In the second
response, the developer responded to the additional information question (Q3) by saying
“This data is useless and these emails are essentially spam.” Fearing being banned from
security-dev@chromium.org for posting spam, we ceased providing feedback to developers
to take a step back and reevaluate our approach.
In total, we got six (seven minus one invalid response) complete survey responses which,
as mentioned earlier, is not a sizeable sample to draw any sort of generalizable conclusions
from. However, we summarize the responses here for completeness. On average, the partici-
pants reported 11.33 and 3.77 years of experience in software development and in Chromium
project, respectively. We aggregated responses to the statements assessing developers’ per-
ception of the security feedback (Q1) by computing the median of the individual responses
(mapped on to a numerical scale spanning from Strongly Agree at 1 to Strongly Disagree at
5). We then rounded the aggregate response to the nearest whole number and mapped the
number back to the Likert scale to simplify interpretation.
The developers reported (1) to have carefully read and understood the feedback implying
that the feedback was clear, (2) being neutral toward the feedback disrupting their workflow
and receiving the feedback in a group setting implying that the choice of code reviews as
a medium for providing security feedback is probably appropriate, (3) being neutral about
discussing the feedback with their peers implying that the feedback did serve as a catalyst
for security conversation, albeit not as consistently as we had hoped for, (4) not being
surprised by the feedback implying that the developers may have been aware of the concerns
highlighted in the feedback or that concerns raised were expected, (5) the feedback having not
encouraged them to think about security. The only unanimous response from all developers
was that feedback was not useful.
In three of the six complete survey responses, developers provided additional informa-
tion (in response to Q3) as free form text. We analyze these responses in addressing the
expectations research question.
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In aggregate, Chromium developers reported that security feedback informed by insights
from vulnerability discovery metrics was, despite being read, understood, and discussed,
not surprising, at best, and not useful, at worst.
6.3.2 RQ 6 - Expectations
Question: What are developers’ expectations from vulnerability discovery metrics?
Motivation. In addressing the feedback research question, we discovered that Chromium
developers did not perceive the feedback informed by insights from vulnerability discovery
metrics to be useful in assisting them improve the security of their software, in general, and
discover vulnerabilities, in particular. The expectations research question is an opportunis-
tic extension to the feedback research question, in that, the observations from the feedback
research question led us to critically inquire the fundamental purpose of metrics, in general,
and the Chromium developers’ perception of vulnerability discovery metrics and the broader
metrics research community, in particular.
The motivation for the expectations research question is to elicit developers’ expectations
from vulnerability discovery metrics and to assess if the metrics can fulfil these expectations.
Approach. We began to address the expectations research question by initiating an
open conversation with Chromium developers by posting a message (Shown in Figure J.1
in the Appendix) on the chromium-dev Google Group. Our intention was not to collect,
and summarize, a sizeable sample of monologue responses (as surveys typically do) from
developers but, rather, to connect with the practitioners that the research that we produce
is aimed at helping and understand their awareness of the research and its usefulness in their
practice.
In the message posted to chromium-dev to initiate the conversation (See J.1 in the Ap-
pendix), we provided context of the project and a summary of our observations from posting
security feedback on code reviews. We included four open-ended and high-level questions
(shown below) in the message to serve as a catalyst for the conversation.
1. What are your thoughts on the security metrics research community?
2. Are we producing work that could be valuable to you?
3. Do you think there is a place for security metrics in the Chromium development life
cycle?
4. When, in the Chromium development life cycle, do you think is an appropriate oppor-
tunity for providing metrics-derived security feedback?
One of the early responses to our message included a suggestion that we post the message
to security-dev Google Group to “get the attention of the security-focused members of the
Chromium community” as “Not everyone keeps up with all of the mail on chromium-dev@.”
We acted on the suggestion and posted a similar message to security-dev to have a more
focused conversation.
We used the approach described by Auerbach and Silverstein [6] to analyze the qualitative
data that the conversation with the Chromium developers produced. The approach, which
has five steps, is bottom up with each step raising the level of abstraction at which we
reason about the data. The five steps in the approach involve (1) the extraction of relevant
text from the raw responses, (2) the identification of repeating ideas in the relevant text,
(3) the grouping of similar repeating ideas into themes, (4) the grouping of similar themes
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into more abstract theoretical constructs, and finally, (5) the development of theoretical
narratives by organizing the theoretical constructs. In presenting the analysis, we support our
interpretation of the responses by including quotations from the developers to be transparent
with the subjectivity inherent in qualitative analysis.
Observations. We had a total of seven developers respond to our message across
both chromium-dev and security-dev. We had more conversations with developers on
chromium-dev than on security-dev with five of the seven developers responding on chromium-dev.
The conversations with three of the seven developers was private, in that, the developers
choose to respond directly to us without including the Google Group email address. We
respected their choice when responding to their messages so the response was not publicly
posted to the Google Group. We had only two of the seven developers with whom we
exchanged multiple messages.
We gathered all the messages in our conversations, in their raw format, from the chromium-dev
and security-dev Google Groups and our mailboxes into a single location. We applied the
approach described by Auerbach and Silverstein [6] to analyze only those messages that we
received from the developers since our responses to the developers are not relevant to the
research question. We had ten such messages across all seven developers who responded
(either publicly or privately).
We extracted relevant text from the responses by removing any quoted text that email
clients tend to automatically include when responding to a message. We eliminated one re-
sponse at this stage because the response was just “iok”, which we interpreted as the acronym
for it’s okay, commonly used in chat-based conversations. Although we were familiar with
the responses, having replied to most of them, we perused the responses again to famil-
iarize ourselves with the specific expectations and/or concerns that the developers talked
about. We then systematically reviewed every response to identify excerpts that expressed
an expectation or suggestion. As we aggregated the excerpts from multiple responses, we
observed repeating expectations and/or suggestions. We grouped excerpts representing such
repeating expectations and/or suggestions into themes. As we labeled the themes, we ob-
served that the expectations and/or suggestions were about the approach we used to provide
the security feedback or about the feedback itself. We grouped themes pertaining to the
approach we used to provide security feedback and those pertaining to the feedback itself
into independent theoretical concepts. The theoretical narratives that follow leverage the
themes in these two theoretical constructs to describe the qualitative data.
Despite the survey that we used to assess developers’ perception of the security feedback
beginning with an informed consent form, one of the developers remarked that they have
“observed a worrying trend in the research community of sending unsolicited surveys to open
source project contributors” and that they “did not consent to be the subject of this research.”
The developer suggested, in retrospect, that we should “solicit feedback from the community
on whether or not it is interested in making this a part of the code review process” before
posting comments that may be regarded as “disruptive” and “spam” which may in turn lead
to “accounts blocked.”
Developers expected the feedback to be specific, actionable, and in the context of the
change. Developers expected the feedback to be “specific and actionable” and that “stating
that a particular file scored high on some model is of absolutely no use to us at all.” The
feedback must include “definitive evidence ... (not ... probability) that there is a bug” and
“some indication of where it is” and, if definitive evidence is not available, a description of
the ways in which developers “could improve the change” and/or a prescription of “what
action should a developer take”. The feedback must be specific to the change in that it must
“discuss the actual change” and if the change is actually “causing any security issues”.
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Chromium developers expect the feedback, and by extension, the vulnerability discovery
metrics the insights from which informed the feedback, to be specific, actionable, and in the
context of the change. The expectations are largely informed by the developers’ preference
for the feedback to lead to a bug report, one that they can triage and fix.
The observations from the expectations research question highlights a possible discon-
nect in the definition of actionability between research and practice. As Meneely et al.
[84] mention, the perception of actionability differs between theory-driven and goal-driven
philosophies, with those of the theory-driven philosophy not regarding a metric as useless
simply because it is not actionable because some metrics tend to be relevant to characterize
attributes of software beyond specific goals. Developers, being goal-driven, expect the met-
rics to be actionable in the sense that the metric must lead to a tangible goal (the creation
of a bug report describing the vulnerability that the metric found in a piece of software,
in our case). Vulnerability discovery metrics quantify systemic problems within the prod-
uct, process, or people involved in engineering software and literature has shown that such
systemic problems are associated with historical vulnerabilities. However, Chromium devel-
opers’ expectation of specific, actionable, and in the context of the change do not seem likely
to be fulfilled by vulnerability discovery metrics. The only exception to this observation was
the expectation from one of the developers that the metric indicate that “this file you are
touching right now has had security problems in the past” and the (known) offender metric
[85] fulfills this expectation.
6.3.3 RQ 7 - Effectiveness
Question: How effective are existing vulnerability discovery approaches?
Motivation. In addressing the expectations research question, we observed that devel-
opers, being of the goal-driven philosophy, expect their vulnerability discovery approaches
to be specific, actionable, and in the context of the change. We further observed that the
vulnerability discovery metrics we used are unlikely to fulfill these expectations. In the
effectiveness research question, we wanted to broaden the scope of the vulnerability discov-
ery beyond metrics to include other, existing, vulnerability discovery approaches to identify
those that are likely to meet developers’ expectations.
Shahriar and Zulkernine [130] systematically reviewed the literature to compare and
contrast various approaches proposed to mitigate vulnerabilities in software, including an
enumeration of the challenges in applying these mitigation approaches. Among the three
vulnerability mitigation techniques surveyed, static analysis achieved the same coverage of
vulnerabilities as testing and hybrid analysis (i.e. combination of static and dynamic analy-
sis). Despite the high false positive rate [56], the use of static analysis techniques for security
[19] has seen a steady growth with several popular open-source projects using at least one
static analysis tool to analyze their source code [8]. The concern of static analysis breaking
developers’ workflows [52] is being alleviated by solutions like Tricorder [126] and Tricium
[41] by Google and GitLab DevSecOps [40] seamlessly integrating static analysis into existing
developer workflows.
The motivation for the effectiveness research question is to assess the effectiveness of
existing vulnerability discovery approaches in assisting developers discover vulnerabilities.
Among the existing vulnerability discovery approaches, we choose to target static analysis
for the following reasons: (1) static analysis does not require the source code to be exe-
cuted, freeing our analysis from the need to compile the source code of our study subjects,
(2) there are several popular open-source static analyzers that we could use in our analysis,
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and (3) with static analysis increasingly becoming a commonplace in most mature software
engineering workflows, our analysis could provide insights on its effectiveness in vulnerability
discovery.
Approach. We address the effectiveness research question in the context of the FFmpeg
project. We chose FFmpeg because the dataset of vulnerabilities that have been fixed in the
project is sizable yet not prohibitive when identifying vulnerability contributing commits. We
begin the analysis by identifying the parent commit of each of the vulnerability contributing
commits in FFmpeg. The parent of a vulnerability contributing commit represents the state
of the source code before the vulnerability was contributed (by the vulnerability contributing
commit). We checkout the FFmpeg source code at each vulnerability contributing commit,
and its parent, and subject it to static analysis (See Section 6.2.1 for details about static
analysis as used in our work).
As mentioned earlier, a vulnerability contributing commit can contribute to a vulnera-
bility in one of two ways: the vulnerability is contributed when the file is added for the first
time or the vulnerability is contributed when the file is modified during its evolution. The
dichotomy of vulnerability contributing commits based on the mode of vulnerability contri-
bution is necessary because the analysis approach, as described below, is different based on
the mode of vulnerability contribution.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Modification
In this case, we compare the static analysis findings associated with the vulnerable file
at vulnerability contributing commit and that at its parent. The expectation here is that
the change to the vulnerable file must be correlated with an increase in the number of static
analysis findings.
The analysis approach is slightly involved because the task of identifying static analysis
findings attributable to code modified in the vulnerability contributing commit is nontriv-
ial. We illustrate this with an example shown in Table 6.3. In the example, foo.c is an
existing file into which a vulnerability was introduced at line 4 by the vulnerability con-
tributing commit, contributor. foo.c before (i.e. at commit parent) the vulnerability
was introduced, had a trivial static analysis finding (unused variable) on line 4. Since the
vulnerability contributing commit added a new line to foo.c, line 4 in parent is now line 5
in contributor. If we were to subject foo.c at contributor to static analysis, two findings
would be reported, one at line 4 (new in contributor) and one at line 5 (unresolved from
parent). The actual number of static analysis findings attributable to the code modified in
contributor, however, is just the one associated with line 4. In our analysis, we used the
patch associated with the vulnerability contributing commit to map a line after the commit


















Table 6.3: Two versions, contributor and parent, of a file, foo.c, with contributor contributing to a vulnerability used
to illustrate the approach to identify static analysis findings associated with code modified in a vulnerability contributing
commit
contributor parent
Code Line Line Code
#include <stdio.h> 1 1 #include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { 2 2 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char message[6] = "world"; 3 3 char message[6] = "world";
gets(message); 4 -
int x; 5 4 int x;
printf("hello %s\n", message); 6 5 printf("hello %s\n", message);
return 0; 7 6 return 0;
} 8 7 }
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An alternative, arguably simpler, approach would have been to only consider the static
analysis findings associated with the vulnerable file after the vulnerability contributing com-
mit was applied to it and identify those findings that were associated with the suspect lines.
Perl et al. [115] did indeed use this approach in their work. The intention with our choice
of analysis approach was to account for the situation where the lines of code being added,
deleted, and/or modified in the vulnerability contributing commit causes the introduction
of static analysis findings in a different part of the file. In effect, our approach is attempting
to improve recall over the alternative (simpler) approach.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Addition
In this case, we reason about the distance, in number of lines, between the suspect lines
and the static analysis finding lines. The expectation here is that the vulnerable file must
have static analysis findings near the lines suspected of contributing to the vulnerability.
As with our analysis approach for vulnerabilities contributed during file modification,
we are not only assessing if static analysis findings were associated with the vulnerable lines
but the distance of the static analysis findings from the vulnerable lines, achieving a holistic
perspective over the alternative approach [115]. Furthermore, the distance affords us the
ability to reason about the likelihood of the developer even having seen the vulnerable lines
in their peripheral view, if not directly, when perusing the static analysis findings. For
instance, if a file with 120 lines of code had a finding at line 20 but the vulnerable line of
code was at line 118, the developer is unlikely to have even seen the vulnerable line, which
was 98 lines away from the static analysis finding.
The approach to compute the distance between suspect lines and the static analysis
finding lines involves an aggregation step because a single vulnerable file can have more
than one suspect lines and more than one static analysis finding lines. We compute the
distance between a single static analysis finding line and all the suspect lines and aggregate
the distances at the static analysis finding level. For instance, consider a file foo.c which
has two static analysis findings at lines 53 and 64 and three suspect lines at 13, 34, and
82. We first compute the distance between the each static analysis finding and each of the
three suspect lines to get 40, 19, and 29 for finding at line 53 and 51, 30, 18 at line 64. We
then aggregate the distances computed for each static analysis finding to get the minimum
distance between the finding and the suspect line. If the minimum distance is zero, then the
static analysis finding is on the same line as one of the suspects.
Observations. We begin the presentation of our observations by summarizing the
static analysis findings associated with known vulnerable files at the time of vulnerability
contribution (i.e. at the vulnerability contributing commit). Shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3
is the distribution of number of static analysis findings in known vulnerable files at the time
of vulnerability contribution and their severity, respectively.
The distribution of the number of static analysis findings (Figure 6.2) is clearly right
skewed, implying that several files have few findings while a few files have several findings.
We assessed if the skewness of the distribution could be an artifact of the size of the vulnerable
file. Shown in Figure 6.4 is a scatter plot depicting the correlation between the size of the
vulnerable file (expressed as number of source lines of code) and the number of static analysis
findings associated with the file. A trivial inference one can make from Figure 6.4 is that the
size of vulnerable file is correlated with the number of static analysis findings associated with
the file. We found quantitative evidence to support this inference leading us to conclude that
vulnerable files with more source lines of code are statistically (Spearman’s p-value  0.01)
and practically (Spearman’s ρ = 0.7999 representing a strong positive correlation) more likely
to be associated with more static analysis findings. As a consequence of this observation, we
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of number of static analysis findings in known vulnerable
files at the time of vulnerability contributing commit
Figure 6.3: Distribution of severity of static analysis findings in known vulnerable
files at the time of vulnerability contributing commit
use density (ratio of number to size) of static analysis findings rather than the number.
The distribution of the severity of static analysis findings (Figure 6.3) indicates that
the static analysis findings from the different analyzers are very different, with RATS being
left skewed and Flawfinder being right skewed. The skewness could be an artifact of the
difference in the way the analyzers assign severity to the findings or it could mean that
certain analyzers are better at discovering fewer high severity problems while others are
better at discovering several low severity problems. If it is the latter, then our decision to
use multiple static analyzers to improve soundness [19] of static analysis, as suggested by Li
and Cui [65], is supported by the data from FFmpeg.
We now present the observations from applying our approach to addressing the effec-
tiveness research question. Since the analysis approach is different if the vulnerability was
contributed when the vulnerability contributing commit modified an existing file and when
it added a new file, we present the observations separately as well.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Modification
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Figure 6.4: Scatter plot depicting the correlation between the size of the vulnerable
file (expressed as number of source lines of code) and the number of static analysis
findings associated with the file at the time of vulnerability contributing commit
In the case of vulnerabilities contributed during file modification, we have two versions
of the vulnerable file: before and after the vulnerability was contributed by the vulnerability
contributing commit. The key in assessing the effectiveness of static analysis to highlight
risk in these commits is to identify if there is a change in the number of static analysis
findings associated with the vulnerable file before and after the commit. In other words, we
assess if a vulnerability contributing commit contributes new static analysis findings to the
vulnerable file.
Shown in Figure 6.5 is the distribution of the severity of static analysis findings associated
with vulnerable files at the time of vulnerability contribution during file modification. An
interesting insight from Figure 6.5 is that the severity of unresolved static analysis findings
(i.e. static analysis findings that existed even before the vulnerability contributing commit) is
high (mean severity was 3.16), implying that the files were already at risk of being vulnerable.
If static analysis was an effective means of vulnerability discovery, then every vulnera-
bility contributing commit must be associated with at least one new static analysis findings.
We evaluate this notion by computing the percentage of vulnerability contributing commits
which were associated with at least one new static analysis finding. Shown in Table 6.4 is
the percentage of vulnerable files marked as risky (i.e. have at least one new static analysis
finding) after a vulnerability was contributed by the vulnerability contributing commit. If
developers were to use static analysis to discover vulnerabilities, they are likely to ignore
less severe findings (such as unused variables) in favor of the more severe findings (such as
null pointer access). We simulate this behavior of developers by stratifying the static anal-
ysis findings by severity. The minimum severity in Table 6.4 specifies the severity threshold
used when computing the percentage of vulnerable files marked as risky. For instance, if the
developers had chosen to consider only those static analysis findings with severity of high
or above, then 28.57% of the vulnerable files would have been highlighted as being risky by
static analysis.
As shown in Table 6.4, the percentage of vulnerable files that would have been marked
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of static analysis findings density associated with vulnerable
files at the time of vulnerability contribution during file modification
Table 6.4: Percentage of vulnerable files marked as risky (i.e. have at least one
new static analysis finding) after a vulnerability was contributed by the vulnerability
contributing commit
Minimum Severity
Trivial Low Medium High Critical Catastrophic
36.55% 35.29% 34.03% 28.57% 4.20% 3.36%
as risky by static analysis is low (with 36.55% being the highest value) indicating that a
considerable portion of vulnerable files (with 63.45% being the lowest value) would not have
gotten the developers’ attention for a security review.
Static analysis was found to not highlight risk of vulnerability in 63.45% of vulnerable files
in the FFmpeg project at the time of vulnerability contributing commit.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Addition
In the case of vulnerabilities contributed during file addition, we have a single version of
the vulnerable file. As a result, all static analysis findings associated with the vulnerable file
are new. As shown in Figure 6.6, the density of static analysis findings in vulnerable files is
low (mean density was 0.0319 i.e. on average, there were approximately three static analysis
findings for every one hundred source lines of code). While certain static analysis findings
(like unused variable) may be trivial to address due to their narrow scope, others may require
the developer to have to review additional lines of code to ensure that addressing a static
analysis finding does not lead to additional bugs. The low density of static analysis findings
indicates that a developer is likely to have to review a considerable number of lines of code
when addressing few static analysis findings.
If static analysis was an effective means of vulnerability discovery, then every vulner-
ability contributing commit must be associated with static analysis findings that are near
the lines that were suspected of contributing to the vulnerability. Shown in Figure 6.7 is
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of density of static analysis findings associated with vulner-
able files at the time of vulnerability contribution during file addition
the distribution of minimum distance between a static analysis finding and suspect lines of
code in vulnerable files. The variance in minimum distance is quite large. Furthermore, the
right skewness of the distributions indicates that a considerable number of static analysis
findings are near the suspect lines. However, the mean and median of the minimum distance
between a static analysis finding and suspect lines of code shown in Table 6.5 indicate that
the minimum distance is not quite near enough. If developers were to review every line in
the n (where n is the mean of minimum distance in Table 6.5) lines before and after the
static analysis finding, then the they would need approximately one and a half hour14 to
address each static analysis finding with trivial severity.
Figure 6.7: Distribution of minimum distance between a static analysis finding and
suspect lines of code in vulnerable files at the time of vulnerability contribution during
file addition
Static analysis findings were found to not be near lines suspected of contributing a vulner-
ability in the FFmpeg project at the time of vulnerability contributing commit.
14 Using 200 lines of code per hour as the rate of review [53]
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Table 6.5: Mean and median of the minimum distance between a static analysis finding











6.3.4 RQ 8 - Utility
Question: Is there a utility for vulnerability discovery metrics?
Motivation. In addressing the effectiveness research question, we observed that static
analysis, a commonly-used approach to improve the overall quality of software [8], (1) would
have missed to highlight risk of a vulnerability in 63.45% of vulnerable files when the files
were being modified and (2) the findings reported were not near the lines suspected of
being vulnerable in vulnerable files when the files were being added. In the utility research
question, we wanted to assess the utility of vulnerability discovery metrics in highlighting
risk in vulnerability contributing commits.
Although there are a plethora of approaches to discover vulnerabilities in software [39],
the academic investigation of the effectiveness of these approaches has largely been siloed.
Over the years, there have only been a few studies that have attempted to assess the comple-
mentary aspects of leveraging multiple vulnerability discovery approaches to assist developers
in improving security of software. As recently as 2018, researchers [139] have highlighted the
need to investigate the ways in which one vulnerability discovery approach can complement
another in improving the effectiveness of vulnerability discovery. In our review, we found a
study by Gegick et al. [37] to be the only one to have investigated the complementary aspects
of vulnerability discovery metrics and static analysis. In their study of pre- and post-release
failures, Gegick et al. [37] found that metrics (churn and source lines of code) alone were
ineffective at accurately predicting attack-prone components but a combination of metrics
and automated static analysis alert density predicted 100% of attack-prone components with
an 8% false positive rate.
The motivation for the utility research question is to assess the utility of vulnerability
discovery metrics in highlighting risk from vulnerability contributing commits. We use the
term utility here as a catchall for the various ways in which the metrics can be reasoned about
as being useful, the chief among which is to highlight risk from vulnerability contributing
commits.
Approach. As with the effectiveness research question, we address the utility research
question in the context of the FFmpeg project. We begin by assessing if the vulnerability
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discovery metrics would have even highlighted vulnerability contributing commits in FFmpeg
as being risky.
We aggregate the risk associated with individual vulnerability discovery metric value
at the appropriate level of granularity to enable reasoning about risk at the higher level
of granularity. For instance, we aggregate risk associated with all change-level metrics to
express change risk. We use median of individual risk to achieve this aggregation. We
then aggregate the risk associated with the change, commit, file, and developer to express
the risk associated with the vulnerability contributing commit. We use the maximum of
change, commit, developer, and file risks to achieve this aggregation to ensure granular risk is
propagated to the vulnerability contributing commit. The aggregation approach is pictorially
represented as a top-down tree shown in Figure 6.8. The colored circles with numbers in
Figure 6.8 are sample risk levels that serve as an example to aid the comprehension of our
aggregation approach.
Figure 6.8: Pictorial representation of the approach used to aggregate risk associated
with metrics at individual levels of granularity (change, commit, developer, and file)
and to aggregate the change, commit, developer, and file risk to express the overall
risk. The colored circles with numbers are sample risk levels that serve as an example.
As with the effectiveness research question, we identify, and use, the parent each of
the vulnerability contributing commits to represent the state of the source code before the
vulnerability was contributed. We collected the 18 metrics described in Section A.2 of
Appendix A from FFmpeg before and after each vulnerability contributing commit. While
we collected all 18 metrics, we did not consider three commit-level metrics—message tokens,
patch tokens, and patch keyword frequency—when addressing the utility research question
due to the inherent lack of generalizability of these metrics. We also do not consider the
source lines of code metric as a vulnerability discovery metric because we used it to normalize
other file-level metrics when computing the thresholds. In effect, we consider the following
metrics: function churn, line churn, # past authors, and # past changes at the change level,
# hunks at the commit level, ownership at the developer level, and collaboration, complexity,
contribution, function churn, line churn, nesting, offender, # inputs, # output, and # paths
at the file level. Although we considered the offender metric, We did consider the offender
metric at the file level but since it is a boolean-valued metric, it has no threshold except that
its value itself indicates if the change is risky or not.
We used the metrics collected from FFmpeg before a vulnerability contributing commit
to compute the metrics’ thresholds and used the thresholds to associate appropriate risk
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levels to the metrics collected from FFmpeg after the vulnerability contributing commit.
The specifics of computing metric thresholds and using the thresholds to classify risk is
described in Section 6.2.2. As mentioned earlier, we use two different versions of FFmpeg
because we wanted to simulate the likely scenario in which the thresholds computed in the
past (before a vulnerability contributing commit, in our case) are used to assess risk of a
future change (the vulnerability contributing commit, in our case).
Similar to the effectiveness research question, the analysis approach here is dependent on
the mode of vulnerability contribution: vulnerability contributed during file modification or
vulnerability contributed during file addition. The dichotomy of vulnerability contributing
commits based on the mode of vulnerability contribution is necessary because the set of
vulnerability discovery metrics available are different based on the mode of vulnerability
contribution. The reason for this difference in vulnerability discovery metric availability
is because some metrics (for instance, contribution centrality and collaboration centrality
proposed by Meneely and Williams [81]) are based on the history of a file and such metrics
are not defined when analyzing a vulnerability contributed during file addition.
Observations. As described in the approach to addressing the utility research question,
we analyzed vulnerability contributing commits that contributed a vulnerability during file
modification separately from those that contributed a vulnerability during file addition. As
a result, we present our observations separately as well.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Modification
When analyzing vulnerability contributing commits that contributed a vulnerability dur-
ing file modification, all 16 metrics listed in the approach are defined.
At the outset, we observed that the vulnerable file in about one third (29.47%) of the
vulnerability contributing commits was a known offender. In their study, Meneely et al. [85]
observed that the 26.6% of vulnerability contributing commits in the Apache HTTP Server
project had known offenders. The similarity in proportion of vulnerability contributing
commits that modified a known offender observed in both studies lends further credence to
the (known) offender metric. The observation implies that even a simple metric like (known)
offender has the potential to assist developers in engineering secure software by highlighting
risky changes and addresses the “... metric that would help me would be “this file you are
touching right now has had security problems in the past”.” expectation that one of the
Chromium developers expressed.
A vulnerable file in about one third (29.47%) of the vulnerability contributing commits
that contributed a vulnerability during file modification was a known offender.
Shown in Figure 6.9 is percentage of vulnerability contributing commits which con-
tributed a vulnerability during file modification highlighted as risky at non-trivial metric
risk levels. The percentage values shown in Figure 6.9 are cumulative; for instance, the
34.3% associated with high change risk includes those changes that had high and critical
risk.
As can be inferred from the percentages in Figure 6.9, a considerable portion of the
vulnerability contributing commits had at least a medium change, commit, and file risk.
Developer risk, on the other hand, is rather interesting with only 3.4% of the vulnerability
contributing commits being risky at all risk levels. A factor that is likely to have con-
tributed to such a low proportion is the skewness in the distribution of ownership (the only
developer-level metric in our study). Shown in Figure 6.10 is the distribution of ownership
in the FFmpeg project at the time of the most recent vulnerability contributing commit
(c8c81ac502). The distribution is clearly right skewed to a severe degree with the skew
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Figure 6.9: Percentage of vulnerability contributing commits which contributed a
vulnerability during file modification highlighted as risky at non-trivial metric risk
levels
quantitatively estimated to be 34.95 [51]. The skewness indicates that a large number of
developers have contributed few changes to the FFmpeg project. In fact, 90% of the com-
mits to FFmpeg at c8c81ac502 were contributed to by 5.93% of the developers. A direct
consequence of the skew in distribution of ownership is that the thresholds computed for the



















Distribution of Ownership at Version c8c81ac502 of FFmpeg
Figure 6.10: Distribution of ownership in the FFmpeg project at the time of the most
recent vulnerability contributing commit (c8c81ac502)
In the remainder of the discussion here, we only reason about risk at the critical level.
By reasoning at critical level of risk, we constrain ourselves to the top 10% of changes,
commits, and files. For instance, the threshold value at the 90% quantile for the # hunks
commit-level metric in the FFmpeg project before the most recent vulnerability contributing
commit (c8c81ac502) is 8. We know (See Section 6.2.2 for specifics on the approach used
to compute thresholds) that at most 10% of the commits can have a # hunks value higher
than 8.
At the individual level of granularity, commit risk seems to be most effective at highlight-
ing risk in vulnerability contributing commits with 36.7% being assessed as having critical
risk. The commit risk, having been aggregated from a single commit-level metric (# hunks),
indicates that vulnerability contributing commits tend to have very high value for the #
hunks metric which in turn indicates that the commit is highly fragmented [115]. Change
risk is not as effective with only 8.7% of vulnerability contributing commits being assessed as
having critical risk. However, change risk is aggregated from the most granular metrics asso-
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ciated with a commit (i.e. function churn, line churn, # past authors, and # past changes)
meaning the risk highlighted by the change risk is likely to be immediately understandable
by a developer contributing the change. File risk, as with change risk, does not seem to
be as effective highlighting only 11.1% of the vulnerability contributing commits as being
risky. However, file risk has been aggregated from nine individual metrics collected at the
file level and the aggregation strategy (median, in our case) may have had an impact on the
effective file risk. The simplicity of the risk assessment approach means that practitioners
can change the aggregation strategy from median to, say, weighted average to selectively
prioritize certain metrics over others.
The overall risk, aggregated from change, commit, developer, and file risks, is effective
at highlighting 42.5% of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky.
Overall, risk from metrics was effective at highlighting 42.5% of the vulnerability contribut-
ing commits as being risky at the critical level. However, at individual levels of granularity,
commit risk was most effective, highlighting 36.7% of the vulnerability contributing com-
mits as risky followed by file risk with 11.1%, change risk with 8.7%, and developer risk
with 3.4%
In the effectiveness research question, we observed that static analysis highlighted 36.55%
of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky (See Table 6.4). In terms of absolute val-
ues, the overall metric risk highlighted 42.5% of the vulnerability contributing commits as
risky outperforming static analysis. While the comparison is not fair because of the lev-
els of granularity at which the analysis was performed for static analysis. In assessing the
effectiveness of static analysis, we classified a vulnerability contributing commit as risky if
the vulnerable file had at least one new static analysis finding implying that the new static
analysis finding was contributed by the change. The overall metric risk is aggregated from
risk at individual levels of granularity, two of which are not directly associated with the
change itself. However, if we considered only the change risk and commit risk, commit risk
still outperforms static analysis (36.7% versus 36.55%). Furthermore, the 36.55% observed
for static analysis was a liberal assessment because we considered any new finding as con-
tributing risk, irrespective of its severity, but with metric risk, we considered only risk at the
critical level.
Overall metric risk at the critical level outperformed static analysis (even with no consid-
eration of severity of findings) in highlighting vulnerability contributing commits as risky.
We further analyzed the utility of metrics in relation to static analysis by assessing the
overall metric risk of those vulnerability contributing commits that static analysis missed
(i.e. the 63.45% of the vulnerability contributing commits that had zero new static analysis
findings in the vulnerable file after the vulnerability contributing commit). We observed
that 32.12% of these missed vulnerability contributing commits had critical overall metric
risk. If the overall metric risk was used as a secondary risk assessment mechanism (with
static analysis being the primary), 68.67% = 36.55% (static analysis) + 32.12% (metric) of
the vulnerability contributing commits would have found to be risky.
Overall metric risk was effective at highlighting 32.12% of the vulnerability contributing
commits missed by static analysis as risky. In effect, a combination of static analysis and
metric risk would have highlighted 69% of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky.
The increase in percentage of vulnerability contributing commits that would have been
highlighted as risky with the inclusion of metric risk presents a promising avenue for using
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static analysis as the primary line of risk assessment with metric being the supplemental,
secondary line of risk assessment.
Vulnerability Contributed During File Addition
When analyzing vulnerability contributing commits that contributed a vulnerability dur-
ing file addition, 9 of the 16 metrics listed in the approach are defined. These 9 metrics are
function churn and line churn at the change level, # hunks at the commit level, ownership
at the developer level, and complexity, nesting, # inputs, # outputs, and # paths at the
file level. The loss of 7 out of 16 metrics (approximately 44%) is a considerable limitation
and goes to show that metrics that are dependent on the history of a file have no utility in
highlighting risk in commits that contribute vulnerabilities when adding a file.
Shown in Figure 6.11 is percentage of vulnerability contributing commits which con-
tributed a vulnerability during file addition highlighted as risky at non-trivial metric risk
levels. The percentage values shown in Figure 6.11 are cumulative; for instance, the 98.1%
associated with high change risk includes those changes that had high and critical risk.
Figure 6.11: Percentage of vulnerability contributing commits which contributed a
vulnerability during file addition highlighted as risky at non-trivial metric risk levels
As can be inferred from the distribution in Figure 6.11, more than half of the vulnerabil-
ity contributing commits had critical risk at the change and commit levels. Developer risk
only highlighted a 5.6% of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky. Although the
value is higher than that observed when analyzing vulnerability contributing commits that
contributed a vulnerability during file modification (See Figure 6.9), it is not high enough to
be effective. However, we did analyze if the ownership of developers contributing vulnerabil-
ities during file addition is lower than that of developers contributing vulnerabilities during
file modification. We used comparative box plot, shown in Figure 6.12, to qualitatively as-
sess if there is an association between ownership and the mode of vulnerability contribution.
The comparative box plot shows a considerable overlap between the distributions of own-
ership of developers contributing vulnerabilities during file addition and that of developers
contributing vulnerabilities during file modification. The quantitative assessment supported
the qualitative inference that can be drawn from Figure 6.12 revealing no statistical evidence
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon p-value > 0.05) to conclude that the two distributions are indeed
different in the FFmpeg project.
The file risk hardly highlighted any vulnerability contributing commits as risky which
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Figure 6.12: Comparing the distribution of developer ownership in vulnerability con-
tributing commits in which a vulnerability was contributed during file modification
and that in vulnerability contributing commits in which a vulnerability was con-
tributed during file addition
could mean that the file-level metrics defined on a new file may not be as utilitarian in
highlighting risky commits than metrics defined on an existing file.
The overall risk, aggregated from change, commit, developer, and file risks, is effective
at highlighting 83.3% of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky. While the high
percentage may seem impressive, the overall risk is likely being biased by change risk and
commit risk, which by themselves seem effective. The reason for change risk and commit
risk to be highlighting so many of the vulnerability contributing commits as risky is because
these commits are adding the vulnerable file which, by the nature of addition, will have very
high values for change-level and commit-level metrics as compared to a file that is being
modified. Nevertheless, if the vulnerability contributing commit is required to be subject to
a code review prior to its acceptance into the source code repository, the file being added
must be assumed to be risky simply because of the size of the change.
Overall, risk from metrics was effective at highlighting 83.3% of the vulnerability contribut-
ing commits as risky. However, the effectiveness may be affected by the fact that a commit
adding a file is likely to have very high values for change-level and commit-levels metrics
relative to a commit modifying a file.
6.4 Summary
In this study, we considered the notion that “un-actionable (metric) is not useless” [84]
and assessed the utility of metrics, treated as agents of feedback rather than mere features
in a black box prediction model, in assisting developers discover vulnerabilities. We used
values, (unsupervised) thresholds, and interpretation of metrics collected from the Chromium
project to generate natural language feedback on security. We provided this feedback to
Chromium developers and assessed their perception using a survey. In conducting the study,
we observed that the Chromium developers reported the insights from vulnerability discovery
metrics, despite being read, understood, and discussed, to be not surprising, at best, and
not useful, at worst. In a follow up conversation with the developers, we discovered that
their expectations were largely informed by the preference for the feedback to lead to a
bug report, one that they can triage and fix, rather than understanding the potential for
deeper systemic problems. We assessed if existing vulnerability discovery approach—static
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analysis—which was likely to meet the developers’ expectation was utilitarian in discovering
vulnerabilities. We found that static analysis missed to highlight a risk in nearly two-
thirds of the vulnerability contributing commits in FFmpeg. However, metrics, when used
independently, highlighted risk in a little over two-fifths of the vulnerability contributing
commits and, when used in concert with static analysis, highlighted risk in little over to
two-thirds of the vulnerability contributing commits. We discovered that the metrics did
indeed contribute an aspect to vulnerability discovery that static analysis by itself could not.
Chapter 7
Summary
In our pursuit of fine-grained metrics to discover vulnerabilities in software, we proposed
two empirically-validated metrics—proximity and risky walk—based on the attack surface
model of a software system. In empirically validating proximity and risky walk metrics, we
demonstrated that the prediction model built with these metrics as explanatory variables
outperformed comparable models from prior literature. The absolute performance of the
model, however, left a lot to be desired. In the applying a conventional approach to using
the performance of a vulnerability prediction model to infer the utility of metrics, we are
ignoring the metrics’ ability to tell a story, as Fenton and Neil suggested in their software
metrics roadmap almost twenty years ago [32]. Furthermore, as Meneely et al. [84] mention,
“un-actionable (metric) is not useless” to a person (researcher or practitioner) of a theory-
driven persuasion. In effect, we were falling short of asking ourselves what is the metric telling
us? and what can we ask developers to do?. The introspection on conventional practice of
rejecting metrics based solely on their inability to predict vulnerabilities in the context of a
black box model proved to be the catalyst behind the vision of the work presented in this
dissertation.
The vision of our research presented in this dissertation was to assist software engineers
in building secure software by providing a technique that generates scientific, interpretable,
and actionable feedback on security as the software evolves. We presented our observations
from two research studies that we conducted toward achieving this vision. We began by
systematically reviewing the literature to enumerate the vulnerability discovery metrics that
have been proposed and/or evaluated in the literature. We identified a plethora of metrics but
the validity of the metrics has primarily been evaluated in the context open-source subjects
written in few programming languages with limited replication by authors other than the
ones proposing the metrics. We also observed that the validation of the metrics tended to be
biased toward assessing association, discrimination, and prediction, with limited attention
paid to assessing causality or actionability. Furthermore, the metrics were seldom validated
using real developers. We implemented a subset of the metrics identified during the review
and specifically assessed the generalizability of metrics across projects, application domains,
and programming languages. We used an unsupervised approach from literature to compute
metric thresholds and assessed the ability of the thresholds to classify risk from historical
vulnerabilities in an open-source project. In keeping with our vision to provide developers
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with security feedback, we leveraged the metric values, thresholds, and interpretation to
provide developers with data-driven feedback on security as they contributed changes to
a large open-source project. In seeing that our feedback was being perceived as spam, we
initiated an open dialogue with the developer community to ascertain their expectations from
such feedback. In response to the comments from the developer community, we assessed the
effectiveness of an existing vulnerability discovery approach—static analysis—that was likely
to fulfil developers’ expectations. However, we found that the existing vulnerability discovery
approach highlight about one-third of commits that likely contributed a vulnerability as
being risky. We assessed the utility of the metrics to highlight risk in the same set of
vulnerability contributing commits and found metrics to outperform existing vulnerability
discovery approach. Furthermore, we found that static analysis and metrics in concert was
able to highlight risk in a considerable portion of vulnerability contributing commits.
In summary, the immediate implications of our work are as follows:
• We highlight, through a systematic literature review of vulnerability discover metrics
in Chapter 5, certain shortcomings of the validation approach used to assess the em-
pirical validity of the metrics, in general, and decision-informing ability of the metrics,
in particular. The bias toward using open-source subjects of study and relying on as-
sociation, discrimination, and prediction to assess metrics’ decision-informing ability
is likely to mask the inherent potential of the metrics: to highlight systemic problems
in the product, process, and/or people.
• We present our observations from using the insights from vulnerability discovery met-
rics to provide feedback to Chromium developers as they contributed changes to the
project. We observed that the developers reported that the feedback, despite being
read, understood, and discussed, was not surprising, at best, and not useful, at worst.
In a subsequent dialogue with the Chromium developers, we observed that developers
expected the feedback, and by extension, the vulnerability discovery metrics the in-
sights from which informed the feedback, to be specific, actionable, and in the context
of the change. The expectations were largely informed by the developers’ preference
for the feedback to lead to a bug report, one that they can triage and fix.
• We provide empirical evidence to show that an existing vulnerability discovery approach—
static analysis—that satisfied the developers’ expectations missed to highlight risk in
nearly two-thirds of the vulnerability contributing commits in the FFmpeg project.
• We provide empirical evidence to show that the metrics, when used independently, were
effective at highlighting risk in little less than half of the vulnerability contributing
commits in FFmpeg. However, when static analysis and metrics were used in concert,
little over two-thirds of the vulnerability contributing commits were highlighted as
being risky.
• We provide evidence to show that metrics indeed have an utility in highlighting risk
in vulnerability contributing commits despite being perceived as not being actionable
by developers.
• We present Samaritan metrics platform (described in detail in Appendix A) which
comprises of the eighteen vulnerability discovery metrics implemented as containerized
microservices to aid replication by researchers and usage by practitioners and the
website (https://samaritan.github.io/) which is the venue of dissemination of our
research to the broader software development community.
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7.1 Future Work
In the conducting the research studies in pursuit of achieving our research vision, we have
gained newfound insights into the expectations of developers from security feedback derived
from vulnerability discovery metrics. We, unsurprisingly, observed that developers, being
goal-driven, expected the feedback to lead to a concrete bug report that they could act on.
Unfortunately, however, the value of metrics is in highlighting deeper systemic problems in
the product, process, or people so that developers or managers can foreshadow risk. We
expect our to spur interest to further aid the adoption of metrics in practice. We highlight
some of the ways in which we envision our work to continue below.
• We conjecture that lack of adoption is likely due to the perceived ineffectiveness of
the metrics in predicting vulnerabilities. We are actively pursuing a line of research in
which we intend to provide the security feedback to stakeholders other than developers
and assess their receptiveness of the feedback. Managers of engineering teams are likely
a relevant stakeholders to provide the security feedback to since their role involves
decision making. At the other end of the software engineering workflow spectrum,
we could provide the feedback to participants in bug bounty programs to validate
if focusing their attention on risky files can help their hunt for bugs. We suspect
that since the goal in hunting for bugs is to maximize profit (i.e. the bounty), the
participants may be more receptive of the feedback that could help support their goal.
• In attempting to accomplish our research vision, we have demonstrated the utility of
metrics in highlighting risky changes, commits, and/or files. While our goal is to use
this knowledge to assist developers improve the security of software, one can envision
our approach being used by malicious actors to identify risky changes, commits, and/or
files in open-source projects to exploit any latent vulnerabilities. However, we are
hopeful that, as attackers begin using metrics to discover and exploit vulnerabilities,
developers will take heed and adopt the metrics into their workflows thus rendering
the threat from attackers moot.
In addition to the aforementioned streams of research, we also envision, as a pure en-
gineering exercise, to continue building the Samaritan metrics platform to implement ad-
ditional vulnerability discovery metrics. The eventual vision for the platform is to have it
be offered as a service for projects to leverage to identify systemic problems (if any) using
metrics.
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In the sections that follow, we introduce the Samaritan metrics platform.
A.1 Metrics
We collected 18 metrics known, from existing literature, to be associated with historical
vulnerabilities. The choice of the metrics was informed by the systematic literature review
on vulnerability discovery metrics being conducted reported in Chapter 5. The metrics are
defined at various levels of granularity, such as function, file, developer, change, and commit.
While function, file, and developer levels of granularity need no further elaboration, the
commit and change levels of granularity could use elaboration to aid the comprehension of
metrics defined at these levels. A commit, in the context of a source code repository, is a
unit of change which is always associated with a developer and almost always associated
with one or more files. A metric (say, number of files changed) defined at the commit level
thus quantifies an attribute of the commit itself. A change, on the other hand, is a subunit
of a commit that refers to a specific file changed in a commit. A metric (say, number of lines
inserted and deleted) defined at the change level thus quantifies an attribute of a change
within a commit. The entity–relationship diagram shown in Figure A.1 depicts the various
entities of a software repository (i.e. function, file, developer, change, and commit) and the
relationships between them. Each entity has two sets of data associated with it: metadata
(shown in black in Figure A.1) to identify the entity and metrics (shown in color in Figure
A.1) collected from the entity. The relationships, represented by solid lines between entities,
depict the cardinality of the relationship. While some metrics (shown in blue) in Figure A.1)
are directly collected from an entity, others (shown in orange in Figure A.1) are aggregated
from related entities. In case of aggregated metrics, the directed dotted arrow show the
entity from which the metric is aggregated and the aggregation function used.
The 18 metrics available on the Samaritan metrics platform:
1. Collaboration (Centrality) - The maximum of the edge centrality of edges representing
files in a collaboration network [81]. A collaboration network is an unweighted and
undirected graph in which nodes represent developers and edges represent files. An
edge exists between two developers if they both changed at least one file.
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Figure A.1: Entity–relationship diagram depicting the various entities (function, file,
developer, change, and commit) from which metrics in the Samaritan metrics plat-
form are collected and the relationships between the various entities
2. Contribution (Centrality) - The node betweenness centrality of nodes representing files
in a contribution network [81]. A contribution network is a weighted and undirected
bipartite graph with two sets of nodes: files and developers. An edge exists between
a developer node and a file node if the developer made a change (commit) to the
file. The weight of the edge is the number of changes a single developer made to a
particular file.
3. (Cyclomatic) Complexity - The number of unique decision paths through a function
[156]. We collected this metric at the function level and aggregated it to the file level
by computing the sum of the metric.
4. Function Churn - The total number of functions inserted, deleted, and modified by a
change [115]. We collected the metric at the change level and aggregated it at the file
level by computing the sum of the metric.
5. (Known) Offender - A binary-valued metric that indicates if a file has been fixed for
a vulnerability in the past [85].
6. Line Churn - The number of lines inserted and deleted by a change [160]. We collected
this metric at the change level and aggregated it to the file level by computing the
sum of the metric.
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7. Message Tokens - The tokens in a commit message represented using a high dimension
vector [115]. A message token in is essentially a word in the commit message.
8. Nesting - The maximum nesting level of control structures in a function [156]. We col-
lected this metric at the function level and aggregated it to the file level by computing
the maximum of the metric.
9. Ownership - The proportion of commits contributed by a developer in a project ex-
pressed as a percentage of the total number of commits in the project [115].
10. Patch Token Existence - The tokens in a commit patch represented using a high
dimension vector [115]. A patch token is a essentially a word in the commit patch
with no special programming language preprocessing performed on the patch.
11. Patch Keyword Frequency - The frequency of keywords in a commit patch [115]. The
keywords are specific to a programming language. We implemented this metric for
patches in C, C++, Java, and Python.
12. Source Lines of Code - The total number of lines of source code in a file [160].
13. # Hunks - The number of hunks (a continuous block of changes to a file) in a commit
[115].
14. # Inputs - The number of inputs that a function uses [156]. We collected this metric
at the function level and aggregated it to the file level by computing the sum of the
metric.
15. # Outputs - The number of functions that a given function calls [156]. We collected
this metric at the function level and aggregated it to the file level by computing the
sum of the metric.
16. # Paths - The number of unique decision paths through a function [156]. We collected
this metric at the function level and aggregated it to the file level by computing the
sum of the metric.
17. # Past Authors - The number of distinct developers who have contributed changes to
a file in the past [115].
18. # Past Changes - The number of changes that a file has been subject to in the past
[115].
We only collected the metrics from file paths ending with the extensions .c, .cc, .cpp,
.cxx, .h, .hh, .hpp, .hxx, or .inl for C/C++ projects and .java for Java projects. While
we implemented the algorithms to collect the contribution centrality, collaboration centrality,
and function churn metrics, we used git to collect line churn, ownership, # hunks, # past
authors, and # past changes metrics, a combination of git and CountVectorizer from
scikit-learn [114] to collect message tokens, patch tokens, and patch keyword frequency
metrics, a manual approach to collect the offender metric, and SciTools Understand to collect
the remaining metrics.
The implementation of the Samaritan metric services is open source with the source
code available on GitHub at https://github.com/samaritan/services/ and Docker im-
ages available on GitHub Package Registry at https://github.com/samaritan/services/
packages. The decision to release the implementation of the metrics as containers is our con-
tribution toward alleviating a challenge for researchers to include the metrics in replication
studies and for practitioners to use the metrics in practice.
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A.2 Architecture
The 18 metrics defined in the previous section have been implemented as containerized
microservices. We chose to implement the metrics as containerized microservices to allow re-
searchers and practitioners to collect metrics from any project with minimal effort. We hope
the convenience lowers the barrier to entry to the use of metrics so much so that researchers
are encouraged to consider replicating the metrics and practitioners are encouraged to use
the metrics in practice.
Shown in Figure A.2 is the architectural layout of the Samaritan metrics platform.
Figure A.2: Architectural layout of the Samaritan metrics platform
The metric services are implemented using Nameko, a microservice framework for Python
[157]. The containers running the metric services are depicted using red rectangular blocks
and containers running the supporting services are depicted using orange rectangular blocks.
Although we ran the containers using docker swarm, we only had a single Docker machine
which acted as both the manager and the worker node. While we only show the message
queue being used for communication between Samaritan database and the swarm of ser-
vices, all communications between the services is achieved through the message queue. We
do not show the message queue for communications shown inside the manager node for sim-
plicity. The Samaritan website, accessible at https://samaritan.github.io/, is part of
the platform to disseminate the metrics to the community. We summarize the empirical
knowledge surrounding a metric in the respective metric page on the website. As we intro-
duce additional metric services to the Samaritan platform, the website will get updated to
disseminate the metrics’ knowledge to the community.
Appendix B
Parameter Tuning
In this section, we describe the methodology used to tune the parameters (i.e. personal-
ization vector, damping factor, and edge weights vector) for the risky walk metric. The
objective is to explore parameter values that, when used to compute the risky walk metric,
enables a clear delineation of functions that were fixed for a historical post-release vulner-
ability (i.e. historically vulnerable functions/files) from those that were not (i.e. neutral
functions/files). Although the label “historically vulnerable” may seem similar to the term
“vulnerable” introduced in Section 4.4.3, there is a key difference in usage. To understand
the difference, consider a sequence of chronologically ordered FFmpeg releases with version
numbers 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.1. All functions/files fixed for a vulnerability in 1.0.0
and 1.1.0 are considered historically vulnerable in 1.1.0, whereas, all functions/files fixed for
a vulnerability in 1.2.1 are considered vulnerable in 1.2.0. Furthermore, the set of vulnerable
functions/files and the set of historically vulnerable functions/files do not intersect in any
given release.
Our overall approach for parameter tuning is a brute-force exploration of parameter
values along an exponential scale. Collectively, we examined the following seven variables:
Damping factor (α), personalization of entry points (Pentry), personalization of exit
points (Pexit), weight of call edges (Wcall), weight of return edges (Wreturn), additive
weight for edges terminating at dangerous points (Awdangerous), and additive weight
for edges terminating at historically vulnerable functions/files (Awvulnerable)
For the personalization vector, the attack surface metaphor argument says that an at-
tacker is likely to start the reconnaissance for an attack at either an entry point or an exit
point (e.g. via fuzz testing techniques). We capture this behavior by having the personaliza-
tion vector contain higher probability for entry and exit points than non-entry and non-exit
points. For the non-entry and non-exit points, the personalization vector contains probability
drawn from a uniform distribution.
For the damping factor, tailoring the input to the system is the only way for an attacker
to affect the flow of control through the call graph. We could conceive situations where
explorations would end quickly or after a long time, so in our parameter tuning we considered
a wide range of values.
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For assigning weights to edges, we considered four types of edges: calls, returns, edges to
dangerous points, and edges to historically vulnerable functions/files. We assigned all call
and return edges a base weight. A function/file that makes dangerous system calls or was
historically vulnerable could be potential targets for an attacker. We capture this behavior
by increasing the weight of edges terminating at such functions/files. Weights for edges
become probabilities by summing them per node and dividing each by the total for that
node.
We defined a set of candidate values for each of the seven variables and constructed a
collection of 7-tuple permutations of the candidate values. The range of candidate values
for each of the seven variables were:(a) α from 0.1 to 0.9, (b) Pentry and Pexit from 1 to
1,000,000, (c) Wcall and Wreturn from 10 to 10,000, and (d) Awdangerous and Awvulnerable
from 10 to 1,000. While the candidate values for α were on a linear scale (with an interval of
0.1), the candidate values for the remaining variables were on an exponential scale. Although
the candidate values for the personalization variables (Pentry and Pexit) are not probabilities,
they are transformed into probabilities before being used in the algorithm.
The total number of permutations in the collection was 63,504. We used an iterative ap-
proach to evaluate each permutation to obtain a set of values for the PageRank parameters,
which when used in the computation of the risky walk metric, results in the metric being
statistically significantly associated (p-value ≤ 0.05) with historically vulnerable functions
and have the largest effect size evaluation. We used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW) test to assess the association and Cohen’s d effect size statistic [24] to
assess the effect size. The process was repeated in all 16 releases of FFmpeg and 7 releases of
Wireshark. The permutation that resulted in risky walk having the largest average value of
Cohen’s d when aggregated across releases in each subject was chosen to compose the PageR-
ank parameters. The highest ranking value of the parameters in FFmpeg and Wireshark is
presented in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Highest ranking value of the variables that compose the PageRank param-











To avoid over-fitting the parameters, we also ran a sensitivity analysis of our prediction
question (RQ2, in Section 4.5.2) by using the average of the parameter values of the top 100
highest ranking permutations ordered by the average Cohen’s d (aggregated across releases).
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The primary studies listed below compose the Quasi-Gold Standard set that was used to
validate the search string in accordance with the Quasi-Gold Standard approach prescribed
by Zhang et al. [159]. The primary studies in the Quasi-Gold Standard set were curated
based on personal experience of the authors in conducting empirical research in vulnerability
discovery metrics. The evidence of this fact is in five of the primary studies in the Quasi-Gold
Standard set being authored by at least one of the authors of this systematic review.
QGS1 Predicting Vulnerable Software Components [110]
QGS2 An Empirical Model to Predict Security Vulnerabilities Using Code Complexity
Metrics [136]
QGS3 Secure Open Source Collaboration: An Empirical Study of Linus’ Law [81].
QGS4 The Beauty and the Beast: Vulnerabilities in Red Hat’s Packages [109]
QGS5 Strengthening the Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Linus’ Law and
Software Security [82]
QGS6 Searching for a Needle in a Haystack: Predicting Security Vulnerabilities for Win-
dows Vista [160]
QGS7 Evaluating Complexity, Code Churn, and Developer Activity Metrics as Indicators
of Software Vulnerabilities [133]
QGS8 An Initial Study on the Use of Execution Complexity Metrics As Indicators of
Software Vulnerabilities [137]
QGS9 Using complexity, coupling, and cohesion metrics as early indicators of vulnerabil-
ities [22]
QGS10 Can traditional fault prediction models be used for vulnerability prediction? [138]
QGS11 When a Patch Goes Bad: Exploring the Properties of Vulnerability-Contributing
Commits [85]
QGS12 Predicting Vulnerable Software Components via Text Mining [127]
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QGS13 Predicting Vulnerable Components: Software Metrics vs Text Mining [149]
QGS14 VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist
Code Audits [115]
QGS15 To Fear or Not to Fear That is the Question: Code Characteristics of a Vulnerable
Function with an Existing Exploit [156]
QGS16 Beyond the Attack Surface: Assessing Security Risk with Random Walks on Call
Graphs [100]
QGS17 Do bugs foreshadow vulnerabilities? An in-depth study of the Chromium project
[104]
QGS18 Natural Language Insights from Code Reviews that Missed a Vulnerability [106]
Appendix D
Data Extraction Form
The form that will facilitate the extraction of data from primary studies to address the
research questions is shown in Table D.1. The design of the data extraction form was
informed by the type of data needed to address the research questions. As a result, the form
shown in Table D.1 is logically divided into sections with each section, except the first section
(labeled Miscellaneous Metadata), being labeled after the research question being addressed
using the data collected through the data extraction fields in the section. We implemented
the first two sections of the data extraction form using Airtable1 to simplify the collection
of data. We used Google Sheets to collect data for the third section since it was intuitive to
define a matrix associating primary studies with validation criterion. When collecting the
data using the Google Sheets sheet, we used “Yes” to indicate a primary study (in a row)
subjected metrics to a validation criterion (in a column), “No” otherwise.
Table D.1: Data extraction form used to collect data from primary stud-
ies in the systematic literature review of vulnerability discovery metrics
Item Data Type Description
Miscellaneous Metadata (For Each Primary Study)
Extracted By Plain Text The name of the researcher who extracted thedata.
Verified By Plain Text The name of the researcher who verified theextracted data.
Identifier Plain Text The unique identifier of the primary study fromwhich the data was extracted.
# Subjects Numeric The number of subjects of study that a metrichave been collected from.
Continued on next page
1 https://airtable.com
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Table D.1. Data extraction form used to collect data from primary studies
in the systematic literature review of vulnerability discovery metrics
(Continued)
Item Data Type Description
Subjects’ Nature Categorical The type of subject of study. Open-source andclosed-source are the two categories considered.
Subjects’
Language Categorical
The primary programming language in which the
subject of study is written in.
Response Variable Plain Text
The description of the response variable in the
study. In some vulnerability discovery studies,
number of vulnerabilities is used as the response
variable while others used vulnerableness (i.e. is a
function, file, component, or software likely to be
vulnerable). The response variable is an
important piece of information that must be
captured as part of the data extraction.
# Vulnerabilities Numeric The number of vulnerabilities that wereconsidered in the empirical analysis.
Miscellaneous Varying
Miscellaneous metadata about the primary study
such as year of publication, name of the
journal/conference/workshop in which the study
was included, and number of pages.
RQ 1 - Enumeration (For Each Metric)
Name Plain Text The name of a vulnerability discovery metric.
Definition Plain Text The definition of a vulnerability discovery metric.
Type Plain Text The data type of the vulnerability discoverymetric.
Applicability Categorical
The applicability of the metric. For instance, if
the number of late-night commits is posited to be
related to vulnerability discovery, the applicability
of the metric would be categorized as process
because the aspect of Software Engineering that
the metric applies to is Process (Version Control)
Granularity Plain Text
If applicable, the granularity at which the metric
is defined. For instance, if SLOC is posited to be
related to vulnerability discovery, was SLOC
collected at the function-level, method-level,
class-level, file-level, or component-/module-level.
Continued on next page
APPENDIX D. DATA EXTRACTION FORM 127
Table D.1. Data extraction form used to collect data from primary studies
in the systematic literature review of vulnerability discovery metrics
(Continued)
Item Data Type Description
Aggregated Boolean
In assessing the validity of a metric, was the
metric values aggregated to a higher level of
granularity than the one at which the metric was
collected? For instance, if number of lines added
and deleted (i.e. churn) in a commit is a metric
posited to be related to vulnerability discovery,
then, depending on the level of granularity of the
analysis, the metric may have been aggregated to
the file-level or component-/module-level prior to
analysis.
Aggregated From Plain Text If applicable, the granularity at which the metricwas collected.
Aggregated To Plain Text If applicable, the granularity at which the metricwas aggregated to prior to analysis.
RQ 2 - Validation (For Each Primary Study)
Validation
Criteria Categorical
The name of the validation criterion, one that is
associated with the benefit of informing decisions,
that metrics in a primary subject have been
subject to. We use the 10 atomic
decision-informing validation criteria enumerated
by Meneely et al. in their systematic review of
metric validation criteria [84]. For instance, if
SLOC was one of the metrics empirically
evaluated to be associated with historical, we say
that the authors of the primary study have
demonstrated the #5 Association validity.
Developer
Feedback Boolean
In validating the decision-informing ability of a
metric, was feedback from real developers’ sought?
Appendix E
Primary Studies
The candidate studies that satisfied the inclusion and exclusion criteria established during
the planning stage of the systematic literature review process are enumerated below. These
candidates studies are referred to as primary studies. Along with the studies in the Quasi-
Gold Standard Set, the primary studies enumerated below form the source of data used to
address the research questions.
P1 Vulnerability Discovery in Multi-Version Software Systems [54]
P2 Prioritizing Software Security Fortification Through Code-Level Metrics [37]
P3 Predicting Attack-prone Components [36]
P4 Toward Non-security Failures as a Predictor of Security Faults and Failures [38].
P5 Can Complexity, Coupling, and Cohesion Metrics Be Used as Early Indicators of
Vulnerabilities? [20]
P6 Predicting Vulnerable Software Components with Dependency Graphs [111]
P7 An Attack Surface Metric [71]





The vulnerability discovery metrics identified in the systematic literature review are enu-
merated in Table F.1. The ordering of the enumeration is based on the number of primary
studies in which the metric was considered. For instance, source lines of code metric was the
most common metric with 14 primary studies in which the metric appeared.
Table F.1: Vulnerability discovery metrics identified in the systematic
literature review
Metric (# Primary Studies)
Source Lines of Code (14) Incoming Information Flow(aka Fan In) (8) Nesting Degree (8)
Cyclomatic Complexity (7) Outgoing Information Flow(aka Fan Out) (7) Essential Complexity (6)
Strict Cyclomatic
Complexity (6) Number of Commits (5)
Number of Unique
Contributors (5)
Comment Density (4) Line Churn (4) Number of FunctionsDefined (4)
Path Count (4) Coupling between Classes(3)














Code Token Frequency (2) Component Import (2) Contribution Network FileNode Betweenness (2)
Continued on next page
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Table F.1. Vulnerability discovery metrics identified in the systematic literature review
(Continued)
Metric (# Primary Studies)
Density of Static Analysis
Warnings (2) Henry-Kafura (2)
Lack of Cohesion of
Methods (2)




Called (2) Number of Lines Added (2)
Number of Lines Deleted
(2)
Number of Lines Modified
(2) Number of New Lines (2)
Number of Preprocessor
Lines of Code (2) Relative Line Churn (2) Response Set for Class (2)









Baseline Commit (1) Blank Lines of Code (1) Block Coverage (1)
















(Developer) Degree (1) Distance to Kernel (1) Edit Frequency (1)
Exclusive Execution Time
(1) Frazier Score (1) Function Call (1)
Halstead Volume (1) Inclusive Execution Time(1) Inquisitiveness (1)
Interface Complexity (1) Interface Edges (1) Keyword Frequency (1)
Known Offender (1) Level of OrganizationalCode Ownership (1) Negativity (1)
New Effective Author (1) Non-text-based DataAccess (1) Notable Commit (1)
Number of Affected
Authors (1)
Number of Alpha Testing
Non-security Faults (1)
Number of Beta Testing
Non-security Faults (1)








Continued on next page
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Table F.1. Vulnerability discovery metrics identified in the systematic literature review
(Continued)
Metric (# Primary Studies)
Number of Data Items
Transferred (1)
Number of Database Nodes
(1)









Number of External User
Nodes (1) Number of Failures (1) Number of Features (1)


















Number of HTML Sinks
(1)
Number of Hunks (1) Number of IndirectIncoming Connections (1)
Number of Indirect
Outgoing Connections (1)
Number of Instances of
External Function Call (1)
Number of Internal
Functions Called (1)
Number of Internal Use
Non-security Faults (1)
Number of Invocations (1) Number of Member Nodes(1)
Number of Non-security
Faults (1)
Number of Numerical Data
Conversion Nodes (1)
Number of Past Changes
(1)

















Number of Security Bugs
(1) Number of SQL Sinks (1)
Number of SQLi-sanitizing
Nodes (1)
Number of Stability Bugs
(1) Number of Stars (1)
Number of Static Analysis
Warnings (1)
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Table F.1. Vulnerability discovery metrics identified in the systematic literature review
(Continued)



















Package Dependency (1) Percentage Commits (1) Percentage of Contributorsat Organization Level (1)
Percentage of Interactive
Line Churn (1) Positivity (1)
Programming Language
(1)
Proposition Density (1) Proximity to DangerousPoint (1)
Proximity to Entry Point
(1)
Proximity to Exit Point (1) Ratio of External toInternal Data Flow (1)
Ratio of Outgoing to
Incoming Data Flow (1)
Release Time Lag (1) Repeat Frequency (1) Review Message TF-IDF(1)




Non-HTML Code (1) Stability Experience (1)
Test Fail Experience (1) Text-based Data Access (1) Thirty Day Number ofAffected Authors (1)
Thirty Day Percentage of
Interactive Line Churn (1)
Tokens in Commit Message
(1)





Shown in Figure G.1 is Form C (IRB Decision Form) from the Institutional Review Board
at Rochester Institute of Technology approving our proposed protocol to provide Chromium
developers metrics-derived feedback on security.
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Figure G.1: Form C (IRB Decision Form) from the Institutional Review Board at




Shown in Table H.1 it the survey questionnaire we used to assess Chromium developers’
perception of the security feedback we provided. The survey questionnaire and the proto-
col associated with its administration, and the subsequent analyses of the responses, was
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Rochester Institute of Technol-
ogy.
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Table H.1: Survey questionnaire used to assess the Chromium developers’ perception
of the security feedback we provided
Q1 of 3. Please indicate your level of agreement on the following



















































The feedback disrupted my workflow. m m m m m
I read the feedback carefully. m m m m m
I understood the feedback that was provided. m m m m m
I discussed the feedback with my colleagues. m m m m m
The feedback was surprising to me. m m m m m
The feedback caused me to think about the
security implications of this change. m m m m m
I found the feedback to be useful. m m m m m
I would prefer the feedback provided directly
to me not in a group setting. m m m m m
Q2 of 3. How many years have you ...
... been working on the Chromium project?
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
... been working in software development?
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Q3 of 3. Is there anything you would like to tell us?
Appendix I
Sample Security Feedback
Shown in Figure I.1 is a sample security feedback that we provided to Chromium developers
in a code review identified by I0f3ee423792469a735148d9008e98341074c7d5b.
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Hello,
I ’m a PhD Student at the Rochester Institute of Technology. We are working on a machine
learning technique to discover vulnerabilities with metrics.
We believe 1 of the 5 source code files modified in
I0f3ee423792469a735148d9008e98341074c7d5b is at a higher risk of having undiscovered
vulnerabilities . The suspect file , along with evidence to support the assessment, is
enumerated below.
− chrome/browser/chrome_browser_main.cc − The file has been changed a lot (churn at the
94th percentile) by many developers who also changed many other files (contribution centrality
at the 100th percentile). The file is also hard to test exhaustively (nesting at the 96th
percentile ) .
Any questions? I’m open for discussion. For more information on the metrics used in the
assessment, please visit https://samaritan.github.io/metrics
We would really appreciate if you could spend 5 minutes of your time to fill out an
anonymous survey at https://rit.az1.qualtrics .com/jfe/form/SV_ebrp7G3vpPZ01H7?Source=
I0f3ee423792469a735148d9008e98341074c7d5b to help us improve the feedback.
Thank you,
Nuthan Munaiah
Figure I.1: Sample security feedback provided to Chromium developers in the code
review identified by I0f...d5b
Appendix J
Initiation of Dialogue with
Chromium Developers
Shown in Figure J.1 is the message posted to both chromium-dev and security-dev Google
Groups to elicit Chromium developers’ expectations from vulnerability discovery metrics.
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Hello,
My name is Nuthan Munaiah and I am a PhD Student at Rochester Institute of Technology in
Rochester, NY, USA. I am working on assessing the utility of vulnerability discovery metrics in
assisting developers engineer secure software (See Munaiah 2018 for an overview of my research
project).
Over the last few weeks, I have been using nine metrics collected from the Chromium project
to derive security feedback. I started providing the security feedback as comments on code
reviews but, after providing feedback on a few changes, my access to the code review system was
revoked, citing spamming as the reason. One of the developers suggested that I try security−
dev and/or chromium−dev Google Groups as alternative places to provide the security feedback.
However, after posting two security feedbacks on the security−dev Google Group, I was accused
(in the anonymous survey) of posting spam again. With the exception of the issue tracker, I
seem to have exhausted potential places I could provide security feedback on.
When designing the research study, I had anticipated non−response to survey as a potential
challenge . However, the overwhelming opinion that security feedback is spam has been
surprising. There is a large community of academic researchers working to assist software
engineers discover and resolve bugs ( especially vulnerabilities ) using advances in data
science and software repository mining. See Morrison et al . 2018 for a survey of research in
the realm of security metrics. I am reaching out the chromium−dev Google Group to take a
step back and address certain overarching questions to better understand and be respectful of
the Chromium development processes.
∗ What are your thoughts on the security metrics research community?
∗ Are we producing work that could be valuable to you?Do you think there is a place for
security metrics in the Chromium development life cycle?
∗ When, in the Chromium development life cycle, do you think is an appropriate opportunity
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Figure J.1: Message posted to both chromium-dev and security-dev Google Groups
to elicit Chromium developers’ expectations from vulnerability discovery metrics
